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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. MOTIVE IN SELECTION OF PROBLEM. 
,, A consideration of tradition and change in John Dewey's 
11 social philosophy is prompted by the desire to know and evalu-
1
. ate his views, having in mind, especially, their relation to 
transition and reconstruction within the Chinese Republic. 
There can be little doubt that Dewey has exerted more 
influence in China during the well-nigh thirty years since the 
revolution than any other non-Chinese person. Numerous leaders 
in the political, social and educational life of China have 
been students of Dewey; others were influenced by his lectures 
and counsel during the two years he spent in China, twenty 
years ago; and hosts of Chinese know him through his writings 
translated ~nto the Chinese language. 
This dissertation is confined to social phases of Dew-
! ey' s thought , a 11m1tation tliat seems possible even though it 
might be allowed that Ottol (said to be "one of Dewey's most 
1 mature and discr1minating admirers") 2 is not wholly incorrect 
1. Otto, Art.(l939), 42. 
2. Ibid., editorial footnote, 42. 
1 
in saying that it is tautological to combine the word it social 11 
with the word "philosophy" in speaking of John Dewey. Otto be-
lieves Dewey's philosophy is "social from center to circumfer-
ence ••••• social through and through in origin, direction, and 
consummation. n 
2. LITERATURE OF THE PROBLEM. 
Dewey has written widely over a period of almost sixty 
years, his first articles having been published in 1882. It 
requires sixty-five pages of the new Schilpp volume3 to list 
the writings of Dewey up to the fall of 1939. 
An effort has been made to read everything he has writ- I 
ten more directly pertinent to the problem. It may be seen 
that the greater part of this material was published during the 
past twenty-five years, or since the beginning of the World 
War. Ratner speaks of the years 1917-1923 as the period of the 
major part of Dewey's publicist writing. 4 In 1929 more than 
one hundred of Dewey's essays, mainly dealing with social and 
political matters, were published in two volumes under the 
title, Characters and Events. The greater number of these · es-
says first appeared in the New Republic. In the bibliography 
of this dissertation reference to those essays is made by way 
of the book, Characters and Events. Excluding this collection 
3. PJD, 611-676. 
4. Ratner, Art.(l939), 61. 
-~=-=-~r-========== 
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of essays and the Ethics, published by Dewey and Tufts in 1908 
and extensively revised in 1932, the dozen books that have 
been of the most value in · this study are as follows: 
On General Background. 
How We Think, 1910. 
Reconstruction in Philosophy, 1920. 
Human Nature and Conduct, 1922. 
Experience and Nature, 1925. 
The Quest for Certainty, 1929. 
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, 1938. 
On Social and Political Problems. 
The Public and its Problems, 1927. 
Individualism--Old and New, 1930. 
Democracy and Education, 1930. 
Philosophy and Civilization, 1931. 
Liberalism and Social Action, 1935. 
Freedom and Culture, 1939. 
The magazine most freely consulted for Dewey's writings 
has been the New Republic; however, there are scattered 
articles from numerous journals, with a larger number from the 
Journal of Philosophy and School and Society. Since the begin-
ning of the Social Frontier in 1934 Dewey has been a frequent 
contributor, and these articles :have been read. 
When one comes to consider the writings of others on 
I Dewey's social philosophy but little in the way of books is to 
-. -=1-=~~~ Perhaps the best treatment of Dewey's philosophy as 
I 
3 
a whole is Sidney Hook's new book, John Dewey: An Intellectual 
Portrait. Schneider, in reviewing it, says that it follows 
Dewey so closely that it "can scarcely be called 'external to 
t Dewey.' "5 It has been useful for biographical material and 
for Hook's interpretation of what he calls Dewey's "break with 
capitalism and acceptance of socialism."6 
Ratner's long introduction7 to Intelligence in the 
Modern World and his notes in the same on the "detailed program 
of the Plan to Outlaw War"8 proved useful. 
'lhe seventeen essays on Dewey's philosophy, "descrip-
tive and critical" 1 published in the Dewey volume of the Libra~ 
of Living Philosophers and edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, to-
gether with Dewey's response, constitute what would seem to be 
the most comprehensive and valuable airing of his philosophy 
j available. Three of these essays are mentioned in treating wor~ 
J done by previous investigators, having bearing on the problem 
of this study. 
II 
3. RELATION TO PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS. 
There seems to have been no previous study of Dewey hav-
to do with tradition and change in his social philosophy. 
However, there are articles in the Schilpp volume that touch on 
5. Schneider, Art.{l939), 695. 
6. JDIP, 227. 
7. IMY(, 3-241. 
8. IMW, 525-566; 602-604. 
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phases of the problem as dealt with in this study and three ear-
lier dissertations on Dewey are to be noted because of a simi-
lar bearing. These dissertations are as follows: 
Han Yti-shan 1 s 11 The Meaning of Experience in the Thought 
of John Dewey." Unpublished dissertation, Boston University, 
1929. 
W. T. Feldman's The Philosophy of John Dewey, 1934. 
Francis Gerald Ensley's "The Naturalistic Interpreta-
tion of Religion by John Dewey." Unpublished dissertation, 
Boston University, 1938. 
A citation to Han 1 s dissertation is made because of its 
work on 11 continui ty", with which this study deals in the chap-
ter on social process. Han9 states that when Dewey looked over 
the outline of his investigation, in a personal interview, he 
said that the "stress upon continuity was a good interpretation 
of his motive." By this he meant the bridging over of such du• 
alisms as the actual and the ideal, sensationalism and ration-
alism, science and philosophy. Han, however, believes that 
Dewey's "protest against dichotomy and bifurcation has paved 
the way for new dichotomies and bifurcations,"10 such as, 
"events and objects, existence and meaning, moral and metaphy-
sical, or natural and practical. 1111 
Feldman comes to a similar conclusion in his study of 
9. Han, Art.(l929), 44. 
10. Ibid., 145. 
11. Ibid., 148. 
--· 
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Dewey's concepts of organism, empiricism, temporalism, . Darwin-
ism, practicalism, futurism, creative intelligence and emergent 
evolution, continuity and moralism• He finds evidences of con-
flict between some of these principles, preventing Dewey from 
expressing himself unequivocally and causing him to "waver un-
ceasingly between irreconcilable theses."l2 With reference to 
~he conflict between continuity and creative novelty, Feldman 
says: 
There is not a~d cannot be, •••• at least in so far 
as Dewey's philosophy represents such an attempt, a 
consistent conjunction of the two principles of con-
tinuity and creative novelty; and the adherence to 
either compels the denial of the characteristic the-
ses of the other.l3 . 
Feldman considers the most fruitful of Dewey's .stand-
points to be his conviction that reflective experience is a 
~actor in altering the world we live in. He believes: 
The liberation thus effected in social thinking has 
been immeasurable; for if thought can modify the natur-
al growth of institutions, the task of the social phil-
osopher is not limited to a description of how society 
has developed in the past and a forecast of its proba-
ble future development, but also implies a measure ·6f 
responsibility for its evolution toward desired goals.l4 
Ensley devotes a chapter of his dissertation to the doc-
trine of progress and its significance for religion. He summa-
rizes Dewey's theory of progress thus: 
Progress is a process of perpetual growth by which 
existent situations are so transformed that increase 
of value results. Past progress has been confined to 
science, technology, but the successes of science will 
12. PJD, vii. 
13. PJD, 118. 
14. PJD, 125. 
6 
be carried over ·into all realms of human endeavor in 
the future. The end toward which this future prog-
ress in the several fields should be coordinated is 
the development of the capacity of human individuals, 
which is democracy. While he is optimistic with re-
gard to the future, Dewey acknowledges that future 
progress depends not upon God or physical nature, but 
upon human attitudes and achievement; the desire for 
p-rogress, intelligent method, communication, and ef-
fective organization.l5 
En~ley finds certain contradictions in Dewey's philoso-
phy of progress.l6 While Dewey opposes the idea of ends of 
process, he himself sets up ends; "the breach between man and 
nature which he attempted to close with his doctrine of contin-
uity is opened by his doctrine of progress"; Dewey's conviction 
of progress is not proved by him, but rather is a matter of 
faith and is under the "influence of desire", faith and desire 
being the causes of his opposition to supernaturalists; lastly, 
the element of finality which he opposes is found in his notion 
of the scientific as ultimate. 
Of the essays in the Schilpp volume the one by Randall 
on "Dewey's Interpretation of the History of Philosophy" and 
the one by Geiger on "Dewey's Social and Political Philosophy" 
are the most pertinent to this study; however, attention should 
be called to Allport's "Dewey's Individual and Social Psycholo-
gy'', and to Ratner's interpretation of Dewey in this volume as 
well as in his introduction to John Dewey's Philosophy, men-
tioned above. 
15. Ensley, Art.(l938), 188. 
16. Ibid., 192-194. 
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Randall's essay is appreciative. Lamprecht in a review 
of the Schilpp volume says Randall is 11 more royalist than the 
king."l7 Randall states that while Dewey on occasion criti-
cizes past assumptions he has often made it clear that the "v.al,.,. 
1 ue and importance of the philosophical tradition is not exhaust-
ed by the assumptions it has transmitted that need altering."l8 J 
He believes, also, that there are 
basic elements in Dewey's thought which make constant 
concern with the great intellectual traditions of our 
civilization not only compatible with his experimental-
ism, but actually an essential and integral component 
of it.l9 
If Lamprecht is right in his statement about Randall, the lat.;. 
ter' s interpretation of Dewey as a traditionalist is probably 
true to Dewey's intent. Since there are those who would not 
agree with Randall's estimate of Dewey's thought he is led to 
formulate certain of their doubts for Dewey to answer. He 
asks, in the first place, .whether we are to 
approach the past as revolutionaries who \'rould fain , 
forget as much of it as we can, and make a wholly 
fresh start? or are we to analyze and use it in the 
interests of experimental reconstruction?20 -
Then he raises the question as to the method by which the value 
of past ideas is to be judged, since 11 to cr itics he has seemed. 
to commit the genetic fallacy, and to admirers, ,to justify the 
discrediting of ideas by an account o:f their origins." He asks: 
17. Lamprecht, Art.(:l939) ,o92. 
18. Randall, Art .(l939),82. 
19. Ibid . 
20. Ibid., 99-100. 
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Is the bare discovery of the genesis of beliefs in 
some past epoch enough to dispose of them? Or is such 
a. genetic analysis only a preliminary to determining 
the condgfions to be satisfied by a genuinely function-
al test? 
Randall finds Dewey very close to Aristotle. In fact he 
thinks he could show Dewey to be more Aristotelian than Aristot-
lle himselr, 22 and wonders why Dewey should see Aristotle through 
the eyes of the Neothemists rather than see him for "what he is, 
the greatest functionalist in the philosophical tradition." 
When Dewey makes his response he expresses himself as 
grateful for Randall's interpretation and states that his chief 
problems have centered about the "reworking of traditions ••••• 
to bring them into harmony with the potentialities of present 
science and technology.n23 
Geiger, also, writes from the inner circle of those who 
interpret Dewey from long personal acquaintance. He says social 
, philosophy is "legitimately John Dewey's first and last love. • 24 1 
He dwells on the matter of liberalism and collectivism in 
Dewey's thought, showing that he considers Dewey still a liberal 5 
in contrast to Hook's interpretation noted above. Geiger is 
1 disturbed by the change of modes of thought that leads graduate 
students in philosophy today to talk about "propositional func-
tiona, and syntactics, and protocol sentences, instead of about 
21. Randall, Art.(l939), 100. 
22. Ibid., 102. 
23. Dewey, Art.{l939), 522-523. 
24. Geiger, Art.(l939)., 341. 
25. Ibid., 357. 
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human nature, social conditioning, and moral reconstruction," 
as well as by the 11 lack of enthusiasm and the actual distrust 
which greet Dewey in the field of economics and politics.n26 
What gives concern is not so much any eclipsing of Dewey whose 
"power will vary directly as the power men accord to scientific 
inquiry in solving their social problems,"27 as it is 
the distrust of critical thinking, of provisional hypo-
theses, of the specific--and perhaps piecemeal--handling 
of specific problems, of pati ence which is truly reflec-
tive and exploratory--in a w~Sd' I suppose, the distrust 
of liberalism and democracy. 
Geiger raises questions29 having to ·do with what he be-
lieves to be in the minds of critics of Dewey as present condi-
tions are faced, questions as to how the experimental method is 
to be carried out at such a time of crisis as the present when 
action of some sort seems imperative. He questions, too, the 
outlook for democracy. With reference to liberalism he asks: 
Can the gradualness and tentativeness insisted upon 
by Dewey operate during c.rises? •••• What motivation for 
action is to be found in the progrgm of liberalism, and 
how is it to operate? 
He wishes to discover whether Dewey, "as an instrumentalist, is 
prepared to accept the values of method as final,"30 while re-
cognizing that it is not "fair to Dewey, or to anyone else, to 
place his social and political philosophy against the crazy 
26. Geiger, Art.{l939), 360. 
27. Ibid., 361. 
28. Ibid., 360. 
29. Ibid., 362ff. 
30. Ibid., 367. 
10 
background of a fugitive present.u31 
In response to Geiger's questions Dewey states that 
there is something 
critical in every problematic situation •••• Crises dif-
fer of course, in the depth and range of the conflict-
ing issues involved in them. But the critical quality 
remains in spite of differences of degree. The execu-
~ of any policy for directing change to one outcome 
rather than to another is nevertheless a gradual affair; 
the more critical the amergency, the more gradual will 
be the execution of the plans and policies by which it 
is finally resolved ••••• The method of intelligent action 
has to be applied at every step of tha~ process in 
which a revolution 'runs its eourse.'3 
It is to be remembered, also, that the question is . not one o£ 
intelligence versus action, but one of 
intelligent action versus some other kind of action--
whether it relies on arbitrament by violence, or 'dia-
lectical materialistic inevitability, on dogmas o£ 33 race, blood, nationality, or supernatural guidance. 
Allport appreciates the significance of Dewey's connect-
ing psychology and democracy. "Psychology studies progressive 
mental adaptation; democracy is the means o£ achieving that 
adaptation." 34 However, he makes some criticisms as a psycho-
logist which Dewey in his reply gratefully acknowledges. 35 His 
criticisms that have the most direct bearing on tradition and 
change in Dewey's social philosophy have to do with what he 
calls an "exaggeration of change within any given individu~ 1136 
31. Loc. cit. 
32. Dewey, art.(l939), 593. 
33. Ibid., 592. 
34. Allport, Art.(l939), 290. 
35. Dewey, Art.(l939), 554-556. 
36. Allport, Art. (1939)-; 276. 
11 
II I 
and Dewey's public being "nothing but the by-product of social 
. 37 
activity between individuals" With reference to habit and 
change Allport states: · ·· . 
Dewey's stress on evolving goals and evolving mecha-
nisms takes his attention away from the s.tability of or-
ganization in the individual personality ••••• He seems 
not to have asked himself ho~8long-lived an interest may be, or how enduring a habit. 
Enlarging upon the second problem raised by Allport, the ques-
tion becomes one of reconciling 
personality as an ethical end with the inevitable in-
crease of special publics that include mere segments 
of the personality and never the whole. In advocating 
the face-to-face community Dewey is on solid enough 
ground; but such a totally inclusive community cannot 
be achieved by the multiplication of partial publics 
separated in space. More and more vigorous participa-
tion in the segmental activities of a democratic state 
will not achieve unity for the individual. The prob-
lem is a serious one an~9 it remains, in spite of Dew-ey's efforts, unsolved. 
Dewey agrees that this problem is unsolved and that as a 
practical problem he considers it "~problem of our day and 
generation," because it would point the way to a solution of the 
"present widespread reaction from atomistic 'liberal' theories t< 
totalitarianism."4° However he is not willing to admit that the 
incompatibility between individual human beings inte-
grated in themselves and a community life marked by di-
versity of voluntary groups representing different in-
terests is inherent. It is an incompatibility which is 
historic and which is always changing its constituents 
37. Allport, Art.\1939), 285. 
38. Ibid., 276. 
39. Ibid., 287. 
40. Dewey, Art.(l939), 556. 
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so that the problems it sets have forever to be solved 
anew in construction of new for.ms of social relation-
ships.41 
Ratner, in his introduction to Dewey's philosophy in In-
telligence and the Modern World, as well as in his essay in the 
Schilpp volume, indicates certain changes that have occurred in 
Dewey's thought through the years, giving what seems to him to 
· be reasons for the change in emphasis. Though there have been 
changes in emphasis the method of controlled inquiry has not 
changed. He goes on to say that because there is no valid al-
ternative possible in the way of method it "does not f'ollow that 
the body of' knowledge in Dewey's philosophy ••••• is crystallized 
and f'ixated as 'eternal and immutable.'"42 Rather is the oppo-
l s1te true, as in the case of Galil eo who 
started a revolution in method which has proved its 
singular validity, hot by immobilizing a body or 
knowledge, but by making it possible for that body 
to change and grow. The employment of' controlled in-
quiry--or the method of intelligence--in the fields 
of philosophy and the social sciences, and all human 
affairs, can prove its validity only in the same way.43 
A summary of problems considered by the above writers 
will indicate their relation to this investigation. Randall's 
work makes of Dewey a traditionalist. Is he correct in his 
viewpointf Geiger voices doubt, not his own altogether, as to 
the present effectiveness of the experimental method and liber-
alism. As will be shown in Chapter III of this dissertation 
1
41 .• Loc. cit. 
42. IMW, 241. 
43. Ibid. 
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this method and this theory are central to Dewey's social phil-
osophy. They are its presuppositions. Problems raised by the 
dissertations of Han, Feldman and Ensley, which bear on this 
study, have to do with inconsistency and contradictions discov-
ered in Dewey's writings, a "wavering between irreconcilable 
theses," as is quoted from Feldman above, 44 theses having to do 
with social process. The problems raised by Allport, having to 
do with change within a person, with individuality and the so-
l cial group, will be given attention in this study in their bear-
ings on personality and social process. Ratner indicates 
changes that have taken place in Dewey's thought~ This is a 
natural occurrence and is a fact that must be taken into con-
sideration, lest Dewey be unjustly held inconsistent. 
4. METHOD OF TREATMENT. 
This investigation of tradition and change in John Dew-
ey's social philosophy aims to be mainly expository; however, 
such criticisms will be made as are deemed necessary in the 
light of problems that must be raised. 
Problems that are central to this study are the follow-
l ing: 
What is Dewey's attitude toward tradition and change~ 
Does he conse.rve values of the past'l How does he treat social 
44. PJD, vii. 
--I-· 
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process? What are its ends? · What means does he use to attain 
I 
I 
them~ How do his theories of tradition and change, of the so-
l cial process, work out in· practice? What are their implications 
I for social and economic institutions, for political organiza-
tion, for international relations? Is Dewey's conception of 
tradition and chang~ as related to social philosophy adequate? 
In treating these problems the following method will be 
employed. A brief study of some of the influences on Dewey's 
social thinking will be made. That will be followed by a con-
sideration of presuppositions of Dewey's social philosophy. 
I Then the question of Dewey's general views on tradition and 
change will be treated, as will also their relation to the so-
cial process.• This will be followed by an application of these 
theories to various phases of social and political life and or-
ganization, both national and international. Final evaluations 
and conclusions drawn from the entire study will then be made. 
15 
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CHAPTER II 
SOME INFLUENCES ON DEWEY'S SOCIAL THINKING 
This chapter is not intended to give a biographical 
sketch of the life of Dewey. An excellent one is to be found in 
the Schilpp volume, written by his daughters and edited by one 
of them. Hook's intellectual portrait of Dewey contains bio-
graphical material, much of which is pertinent to a study of in-
fluences on Dewey's social thinking. Material for the first 
section, environmental influences, is drawn in large measure 
I from these two sources. In addition to the biography by his 
daughters, Dewey's own account of his journey "From Absolutism 
to Experimentalism," forms the chief source for the section on 
academic and personal influences. 
1. ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES. 
John Dewey was born of middle class parents1 and reared 
in a Vermont community where life was democratic, "not conscious 
ly, but in that deeper sense in which equality and absence of 
class distinction are taken for granted."2 Hook deems the great 
est influence on Dewey in his early life to have been the social 
life of this community. Here there were not to be found any 
1. Jane Dewey, Art.(l939), 3. 
2. Ibid. 
16 
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great dirrerences in wealth or standards or living and a man was 
judged by what he did, not by what he had. 3 Traces or this early 
social environment Dewey still carries with him 
not as memories but as habits, deep prererenees, and 
an ingrained democratic bias. They show themselves in 
his simplicity of manner, his basic courtesy, freedom 
rrom every variety of snobbism, and matter-of-course 
respect for the rights o~ everyone in America as a hu-
man being and a citizen. 
In his boyhood surroundings there was much "making" and 
"doing". He and his companions were in the habit of sharing in 
household activities and responsibilities. ''Young people were 
brought into intimate contact with a whole round or simple in-
dustrial and agricultural occupations." In contrast to this 
out-of-school life, school itself was a bore and students were 
interested in reading almost anything other than their school 
books. :rhe only pleasant memories were from the occasional 
teacher who "wandered a little from the prescribed curriculum."6 
Doubtless it is true that 
the realization that the most important parts of his own 
education until he entered college were obtained outside 
the school-room played a large r8le in his educational 
work, in which such importance is attached, both in 
theory and in practice, to occupational activities as 
the most effective approaches to genuine learning and 
to personal intellectual discipline. 7 
It was the Vermont environment in his first twenty years 
that "gave him that almost rustic simplicity which characterizes 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
JDIP, 5. 
JDIP 1 6. 
Jane Dewey, Art.{l939), 9. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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lhim even now- that all the world acclaims him.."8 
Dewey spent some fifteen years teaching in Universities 
of the Midwest, Minnesota, Michigan and Chicago. Here it was 
·that Dewey i s said to have experienced ''the most urgent chal-
lenges, resulting in marked changes of thought."9 Here Dewey 
found that 
problems were newer, more urgent. Changes : and -chances 
were greater; rewards for intelligent adaptation high-
er; the costs of ignorance and blundering more fateful • 
••••• Tomorrow took shape as a consequence of what was 
done or left undone today.lO 
While at Chicago University a laboratory school was set 
up by the Deweys and other parents, "interested in procuring for 
their children a different kind of education from any available 
I in Chicago. ttll It was generally known as the "Dewey School." 
i While circumstances made it impossible to continue this school 
many yearsl2 it had performed a distinct service for education 
in this and other lands. In remote Chengtu, West China, for ex-
ample, there is a "Dewey School" where much of the true Dewey 
spirit is found in an indomitable principal ever seeking new 
ways of building his portion of the ,.Great Community." 
Mention should be made of the influence of Hull House on 
Dewey while he was in Chicago. T.he Deweys visited Hull House 
8. Durant, SPH, 566. 
9. Hook, JDIP, 6. 
10. Ibid., 7. 
11. Jane Dewey, Art.(l939), 27. 
12. Ibid., 33-34. 
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were released with a formal apology from the Cabinet, the Chi-
nese delegation in Paris was instructed not to sign the treaty 
and two members of the Cabinet who had cooperated most actively J 
with Japan were compelled to resign. 27 The Deweys were in close 
touch with these forces because the "leadership of the movement 
to modernize China, by ridding it of Japanese control and turn-
ing the nominal republic into genuine democratic channels, lay 
l in educational circles. "28 
Before leaving China Dewey wrote of three stages others 
have noted in the Student Movement: the stage of optimism and 
belief in wholesale change, a later stage of disillusionment andJ 
I' pessimism, and the third stage when "Young China ••••• settled 
I 
down to constructive efforts along lines of education, industry 
and social reorganization. 1129 
I 
II 
I 
One who has been in close touch with China during the 
past twenty years realizes something of ~he impress· made by Dew- ~ 
ey in the most formative period of her history. His daughter ' 
writes thus of the effects of this visit upon her father: 
Whatever the influence of Dewey upon China, his 
stay there had a deep and enduring influence upon 
him. He left feeling affection and admiration not 
only for the -scholars with whom he had been intimate-
ly associated but for the Chinese people as a whole. 
China remains the country nearest his heart after his 
own. The change i'rom the United States to an envir-
onment of the oldest culture in the world struggling 
to adjust itself to new condi tiona was _so great as to 
I 27. EB, v, 544. 
I 28. Jane Dewey, Art.(l939), 41. 
29. CAE, 253. 
act as a rebirth of intellectual enthusiasms. It 
provided a living proof of the value of social edu-
cation as a means of progress.30 
Dewey went to Turkey in 1924 when Mustapha Kemal Pasha, 
the president of the new republic, had just had three laws 
passed at one sitting, expelling the Ottoman dynas~, abolishing 
the Caliphate and placing all of the educational and scientific 
institutions under the commissariat of Public Instruction. 31 
Dewey was deeply impressed at sight of Angora, the new capital, 
and felt that the will to build a new center of government "far 
away from the memories and traditions of Constantinople" was 
"an heroic venture, symbolizing faith in the possibilities of 
the Asiatic peasant.u32 
Dewey was greatly opposed to foreign intervention in 
, 
Turkish politics and he wrote that any change in the regime that 
I came not as a natural evolution would be calamitous, for it 
"would signify an arrest of a movement which is in the direction 
of progress and light."33 
'lhe trip Dewey made to Mexico was in 1926, the year when 
the conflict between Church and State became acute. Early in tha 
year the Calles Government began to enforce a provision in the 
Constitution of 1917 for the confiscation by the government of 
1 
churches, schools and hospitals in the possession of religious 
I 
30. Jane Dewey, Art.(l939), 42. 
31. EB, XXII, 616. 
32. CAE, 334. 
33. Cilli, 329. 
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bodies. 34 "The schools were closed; the priests refused to per-
form their functions; many were arrested and others left the 
country. "35 
Hearty accord was felt by Dewey with the Mexican Govern-
ment's determination to provide rural schools for the neglected 
and despised native Indians, comprising36 eighty per cent of the 
population of Mexico. He wrote of this work among Mexican Indi-
ans: 37 
This is the cherished preoccupation of the present 
regime; it signifies a revolution rather than a renais-
sance. It is not only a revolution for Mexico, but in · 
some respects one of the most important social experi-
ments undertaken anywhere in the world. 
1 Dewey had scant sympathy with business interests that 
I would take a hand in Mexican a.f'fairs. He felt that "from the 
I I standpoint of business in the long run as well as from that of 
human development, vested legalities are secondary to the crea-
tion of an integrated people.u38 
In 1928, when Dewey visited Russia, foreign feeling a-
gainst the Soviet Government was running high, due largely to 
Soviet activities in China in 1927 and to the Intra-Party con-
troversy between Stalin and Trotsky which resulted in the expul-
sion of Trotsky and other Opposition leaders in December of 
1927. 39 Dewey made no effort to investigate economic and 
34. EA, XVIII, 796. 
I 35. Ibid. 
36. ISR, 154. 
I 
37. Ibid. 
38. CAE, 371. 
39. EB, XIX, 742-743. 
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political problems in Russia, because his time was short and his 
particular interest was in educational experiments; however, the 
latter were so interwoven with the for.mer that he could but 
reach certain conclusions of a political nature. 40 
~nen he left Leningrad, Dewey felt that the Revolution 
was a great success, 41 while "Communism was a frost.'' His Mos-
cow experience, too, convinced him that there is little actual 
. . 42 
Communism in Russia. Dewey thought that 
the more successful are the efforts to create a new 
mentality and a new morality of a cooperative social 
type, the more dubious is the nature of. the goal that 
will be attained ••••• This new attitude of mind ••••• 
will create its own future society accordlng to its 
own desires and purposes. This future society will 
undoubtedly be highly unlike the r~gime characteris-
tic of the western world of private capital and indi-
vidual profit. But I think the chances are that it 
will be equally unlike the society which orthodox 
Marxian formulae call for. 
Hook sums up environmental influences on Dewey in a sen-
tence in saying that whether at home or abroad he "has remained 
the plain man from Verrnont, the Midwestern democrat, and the 
subtle cosmopolitan with an enlightened world v1ew. 1143 
1 2. ACADEMIC AND PERSONAL INFLUENCES. 
II 
In one connection Dewey states that on the whole he has 
been more influenced by persons and situations than by b~oks, 
40. Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 42-43. 
41. ISR, 56-58. 
42. Ibid. 
43. JDIP, 9. 
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I 
not that I have not, I hope, learned a great deal 
from philosophical writings, but that what I have 
learned from them has been technical in comparisqn 
with what I have been forced to think upon and about 
because of some experience in which I found myself 
entangled.44 
It would be difficult to attempt a list of people who 
have influenced Dewey--teachers and colleagues, as well as peo-
ple from the wider field of life. It seems advisable to limit 
citations to a very few, and that mostly contacts through writ-
ings • . 
While an undergraduate .Dewey had a course in physiology 
in which the text used. was written by T. H. Huxley. As Dewey 
read this book he was impressed by the "unity of the living 
creature" and in him there was aroused "that intellectual cur-
iosity for a wide outlook on things which interests a youth in 
I 
I philosophic study. "45 He believes that subconsciously he was 
led to desire a world and a life that would have 
the same properties as had the human organism in 
the pictur~ of it derived from study of Huxley's 
treatment. 6 
While a student his attention was drawn to Comte and he 
made a study of Harriet Martineau's exposition of his philoso-
phy. He was not particularly interested in Comte's idea of the 
stages of the evolution of society nor his construction of a 
new religion, but a permanent influence in his thought came 
44. Dewey, Art. (1930}, 22. 
45. Jane Dewey, Art.(l939), 10. 
46. Dewey, Art.,l930), 13. 
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from 
what was said about the disorganization of existing 
social life and the necessity of finding a social fUnc-
tion for science, ••••• although in ·his own philosophy em-
phasis is placed upon the method of s~7ence rather than 
upon organization of its conclusions. 
Dewey was led to take up philosophy as a professional ca 
reer through encouragement given him by w. T. Harris, 48 the edi-
1 tor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, to whom he had 
sent articles for publication. Harris was an Hegelian, . as was 
Professor Morris of the University of Michigan. The latter was 
!especially influential in interesting Dewey in .Hegel. Hegel's 
thought 
suppli ed a demand for unification that was doubtless an 
intense emotional craving, and yet was a hunger that 
only an intellectualized subject-matter could satisfy 
••••• the sense of divisions by way of isolation of self 
from the world, of soul from body, of nature from God, 
brought about a painful oppression--or, rather, they 
were an inward laceration ••••• Hegel's synthesis of sub-
ject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the 
human, was ••••• an immense release, a liberation. Hegel's 
treatment of human culture, of institutions and the arts, 
involved the same dissolution of hard-and- ft6t dividing 
walls, and had a special attraction for me. 
Dewey states that he had never known a man more "single-
hearted and whole-souled"50 th~ Morris. He is "happy to believ 
that the influence of the spirit of his teaching has been an en-
51 during inf'luence," although he has long since deviated from 
l, ----------
1
47. Jane Dewey, .Art. ( 1939), 12. 
48. ~bid., 14. Cf. Kilpatrick, Art.(l939), 454. 
149. Dewey, Art.(l930), 19. 
50. Ibid., 18. 
51. Ibid. 
!Morris's philosophic faith. There are those who see a good deal 
of Hegel even in Dewey's later writings and he, himself, does 
not deny that acquaintance with Hegel has left a "permanent de-
posit" in his thinking. 52 
It is said that the extent of Mead's influence, largely 
the product of conversations through years of the closest friend 
ship, has been underestimated. 53 Mead published very ·little \ 
during his life time, but since his death ~tudents and colleagues 
have put out four volumes, based on manuscripts and lecture 
notes taken by students. One of his graduate students said that 
"for many years articles and even books would continue to be 
published of which the first author was George Mead."54 From 
Mead Dewey got psychological ideas, among them the idea of the 
"organism acting and reacting in an environment," and certain 
theories of the "origin and nature of selves."55 
James's chief influence on Dewey came not from his Prag-
matism, "which appeared after Dewey's theory had been formed, n56 
but from his Principles of Psychology, especially from the chap• 
1 ters "dealing with conception, discrimination and comparison, 
· i u57 and reason ng. Dewey states that this book gave new direc-
tion and quality to his thinking, that it "acted as a ferment 
52. Loc. cit., 21. 
53. Jane Dewey, Art.(l939}, 25. 
54. Ibid., 25-26. 
55. Ibid. 
56. Ibid., 23. 
57. Ibid. 
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to transform old beliefs. 1158 It was from the "objective biolog-
ical approach" of James's psychology that there came to Dewey 
the "perception of the importance of distinctive social cate-
gories, especially connnunication and participation.n59 It became 
Dewey's conviction 
that a great deal of our philosophizing needs to be done 
over again from this point of view, and that there will 
ultimately result an integrated synthesis in a philoso-
phy congruous with modern science and related to actu-
al needs in education, morals, and religion ••••• if I 
read the cultural signs of the times aright, the next 
synthetic movement in philosophy will emerge when the 
significance of the social sciences and arts has become 
an object of reflective attention in the same way that 
mathematical and physical sciences have been made the 
objects of thought in the past, and when their full im-
port is grasped.60 
How is Dewey's philosophy to be characterized? What 
name should be applied to it? Ratner states that Dewey used 
both experimentalis~ and instrumentalism to designate it. 61 The 
latter term was the first to be used and "though it has never 
been discarded or disavowed," it has been allowed to recede in-
to a secondary place. 62 And, that, says Ratner 
1 58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 162. 163. 
is where it rightfully or logically belongs b.ecause the 
basis of Dewey's constructive philosophy is his analy-
sis and evaluation of experiment. llie primary designa- _ 
tion of Dewey's whole philosophy is experimentalism be-
cause its foundation is his philosophy of the experiment. 63 
Dewey, Art.(l930), 
Ibid. 
Ibid., 25-26. 
IMW, 58. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
24. 
Childs, too, designates Dewey's philosophy as experimental, ex-
perimental naturalism. 64 Ayres65 in reviewing Human Nature and 
Conduct which he considered Dewey's "most readable and quotable 
book" noted that the word pragmatism occurs only in the index 
and instrumentalism not at all. Reading more recent books by 
Dewey, or glancing through the index of the same, shows this 
tendency to speak of his philosophy as experimentalism rather 
than instrumentalism. 
In recording his journey from absolutism to experimen-
talism, Dewey states that since he moved away from idealism he 
I has been too much in process o~ change to record just what he 
j is. He feels himself unstable, "chameleon-like," yielding to 
II diverse an~ even incompatible influences, 
struggling to assimilate something from each and yet 
striving to carry it forward in a way that is logic-
ally consisteg~ with what has been learned from its 
predecessors. . 
Dewey is not disturbed by the lack of certainty as to what he 
is philosophically. He is still experimenting and believes: 
Forty years spent in wandering in a wilderness like 
the present is not a sad fate--unless one attempts to 
make himself belie~~ that the wilderness is after all 
the promi sed land. 
64. Childs, Art.(l939), 422. 
65. Ayres, Art.(l922), 475. 
I, 
66. Dewey, Art.(l930), 22. 
67. Ibid., 26-27. 
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CHAPTER III 
PRESUPPOSITIONS OF HIS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 
I 
As has been shown in the previous chapter, Dewey's phil- ~ 
osophy is experimental. This may be said to be the chief pre-
supposition of his social philosophy. However, with it should 
be linked the theory of liberalism. In Chapter I it was stated 
that the experimental method and the theory of liberalism are 
presuppositions of Dewey's social philosophy. It is the purpose 
of this chapter to analyze these presuppositions and their im-
plications for tradition and change. 
1. EXPERIMENTAL INQUIRY. 
It may be said that Dewey's philosophy "begins and ends 
in logical theory as the method of inguirz~ "1 No matter what 
the fie~d being explored by Dewey it proves to be but a varia-
tion of subject matter upon the "central theme of inquirv." This 
is uthe locus within which, or the supreme principle by which, 
conceptions of philosophy that are really significant can be 
understood." 2 
In its· widest sense experimental inquiry "signifies 
1. Piatt, Art.(l939)t 109. 
2. Stuart, Art.(l939J, 295. 
31 
opposition to fixed ends, system-making, and changelessness; it 
' signifies a refusal to divorce thought from action."3 That is, 
I negatively, inquiry may be said to be opposed to absolutism, 
I while, po si ti vely, 1 t is a method of obtaining knowledge. 
j "Any philosophy," says Dewey, "which is not consistently 
1 experimental will always traf'fic in absolutes no matter in how 
disguised a .form, "4 it will have a "ready-made answer for prob-
5 lems that present themselves." InDewey's most recent book, 
Freedom and Culture, he repeatedly emphasizes the harm that has 
! come to society from two generalization of diverse nature taken 
I to be absolute, Marxism and laissez-faire. Marxism contains a 
I 
j supposition that 
a generalization that was made at a particular date and 
plaee ••••• can obviate the need for continued resort to 
observation, and to continued revision of generaliza-
tions in their office of working hypotheses. In the 
name of science, a thoroughly anti-scientific procedure 
was formulated in accord with which a generalization is 
made having the nature of ultimate 'truth,' and hence 
holding good at all times and places. Laissez-faire in-
dividualism indulged in the s~e sweeping generalization 
but in the opposite direction. 
II Since the world is one of constant change, knowledge can 
II never be "eternal, absolute and certain. "7 It should be the 
consequence of experimental inquiry, in which there is "overt 
3. Geiger, Art.(l939), 342. 1 4. GPP, 89. Cf. Dewey, Art.(l935) , 229. 
5. FAC, 100. 
6. FAC, 87. 
7. Ratner, IMW, 21. 
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doing ••••• directed by ideas which have to meet the conditions 
set by the need of the problem inducing the active inquiry."8 
When Dewey says that thinking and beliefs should be experiment-
al, not absolutistic, he has in mind a logic that involves the 
following factors: 
First, that those concepts, general principles, the-
ories and dialectical developments which are indispensa-
ble to any systematic knowledge be shaped and tested by 
tools of inquiry. Secondly, that policies and propos-
als for social action be treated as working hypotheses, 
not as programs to be rigidly adhered to and executed. 
They will be experimental in the sense that they will 
be entertained subject to constant and well-equipped 
observation of the consequences they entail when acted 
upon, and subject to ready and slexible revision in the 
light of observed consequences. 
A study of experimental inquiry involves a consideration 
of (1) the matrix of inquiry, and (2) the structure of inquiry. 
For Dewey inquiry is naturalistic. 10 It postulates the 
"continuity of the human, the organic, and the physical. 1111 
Since the matrix of inquiry is biological as well as cultural, 
the process of inquiry "reflects and embodies the experiential 
continuum which is established by both biological and cultural 
conditions. 1112 
Biological factors of inquiry are those that have to do 
with such organs as eyes and ears, hands and brains. ' While "bi-
ological operations and structures are not sufficient conditions 
a. QC, 86-87. 
9. PP, 202-203. 
10. LOG, 23. 
11. Childs, Art.(l939), 422. 
12. LOG, 246. 
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of inquiry, they are necessary conditions. 1113 There is a natur-
al world existing independently of the organism, but "this world 
is environment only as it enters directly and indirectly into 
life-functions."14 
Organic learning develops into habits; however, in a 
higher organism these habits of behavior do not become complete-
ly rigid. There is retained a "certain amount of flexible capa-
city to undergo further modifications as the organism meets new 
environing conditions.ul5 
Dewey makes clear the importance he attaches to man's 
being within nature when he says: --
A naturalism which perceives that man with his hab-
its, institutions, desires, thoughts, aspirations, 
ideals and struggles, is within nature, an integral 
part of it, has the philosophical foundation and the 
practical inspiration for effort to employ nature as 
an .ally of human ideals and goods such as no dualism 
can possibly provide.l6 
However, what man does and how he acts is "determined 
not by organic structure and physical heredity alone but by the 
influence of cultural heredi ty1117 as well. A great difference 
separates the "activities and achievements of human beings from 
those of other biological forms." 18 It is believed that the de-
velopment of language is largely, if not entirely, responsible 
13. LOG, 23. 
14. LOG, 33. 
15. LOG, 32. 
16. ION, 153. Cf. EN, 435. 
17. LOG, 43. Of. LOG, 487. 
18. Ibid. 
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for this difference.l9 This has made possible the transfer of 
customs, beliefs and institutions of a cultural environment. 20 
While "organic biological activities end in overt actions, whose 
consequences are irretrievable," the existence of language sym-
bols makes possible "deliberate recollection and expectation, 
and thereby the institution of new combinations of selected ele-
ments of experiences having an intellectual dimension." 21 
"A thorough-going naturalistic point of view," says 
Childs, "fs wholly compatible with high regard for the distinc-
tively human, or social."22 It tends to regard the social as a 
"bridge from behavior that is organic to behavior that is dis-
tinctively human. 1123 Social factors in human environment "over 
and above natural factors" form an ideal element. As 
this ideal element is progressively included the needs 
which are fulfilled, the ends which are attained are no 
longer of a merely biological or particular character, 
but include also the ends and activities of other mem-
bers of society.24 
While Dewey is a naturalist he is impatient with a psy-
chology that is exclusively concerned with "actions and reaction 
of human beings with their physical surroundings to the neglect I I 
of interpersonal relationships." 25 In replying to Santayana's 
criticism of his naturalism as "half-hearted," Dewey e.xplains 
19. LOG, 44. 'Of. IMW, 825. 
20. LOG, 45ft'. 
21. LOG, 57. 
22. Childs, Art.(l939), 435. 
23. Ibid. 
24. PHC, 32. 
25. IMW, 825. 
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how he has tried to bring together mind and matter, kept worlds 
apart by Santayana. 26 He grants the attempt is unusual and that 
his may end in failure but he believes others will make the tri-
al and with increasing success. Whitehead's dipolarity of an 
actual entity, having its "physical and mental poles, n27 repre-
sents a similar attempt to do away with the bifurcation of mind 
and matter. 
Four factors 1 at least, enter into a consideration of 
the structure of inquiry: (1) The antecedent situation, 
(2) Facts and ideas, (3) Hypotheses and inferences, and (4) An 
evaluation of the outcome. 
Inquir7 arises because of an indeterminate situation, a 
situation that is 11uncertain, unsettled, disturbed."28 ~re 
are people to whom problems never seem to occur. For them a 
situation is never problematic and they do not engage in inquiry 
Hume speaks of security as the "bane of inquiry." 29 
Possible solutions of problems come to one in the for.m 
of ideas. But the ideal factor is not sufficient. With it must 
be coupled facts that bear on a situation. There are operations 
of two kinds in inquiry, operations in "functional correspond-
ence with each other," one dealing with conceptual 
ter, the other being an activity of observation. 30 
26. Dewey, Art.(l927), 62. 
27. PR, 366; AI, 238-239. 
28. LOG, 105. Cf. 107. 
29. EHU, 24. 
30. LOG, 11.'7. 
subject-mat- I 
Sensible and\ 
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I 
rational factors cooperate to make knowledge possible. 31 The 
importance of the sensible factor is emphasized when Dewey 
states that "Being and having things in ways other than knowing 
them ••••• exist, and are preconditions of reflection and know~ 
ledge."32 The importance of the rational factor is indicated 
when he says that without a "guiding idea, facts would be heaped 
up like grains of sand; they would not be organized .into intel-
lectual unity."33 
Too often has social philosophy, thinks Dewey, tried to 
solve problems by "showing the relationship of ideas, instead of 
helping men solve problems in the concrete by supplying them hy-
potheses to be used and tested in projects of reform. 1134 Social 
difficulties cannot be settled abstractly. 
We need guidance in dealing with particular perplex-
ities in domestic life, and are met by dissertations on 
the Family or by assertions of the sacredness of indivi-
dual Personality. We want to know about the worth of 
the institution of private property as it operates under 
given conditions of definite time and place. We meet the 
reply of Proudhon that property generally is theft, or 
with that of Hegel that the realization of will is the 
end of all institutions.35 
Idealistic philosophies have rightly attached importance 
and power to ideas, but usually have isolated them from the 
. . 
function and test of action, forgetting that 
I 31. QC, 171. 
I
I 32. EN, 18. Cf. HWT, 104-105. 
33. HWT, 133. 
I 34. RPH, 192. 
I 35. RPH, 189. cr. ETH, 358-359. 
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to seek after id~as and to cling to them as means of 
conducting operations, as factors .in practical arts, is 
to participate in creating a world in which the springs 
of thinking will be clear and over-flowing.36 
Ideas serve as hypotheses. Such hypotheses have a direc 
tive function in the control of observation and the practical 
transformation of antecedent phenomena. They should be "tested 
/ and continually revised on the ground of the consequences they 
I produce in existential application. 1137 As will be brought out 
I in more detail in a later chapter inquiry is a continuing pro-
cess. Settling a particular situation by a particular inqui~ 
, is not a guarantee that the matter will always remain settled.38 
I 
I 
1 To avoid the tendency toward fixation and inertia there must be 
I I recognition that in any inquiry the facts have a "provisional 
I 
I 
I 
. I 
and conditional nature" and conceptions and theories employed 
are hypothetical.39 
It would seem that an experimental philosophy of life 
really is a 11 hit-and-miss 11 philosophy and Dewey says it is im-
possible to disguise the fact, that 
it means missing rather than hitting, if the aiming is 
done in a happy-go-lucky way instead of bringing to bear 
all the resources of inquiry upon locating the target, 
constructing propulsive machinery and figuring out the · 
curve of trajectory. That this work is, after all, but 
hypothetical and tentative till it issue from thought 
into action does not mean that it might as well be ran-
dom guesswork; it means that we can do still better 
next time if we are sufficiently attentive to the 
1 ------~------------
l 
I 
I 
I 136. 
I 37 • 
I 38. 
39. 
QC, · 139. 
LOG; 506. 
LOG:, 8. 
LOG, 40. 
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causes of success and failure this time.40 
Dewey does not always state clearly his criterion for 
evaluating the outcome of inquiry. Outcomes may be numerous, 
and how is the result required to be known? He states: . · 
Inquiry into social phenomena involves judgments 
of evaluation for they can be understood only in terms 
of eventuations to which they are capable of moving. 
Hence, there are as many possible interpretations in 
the abstract as there are possible kind of consequences.41 
Conceptions and ideas are said to be sound if the operations 
they direct give us the "results which are required. 1142 
Murphy considers it important to distinguish between the 
"goodness of knowing for its own primary objective as knowing 
and its goodness as a means to other ends. 1143 He believes that 
earnest men in a hurry are. likely to be impatient of 
inquiries whose relevance to their own socially recon-
structive aims is not apparent. If they are . encouraged 
to confuse the practical value of such inquiries for 
the ends which they take to be of primary ·importance, 
with their cognitive validity, they will inevitably 
judge them unfairly and make utility for the further-
ance of their preferred interests the fa;nal measure of 
what is actually true about the world.4 
Dewey gives grounds for such a criticism; however, ·at 
times he offers a test of outcome that is more one of coherence 
than pragmatism, as when he says that the "ultimate end and test 
of all inquiry is the transformation of a problematic situation 
••••• into a unii'ied one,"45 and recognizes the danger that pains 
40. GPP, 128-129. 
41. LOG, 502. Cf. EEL, 31. 
42 • . QC, 137. 
43. Murphy, Art.(l939), 214. 
44. Ibid., 2~5. 
45. LOG, 491. 
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will not be taken to scrutinize the results of inquiry to "as-
certain whether the existential conditions actually cohere in a 
unified way. u4S 
The above consideration of the method of inquiry yields 
two points of importance to the further study of the problem of 
this dissertation--the provisional nature of results and the 
large place that must be assigned to reflection, thought and in-
telligence. 
Dewey rightly observes that mankind does not find it 
easy to hold beliefs in suspense for further evidence, nor to 
"go where evidence points instead of putting first a personally 
preferred conclusion," nor to use ideas as hypotheses to be 
tested instead of "dogmas to be asserted." 47 These elements of I 
inquiry are contrary to strong human impulses; they go "contrary 
to the grain." 48 However, they are necessary to the scientific 
attitude that experimental inquiry requires. 
Bryce expressed the fact that all conclusions must be 
subject to revision in the process of social reconstruction, be- , 
cause the 
materials are always growing. Every generalization 
now made is only provisional, and will have to be some 
day qualified; every book that is written will before 
long be out of date, except as a record of what were 
deemed to be salient phenomena at the time when i't was 
written. Each of us who writes describes the progress 
mankind was making with its experiments as he saw them; 
46. LOG, 131. 
47. FAC, 145. 
48. FAC, 145. 
40 
each hands on the torch to his successor, and the suc-
cession is infinite, for the experiments are never end-
ed.49 
There are many to whom the idea of using experimental 
methods in social affairs, in the "matters deemed of.' most endur-
ing and ultimate worth," says Dewey, seems a "surrender of all 
standards and regulative authority." However, in principle 
there is nothing random nor aimless about experimental method 
because it "implies direction by ideas and knowledge. 1150 
While the factor of thought has been considered in the 
preceding discussion it has not been given the emphasis really 
due it in Dewey's mind, despite his naturalism. Ayres finds it 
remarkable that a. man who is as critical of Kant as is Dewey 
should express the belief he does in the efticacy of thought. 
He says that in magazine articles Dewey's . 11 enthusiasm for in-
telligence approximates that of the revivalist. 1151 
Dewey distinguishes intelligence from reason, and says 
that experimental inquiry . exchanges reason for intelligence. He 
thinks of reason as theoretical, marked by 11necessi ty, univer-
sal! ty, superior! ty to change'', while intelligence he associ-
ates with the practical, with ,judgments, with the "selection 
and arrangement of means to effect consequences and with choice 
of what we take as our ends."52 To thought, as such intelli-
49. MD, I, x. 
50. QC, 273. 
51. Ayres, Art.(l922), 473. 
52. QC, 212-213. Cf. EN, 378. 
ii 
gence, he gives a high position, 53 on a par with scientific 
method. 54 Dewey says he identifies the supremacy of method with 
the assertion that intelligent action is man's ultimate recourse 
in every phase of life. 55 Hence intelligence in operation, 
which is "another name for method, becomes the thing most worth 
winning. "56 'lhis leads him to say that "the perfecting of 
method, the perfecting of intelligence, is the thing of supreme 
value. 1157 
2. LIBERALISM. 
Dewey, in writing of Justice Holmes as a liberal, says 
that liberalism "signifies the adoption of the scientific habit 
of mind in application to social affairs."58 fuis shows the 
close connection in his thought between the two elements select-
ed as presuppositions of his social thinking--experimental meth-
Od and liberalism. 
Dewey believes that the use of the word "liberalism" to 
denote a particular social philosophy did not appear earlier 
than one hundred years ago, 59 although the idea to which the 
word is applied goes back to Locke and even back to Greek 
thought as expressed in the "funeral oration attributed to 
53. PHC, 33. 
54. CAE, 774. 
55. Dewey, Art.(l939), 583. 
56. QC, 204. 
57. QC, 200. 
58. CAE, 101. Cf. Dewey, Art.(l939)1, 228. 
59. LSA, 3. 
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Pericles." The word liberalism came into use to denote a spirit 
that spread with the rise or democracy. This spirit was 
liberal in Qoth senses of the word. It was marked 
by a generous attitude, by sympathy for the underdog, 
for those who were not given a chance. It was part 
of a widespread rise of humanitarian philanthropy. 
It was also liberal in that it aimed at enlarging 
the scope or free action on the part of those who for 
ages had had no part in public arrairs and gs lot in 
the benefits secured by this participation. 
In articles that Dewey and Hocking wrote in 1935 for the 
Journal of Philosophy on "The Future of Liberalism," Hocking 
distinguishes the liberal spirit from liberalism. The latter, 
to him, signifies a "special historic pattern of political and 
,, economic ideas," and that he sees as gone. However, the former, 
' he believes, will never die for it belongs to human nature. 61 
Liberalism was doomed because it showed itself "incapable of 
achieving social unity."62 Dew·ey 1 s idea is similar but he -ex-
II 
! 
presses it differently. He would not say that liberalism is a 
thing or tpe past. Its ends are still the same, but the means 
of attaining them "demand a radical change in economic institu-
tions and the political arrangements based upon them.n63 
The values for which earlier liberalism stood are endur-
ing, Dewey believes. He enumerates these values as: liberty, 
individuality and intelligence. 64 Hocking seem to call these 
1
60. Dewey, Art. (1935) 3 ~ 74. 
61. Hocking, Art.(l939J, 230 
62. Ibid., 231. 
63. Dewey, Art.(l935) 3 , 75. 
64. LSA, 32. 
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marks of the liberal spirit which never dies. Liberalism, says 
Dewey, should state these values in ways "relevant to present 
needs and forces.tt65 
"Grateful recognition is due early liberals for their 
valiant battle in behalf of freedom of thought, conscience, ex-
pression and co:mmunication."66 In the past the cause of liber-
l ty was identified with efforts at change of laws and institu- j 
tions but today "a certain group is using all its vast resources ! 
to convince the public that change in economic institutions is 
an attack upon liberty."67 Liberty is a social question rather 
than an individual one. An individual, group or class has no 
I liberty or effective power, "except in relation to the liber-
1 ties, the effective powers, of other individuals, groups, and 
I classes. "68 Dewey would 
let those who are struggling to replace the present 
economic system by a cooperative one ••••• remember tl:).at 
in struggling for a new system of social restraint and 
controls they are also struggling for a more equal and 
equitable balance of powers that will enhance and mul-
tiply the effective liberties of the mass of individu-
als.69 
Dewey believes it is clear that the eclipse of democrat-
! ic institutions is the product of that kind of liberty which has 
upheld the "maximum economic liberty of the individual. 1170 
1___.;.,__--
1
65. LSA:, 47. 
66. LSA, 42. · 
I 67. Dewey, Art.(l935)2, 41. 
68. Ibid. 
69. Ibid. · 
70. Dewey, Art.(l936)1, 105. 
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Liberty of the individual, including civil liberties, can be se-
·cured only through "social control, especially of economic 
forces.n 7l 
Concern for the importance of the individual gpes back 
to Dewey's earliest recorded thought. In his Ethics of Democra-
£11_ of 1888 we read that the organic theory of society "can have 
but one result, that of the sovereignty of the citizen,n72 and 
that "democracy means that personality is the first and final 
. 73 
reality,'' the "one thing of permanent and abiding w6rth. 1174 
Dewey says very little about personality since he became an ex-
perimental naturalist; however, he believes his present theories 
I 
"bring into prominence the importance of the individual." It is 
he 
who is the carrier of creative thought, the author of 
action, and of its application ••••• The individual mind 
is important because only the individual mind is the 
organ of modifications in traditions ~d institutions, 
the vehicle of experimental creation. 
However, the 'self' is not "an original separate entity set over 
against objects and the world."76 "Individuality in a social 
i I and moral sense is something to be wrought out. n77 This means 
I that "every genuine,' act of inquiry" involves "the formation of 
1 
a self new in some respect or degree."78 
I 
I. 
71. Dewey, Art.(l936)2, 138. 
72. ED, 13. 
73. ED, 22. 
74. ED, 23. 
75. LSA, 33-34. Cf. Ratner, IMW, 25. 
76. Dewey, Art.(l939), 586. 
77. RPH, 194. 
78. Dewey, Art.(l939), 587. 
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The importance of intelligence as a factor in liberalism 
is shown in quotations from Hocking and Brightman, as well as 
Dewey. Hocking sees in the liberty to generate ideas and work 
them into the social order the "soul of the old Liberalism," an 
immortal sou1. 80 Brightman expresses a similar idea in stating 
that "He who says liberalism is dead mes.hs that intelligence is 
d.ead."81 He sees the appeal to reason as the essence of lib-
~ralism.82 
Dewey holds the crisis in liberalism due to the "failure 
to develop and lay hold of an adequa te conception of intelli-
gence integrated with social movements and a factor in giving 
them direction."83 
The social conception of the nature and work of in-
telligence is still immature, in consequence its use as 
a director of social action is inchoate and sporadic. 
It is the· tragedy of earlier liberalism that just at 
the time when the problem of soci a l organization was 
most ungent, liberals could bring to its solution noth-
ing but the concg~tion that intelligence is an indivi-
dual possession. 
79. LSA, 41. 
80. Hocking, Art.(l935), 243. 
81. Seminar Record, October 9, 1935. 
82. PR, 130. 
83. LSA, 44. 
84. LSA, 45. 
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He would admit the case of the conservative, for 
if we once start thinking no one can guarantee where 
we shall come out, except that many objects, ends and 
institutions are surely doomed. Every thinker puts 
some portion of an apparently stable world in peril 
! and no one can wholly predict what will emerge in its 
1 place.85 1 
1 The orrice or liberalism may be considered to be that or I 
; adjusting the old to the new. 86 Present change is so rapid an~ I 
I varied that "customs seem to be dissolving under our very eyes," 1 
but "be the ratio little or great, there is always an adjustment 
ito be made, and as soon as the need for it becomes conscious, 
I liberalism has a function and meaning. tt87 
I 
"In its large sense," writes Dew~y, "this remaking of 
. - -
the old through union with the new is precisely what intelli-
gence is,n88 and the liberal is 11 committed to the organization 
lor intelligent action as the chief method. tt89 .It may be be-
l 
lieved that there is hope for liberalism because 
intelligence after millions of years of errancy has 
found itself a method, and it will not be lost forever 
in the blackness of night. The business of liberalism 
is to bend every energy and exhibit every courage sq 
that these precious goods may not even be temporar9oY 
lost but be intensified and expanded here and now. 
Dewey thinks that when the experimental method is ap-
plied to social liberalism a situation like the present will be 
85. EN, · 222. 
86. LSA, 49. 
87. Ibid. 
1
88. LSA; 50. 
89. LSA:, 63~ 
190. LSA, 93. --------- - I 
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I impossible, since ideas and theories will be continuously re-
vised in the light of consequences they produce in actual social 
conditions. 91 
Again there may be noted the close relation between what 
1 this study terms presuppositions of Dewey's social thinking--
I 
experimental inquiry and liberalism. I It is to be observed, also l 
that both find their chief method in intelligent action. 
I 91. Dewey, Art.(1935) 1 , 228. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DEWEY'S GENERAL VIEWS ON TRADITION AND CHANGE 
Doubtless a majority of Dewey's readers are impressed by 
his stress on change and reconstruction; however, there are 
those who think of him as more traditional than radical in out-
look. A critic1 of Dewey's political philosophy gives his "con-
I sidered opinion" that "the tap roots of Dewey's philosophy trace 
back to the traditional philosophies," but "they do not go down 
jl into the soil of American society." In writing on Dewey's in-
· I terpretation of the history of philosophy Randall2 speaks of the 
I "burden of historical baggage" that has "inordinately increased 
I the difficulties of his pages, 11 and states that for all but the 
I "most learned of his readers Dewey has seemed weighed down by 
an obsession with the past." He finds people who object to this 
tendency in Dewey asking such questions as: 
Why all this beating of dead asses? Why does Dewey 
insist on conducting his original inquiries in the 
musty atmosphere of a historical museum? Why does he 
not throw open the windows to let the fresh breezes 
of the present blow these dusty cobwebs away? Why, to 
go forward a step, must he look backward on the whole 
course already traversed? 
In other quarters Dewey figures as the "iconoclast seeking to 
1. Stone, Art.(l939), 281. 
2. Randall, Art.(l939), 80. 
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destroy utterly the idolatrous worship of the past." Randall 
believes nothing could be further from the truth and he express-
es himself as finding it difficult · 
to see how any perceptive reader could fail to discern 
in him the greatest traditionalist among the leading 
philosophical minds of today. For the true tradition-
alist ••••• understands how to use tradition in facing 
our present problems.3 
In this chapter an attempt is made to arrive at some 
conclusions regarding Dewey's views on tradition and change. 
I 1. TRADITION. 
The word "tradition" is derived from the Latin word tra-
-
~which means to give up or to transmit. Dictionaries con-
sulted,4 as well as an encyclopedia5 in which the word is to be 
found, refer to tradition as oral transmission, "the handing 
down of knowledge through successive generations by oral commu-
1 nlcation and without written memorials.·" However, the tendency 
I seems to be to use the word in a wider sense, 6 including writ-i 
ten materials. Hirsch7 defines tradition as "the product of 
conceptual thinking," and marks the movement from savagery to 
ciVilization by the 
supplanting of the carriage or mode ·of tradition from 
the spoken to the written word ••••• Tbrough the intel-
lectual, moral, and institutional traditions of the 
race, the individual starts, as it were, surrounded by 
3. Loc. cit., 93. 
4. WlUD; WSD; SOED; NED. 
5. EA, Vol. 26, 764. 
: ~. Cf. Brightman, ITP, 38-39. 
7. GGI, 215. 
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those mental, moral, and political ideas, forces~ 
and institutions that have survived through ideation-
al and a·ooial ti tness. 
Dewey refers to a wide range of tradition--social, poli-
tical, scientific, literary, educational, religious and philo-
sophical. He speaks of schools coming into existence "when so-
cial traditions are so complex that a considerable part of the 
social store is committed to writing and transmitted through 
written symbols. 11 8 In one of his most recent articles he notes 
that traditions include "institutions, customs, beliefs of ,all 
sorts."9 
It is evident that Dewey shows an appreciation of tradi-
tion. There is sympathy and understanding when he notes the 
rise of Greek philosophy in connection with tradition, and 
writes: 10 
It became the work of philosophy to justify on· ra-
tional grounds the spirit, though not the form, of ac-
cepted beliefs and traditional customs ••••• The work 
was critical and in the interests of the only true 
conservatism--that which will conserve and not waste 
the Values wrought out by humanity. 
1 There is understanding, as well as tact, with reference to po-
ll li tical tradition in delivering his lectures in Japan. He 
speaks of the necessity which "leads a ruler to centralize tra-
dition and belief's to strengthen his prestige and authority" in 
the "interests of a wider social unity and a more extensive 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I' 
I 
8. DE, 22. 
9. Dewey, Art.{l939}, 523. 
10. RPH, 18. 
political power. nll He recognizes social dependence upon tradi-
tion because the latter is rooted in social habits and loyalties 
and gives life its "deeper lying values. 1112 In another connec-
tionl3 he notes that without a 
communication of ideals~ hopes, expectations~ standards, 
opinions~ from those members of society who are pass-
ing out of the group life to those who are coming in-
to it~ social life could not survive. 
Dewey is unable to carry on his experimental method with~ 
out reference to the past and its experiences. "Every inquiry 1
1 
utilizes the conclusions or judgments of prior inquiries in the 
degree in which it arrives at a warranted conclusion.rr14 He 
finds that examination of the past:is often the "chief and de-
cisive factor in thought, 1115 and that "intellectual piety toward 
experience is a pre-condition of the direction of life and of 
tolerant and generous cooperation among men. "16 To be sure, he 
values the past largely, if not entirely, for its instrumental 
value. "Retrospect," he states, "is of value in the solidity~ 
security~ and fertility it affords our dealings with the fu-
1 ture~nl? and "precedent is ••••• a valuable instrumentality.nl8 
I 
I do not for a moment suppose that the experiences 
of the past, personal and social, are of no importance. 
1--
l ll. RPH, 9. 
12. RPH~ 14-16. 
13. DE, 3. Cf. CF, 87. 
14. LOG, 246. Cf. EAE~ 97. 
I 15. HWT, 118. 
1
16. CAE, 123. 
17. DE, 178. I 18. ETH, 365. 
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For without them we should not be able to frame any 
ideas whatever of the conditions under which objects 
are enjoyed nor any estim~te of the consequences of es-
teeming and liking them.l 
Dewey recognizes the emotional hold of traditions and 
the force of established institutions. He considers practical 
difficulties in the way of realizing changes, 20 and would have 
understood the problem a Chinese general had some fifteen years 
ago in an interior city when he tried to do away with the 
bright-eyed-goddess festival by having the image of the goddess 
carried out of the city. After his duties took him away from 
the city a triumphant procession brought the goddess back in 
time to insure good eyesight to suffering pilgrims. Rumor had 
it that the general himself had gotten sore eyes and had sent 
word to have the goddess re-instated. However, upon his return 
more drastic action against tradition was taken. The goddess 
was demolished. 
While Dewey appreciates certain values in tradition and 
relies upon the past in the method of inquiry, he is not one to 
view the past as "an ancestral mansion, 1121 to be explored lov-
ingly, and its praise he leaves to others. Rather does he feel 
the urge to take a critical view of tradition. He sees the in-
fluence of tradition as two-fold.22 
I 
19. 
20. 
21. 
I. 22. 
QC, 272. 
QC, 309. 
Randall, 
FAC, 55. 
Cf. Randall, Art.(l939), 82. 
Art.(l939), 79. 
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On the one hand, it leads to effort to perpetuate 
and strengthen the conditions which brought it into 
existence. But, on the other hand, a tradition may re-
sult in habits that obstruct observation of wh.at is 
actually going on; a mirage may be created in which re-
publican institutions are seen as if they were in full 
vigor after they have gone into a decline. 
It may be said that this indicates the two most serious 
faults of tradition: the tendency (1) to perpetuate the status 
guo, and (2) to obstruct the insight into present conditions and 
their dangers. "Tradition makes the test of ideas to be their 
agreement with some antecedent state of things, 1123 and customs 
dictated by tradition and desire claim finality and immutabili-
ty. 24 
While in Japan Dewey wrote a letter relating an amusing 
incident of the zeal with which the theocracy of the Imperial 
Government is protected against historical criticism. 25 'lhe 
story was that a certain 
bureaucratic gentleman felt sure. that the divine an-
cestors must have left traces of their own language 
somewhere, so he investigated the old shrines, and sure 
enough he found on some of the beams characters differ-
ent from Chinese or Japanese. These he copied and showed 
for the original language--till some carpenters saw 
them and explained that they were the regular guild 
marks. 
The more Dewey studies history the more he is led to believe, he 
says, that "traditions and institutions count more than native 
capacity or incapacity in explaining things. 1126 It is cause for 
23. QC, 136. 
24. RPH, 21. 
25. LCJ, 72. 
26. ION, 16. 
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II - -
I status guo, instead of seriously asking how we are to employ 
I 
the means at our disposal so as to form an equitable and stable 
society." 
Especially is it of concern to democracy that traditions 
be criticized. Without such continual criticism democracy can-
not be maintained, for 
underlying persistent attitudes of human beings were 
formed by traditions, customs, institutions, which 
existed when there was no democracy ••• ~.Their persist-
ence ••••• explains the depth and range of the present 
problem. The struggle for democracy has to be maintained 
on as · many fronts as · culture has aspects: political, eco-
nomic, international~ educational, scientific and 
artistic, religious.~? 
An example of tradition that obstructs vision of condi- II 
II 
I tions is that regarding punitive justice. It tends to prevent 
,11 recognition of social responsibility for crime • . "By killing ~ 
I evil-doer or shutting him up behind stone walls, we are enabled 
to forget both him and our part in creating him. 1128 
While we shall note in later chapters that there are sit 
I 
I 
I 
I 
uations in which Dewey calls for a complete discarding of tradi- \ 
. . I 
tion, in general he thinks such a break with custom apt to re- I 
sult in chaos. Dewey in skeptical mood, however, sees no danger 
of such a break, because "Mankind is too inertly conservative 
55 
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27. FAG; 173. Of. 163. 
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danger actuality." 29 The danger rather is that indifference to 
]l new conditions will lead to disruption, as has happened in parts 
// of the world. 
I Dewey thinks that Americans tend to underestimate the 
!value of tradition and he finds in this cause for rejoicing be- , 
cause it provides a fruitful field for instrumental experiment-
1 alism. He finds that 
I. 
our neglect of the traditions of the past with what-
ever this negligence implies in the way of spiritual 
impoverishment of our life, has its compensation in 
the idea that the world is recommencing and being 
remade under our eyes.30 I 
I 
1
1
who 
A contrast to Dewey's view is found in that of Shorey 
thinks that in our reading, for example, we are in danger 
·I 
preciation for tradition, and that for him the past has instru- 1 
• I 
mental value in inquiry; however, he critlcizes tradition as per ~ 
I 
petuating the status guo and obstructing vision. Moreover there 
are times when he sees advantages in breaking with tradition. 
2. CHANGE. 
11 Change", holds Dewey, 11 is the primary social fact as 
I 29. QC, . 272. 
I 30. PHC, 33. 
=====+ 3_1._ Sho ~ey, ~~t. (1928), 209. 
I 
surely as motion is the primar y physical f'act;" 32 it is change 
rather than fixity that measures "'reality' or energy of' be-
ing."33 People who have not understood this, or have found it 
to t heir advantage to conceal their knowledge, have talked about 
the stability of' human nature and the impossibility of' changing 
this or that tradition because human nature cannot be changed . 
Dewey scoff's at this as subterfuge. He notes that the idea or 
the love of' freedom as human nature is to be linked with the 
struggle for representation; that self-interest as human nature 
is to be linked with new methods in industrial production; ~­
pathy with the growth of' organized philanthropic activities; 
while the love o~ . J?ow er a s human na ture is coming to the fore at 
the present time.34 
The idea of the fixity of human nature is not tenable. 
Rather is it the case that changes are going on, changes "signi-
ficant of new possibilities and ends to be attained.u35 Not only 
are changes going on, they can be measured and controlled, for 
32. 
33~ 
34. 
35. 
36. 
when correlations of changes are made the goal of 
knowledge, the fulfillment of its aim in discovery of 
these correlations, is equivalent to placing in our 
hands an instrument of control. When one change is 
given, and we know with measured accuracy its connec-
tion with another change, we have the potential means 
of producing or averting that other event.36 
CAE; 730. 
RPH;, 61. 
FAC; 18. 
RPH, 116. 
QC, 100-101. 
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This use of change as preparatory acts to make values more se-
cure is not new. "It is as old as man himself, being the heart 
of all intelligence;"37 however, accuracy and scope of judgment 
with regard to change has come only with the development of mod-
ern science. Conclusions of physical science, for example, are 
having a great influence upon social conditions and human rela-
tions. It is evident that 
change in methods of production, distribution, and 
communication is the chief determining condition of 
social relationships and to a large extent, of actual 
cultural values in every advanced industrial people, 
while they have reacted intensively into the lives of 
all 'backward' peoples.38 
Since science determines the quality of social change, and since 
science is an instrument in the hands of men, they are in a po- I 
sition to decide what changes they wish to see achieved and 
which averted. It must be admitted that 
till now we have employed science absentmindedly · so · 
far as its effect upon human beings is concerned ••••• 
The doctrine that the most potent instrument of wide-
spread, enduring, and objective social changes must 
be left at the mercy of purely private desires for 
purely personal gain is a doctrine of anarchy.39 
Dewey has faith in the possibility of science working a change 
in the mind and character of men as well as in the "outer arena 
of life."40 It may be questioned whether he is not over opti-
mistic as to the power of science. However this may be, the 
37~ QC, -132. 
38. LOG:, 489. 
139. PHC; 323. · 
40. PHC, 326. 
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fact of change and possibilities of its direction present a 
challenge to men. 
The philosophies of flux have quite missed the point of 
change. Hegel, Bergson and the "professedly evolutionary phil-
osophers of becoming" have "deifit;d change by making it univer-
sal., regular., sure."41 Such metaphysics 
sidesteps the painful, toilsome labor of understanding 
and of control which change sets us, by glorifying it 
for its own sake. Flux is made something to revere, 
something profoundly akin to what is best within our-
selves, will and creative energy. !t is not, as it is 
in experience., a call to effort, a challenge to i~~es­
tigation, a potential doom of disaster and death. 
The effort that man is called upon to make is that of causing 
changes to "take one turn rather than another," 43 for it is in 
his power to act so that environing changes will take a certain 
turn. 44 This becomes a problem of instituting modes of inter-
action which will "produce changes in the direction that leads 
to the proposed objective consequence."45 
Before modes of interaction can be instituted there must 
be investigation, or learning enough about changes to be able to 
"lav hold of them and turn them in the direction of our de-
.. 
sires.u46 Conflict of patterns in institutions is today pro-
ducing great changes. These changes are characterized by 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 146. 
EN, 50-51. 
Ibid. 
Dewey, Art.(l917), 9. 
Ibid., 10. 
LOG, 500. Cf. LOG, 238. 
RPH., 116. Cf. QC, 205. 
I 
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"uneasiness, discontent and blind antagonistic struggles" to the 
extent that intelligent direction fails to "moderate the harsh-
ness of conflict, and turn the elements of_ disintegration into 
a constructive synthesis."47 The social compact was a symbol of 
the truth that 
social institutions as they exist can be bettered on-
ly through the deliberate interventions of those who 
free their minds from the standards of order which ob-
tain. The underlying fact was the perception of the 
possibility of a cha2§e, a change for the better, in 
social organization. 
I 
I 
Granting the fact of change and the challenge it pro- I 
duces, there remains the question as to how it comes about. Are ! 
modes of interaction effective in the environment alone, or are 
there changes in individuals as well~ If there are changes in 
individuals, if there is internal change as well as external, 
what is the relative importance of each1 
Dewey makes two explicit statements with reference to 
this matter in his response to the seventeen philosophers who 
wrote descriptive and critical essays on his philosophy in the 
1
1
1
new Schilpp volume. Since these are doubtless authoritative as 
to his present position they are given first: 
What I hold ••••• is that method in knowing of phy-
sical objects ••••• is reconstructive of antecedent 
situations, a reconstruction in which the self as 
knower is changed as well as the environing conditions. 49 
47. HNC, 129. 
48. EN, 218. 
49. Dewey, Art.(l939), 582. 
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I have indeed emphasized, in what I have said about 
morals, especially in their social aspect, the idea that 
production of new environing conditions is a Drerequi-
site of the creation of an enduring new self.50 
~hile these references indicate that there is both in-
ternal and external change, emphasis is placed upon the latter. 
This may be said to be the position taken, in the main, in Hu-
man Nature and Conduct. This book is an introduction to social 
psychology and gives no small attention to impulses and . their 
significance for change in social conditions, while stressing 
the necessity of external change. The following passage is se-
lected as expressive of the importance of external change: 
We change character from worse to better only by 
changing conditions ••••• We may desire abolition of 
war, industrial justice, greater equality of oppor-
tunity for all. But no amount of preaching good will 
or the golden rule or cultivation of sentiments of 
love and equity will accomplish the results. There 
must be change in objective arrangements and institu-
tions. We must work on the environment not merely on 
the hearts of men. To think otherwise is to suppose 
that flowers can be raised in a desert or motor cars 
run in a jungle. Both things can happen and without 
a miracle. But only by changing the jungle and des-
ert.51 
The importance played by impulses of men in change is shown in 
these passages: 
With the dawn of the idea of progressive better-
ment and an interest in new uses of impulses, there 
has grown up same consciousness of the extent to which 
a future new society of changed purposes and desires 
50. Dewey, Art.(l939), 589. 
51. HNC, 29-22. C:f. HNC, 56-57, 716-717. 
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may be created by a deliberate humane treatment of the 
impulses of youth.52 
We have depended upon the clash of war, the stress 
of revolution, the emergence of heroic individuals, the 
impact of migrations generated . by war and frunine, the 
incoming of barbarians, to change established institu-
tions. Instead of constantly. utiliz~gg unused impulse 
to effect continuous reconstruction. 
The value of so emotional a factor as impulse, if taken 
alone, might well be questioned, and Dewey goes on to link it 
with mental factors. He states that no general and enduring 
moral changes have ever accompanied external revolution unless 
"appropriate habits of thought have previously been insensibly 
matured." 54 
In reviewing Whitehead's Science and the Modern World 
Dewey is so positive about the importance of internal change as 
I 
to say that "A change in mentality is the most significant, the 
most practically effective of all changes." 55 He considers that 
the most important change of which Whitehead writes is that o:f 
the substitution of the idea of organism for that of mechanism 
and makes clear his position on Behaviorism when he says;. 
If the psychological school which claims to be the 
only genuine •Behaviorism' could read and digest the 
physical ideas which this book sets forth an immense 
amount of misleading and confusing intellectual activity 
would be saved the next generation ••••• A behaviorism 
which adopts uncritically the basic abstractions which 
have collapsed in their own region ••••• would cease 
52. HNC, 96. Cf. 93 •. 
53 • . , HNC, 101 .. 
54. HNC, 108-109. 
\
1 
55. Dewey, Art. ( 1926•) , 360. 
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taking the behavior of fragments5gf an organism as if they were the whole of behavior. 
That Dewey is not altogether consistent in the place he 
gives mental change, however, is shown in two references to the 
Marxian doctrine of economic determinism. In one connection he 
writes: 
People love to stand on their heads intellectually, 
and so it is that the Marxians who have given the world 
its best modern demonstration of the power of idea and 
of intellectual leadership, are the ones who most deny 
that these things have any efficacy. Even the most hard-
ened upholder of the impotency of intellectual and mor-
al forces might however concede that without certain 
changes of mental attitude and disposition, there are 
certain alterations of society which cannot be accom-
plished, that intellectual changes are at least a nega-
tive condition, a sine qua B£ll.o7 
While here Dewey approves of Marxians standing on their heads 
intellectually, in a review of Gerald Heard's The Emergence of 
Man which Dewey entitles "Marx Inverted,"58 he is critical of 
the author's thesis that history is the evolution of mind and 
of his holding that changes in consciousness precede instead of 
follow changes in natural and social conditions. 
It does not appear possible to settle completely the 
question as to the relative importance of internal and external 
factors in change in Dewey's thought, since interpretations tend 
to vary according as the interpreter himself stresses the one or 
the other element and since Dewey, himself, is not wholly con-
sistent in his statements in regard to the matter. However, it 
1-----
56. Loc. cit., 361. 
57. CAE~ 155. 
58. Dewey, Art.(l932), 52. 
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would seem ~air to consider his latest statements on the matter 
as having comparative authority. 59 As is to be noted in those 
statements, quoted from his reply in the Schilpp volume, exter-
nal change weighs the more heavily in his thought, although it 
is accompanied· by internal change. 
Dewey holds that as culture changes, "the conceptions 
1 that are dominant in a culture change.u60 He speaks of the val-
ue of a coincidence of psychological and industrial changes and 
the resultant reinforcement of both. The one change alone is 
too internal and the other too external to bring about "pro-
found intellectual development." However, when the "creation of 
a new mental attitude falls together with extensive material and 
economic changes something significant happens. 1161 
In concluding this section on change, it may be said 
th~t the ~act of change ~orms an integral part of Dewey's syste 
of thought. Knowledge is arrived at by an investigation of cor-
relations of change. Change is inevitable but man has it in his 
power to direct it as he will. Science is responsible for the 
vast changes that have come about in humanity's outer life dur-
ing the modern era, and Dewey believes it can and is, to a cer-
tain extent, e~fecting a similar change in inner life. While 
he holds that naturally internal and external change occur to-
gether he seems to ·accentuate the importance o~ the latter. 
59. Supra, quotations 49 and 50. 
60. LOG, 233. 
61. RPH, 39. 
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INTERPENETRATION OF TRADITION AND CHANGE. 
Dewey maintains that, in reality, it is not possible to 
/ mark off a sphere for stability and another for change, and that 
I 
the real issue is "that of effecting an interpenetration of the 
two." 62 In the make-up of individuals there are both conserva-
tive factors, deriving their strength from the "inertia of cus-
toms and traditions engrained by long endurance,"63 and liberat-
l ing factors, variable and innovating. The conservative factor, 
!causing an individual to cling to that which has been estab-
1lished, to tradition and social custom, is a genuine part of his 
constitution and usually is a stronger and deeper part of his 
64 
nature than is the desire for change. 
It is sometimes thought that habit is entirely a matter 
of conserving the past, that it is merely habituation; however, 
for Dewey it is also a capacity to "readjust activity to meet 
new conditions."65 Habits of habituation provide the background 
1
l ror growth while the habit of readjustment is the growing it-
self; the stable is the condition of the occurrence of the un-
stable, the unique. 
A large part of the democratic problem is that of achiev 
ing "associations whose ordering of parts provides the strength 
that comes from stability, while they promote flexibility of 
62. 
63. 
I ~~: 
Dewey, Art. ( 1937) , 179. 
Ibid., 174. 
Ibid., 175. 
DE, 62. Cf. EN, 116. 
65 
response to change.n66 The problem then becomes one of giving 
constant attention to the 11 organic uni ty 11 .67 of the factors of' 
stability and change. Assertion of the permanent and enduring 
is always comparative. Sometimes the rate of change is so slow 
l as to have practically all the "advantages of stability in deal-
1 
ing with more transitory and irregular happenings--if we know 
enough."68 
Within this organic unity to designate the slower 
and the regular rhythmic events structure and the more 
rapid and irregular ones process, is sound practical, 
sense. It expresses the function of the one in respect 
1
1 
to the other.69 
Repeatedly Dewey gives examples oi' Either-Or reasoning:? ! 
i a type of thing that would not happen were the functional and 
,instrumental nature of the two perceived. Rather would men be 
concerned with their adjustment, for 
structure and process, substance and accident, matter 
and energy, permanence and flux, one and ·many, continu-
ity and discreteness, order and progress, law and · 
liberty, uniformity and growth, tradition and innovation; 
rational will and impelling desires, proof and discover-!, 
the actual and the possible, are names given to various 
· phases of their conjunction, and the issue of living de-
pends upon the art with which these things are adjusted 
to each other.71 
Hence it is seen that despite, or perhaps because of, 
the organic unity of' tradition and change 
66~ FAC, 167. 
67. Dewey, Art.(l937), 171. 
68~ EN1 70.;.71. 
1 69. EN, · 72. cr. 62. 
70. LOG, 192; 345, 506~ 
71. EN, 75-76. 
a problem is presented 
I 
I 
I 
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It is, says Dewey, just such a mixture of "the fixed and the un-
predictably novel" that "sets mankind upon that love of wisdom 
which forms philosophy. u72 Dewey's own philosophy is one of ex-J 
perience. It does not slight the "struggles and achievements o.rl 
the past,"73 says Childs, but it has 
too much respect for experience as a present on-
going affair to want to make devotion to the past 
a mode of escape from the problems and the possibi-
lities of the present. 
One of these problems is undoubtedly that of failure to 
get at real causes of difficulty. Too often palliative and re-
medial measures are taken, "cheap, short cuts which avoid re-
cognition of basic causes" only put off the day when fundamental 
causal .factors must be "faced and constructive action taken. 117 4 
Another problem that Dewey considers deeply significant 
is that of the interaction within social groups, 
how those established and more or less deeply grooved 
systems of interaction which we call social groups ••••• 
modify the activities of individuals who perforce are 
caught-up within them, and how the activities o.f com-
ponent individuals remake and redirect previously es-
tablished customs.75 
A third problem may be considered the one of the remak-
ing of environment as a means o.f retaining and transm-itting 
one's heritage. For Dewey this is not a concern out of piety to 
the past nor for the sake of the past, but for the sake of a 
72. EN, 59. 
73. Childs, Art.(l939), 440. 
74. CAE, 762. 
75. HNC, 60. 
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present so secure and enriched that it will create a yet better 
future. 1176 
However, it may be said that the paramount problem with 
r ·elation to the interpenetration of tradition and change in Dew-
ey's thought has to do with cultural lag, changes in environ-
ment without appropriate readjustment in the emotional and mor-
al attitudes of men. It is estimated that the rate of change 
in conditions within the last century has been proportionately 
greater than that which had occurred in thousands of years be-
! fore. A pace so swift that it was "practically impossible for 
I 
!underlying traditions and beliefs to keep step. 1177 This great 
change has been brought about largely by science. Dewey sees 
democracy and all civilized values doomed, if science is not 
capable {as he believes it is if given the chance) of develop-
ing moral techniques which will determine the relations of 
human beings. 11 A culture," says he, ''which permits science to 
11 destroy traditional values but which distrusts its power to 
I create new ones is a culture which is destroying itself. 1178 
Dewey believes that a solution for such problems as 
these is not to be -found without the help of philosophy, that 
they indicate the type of work in which philosophy should be 
engaged; a work of reconstruction of tradition, it might be 
76. HNC, 21. Cf. CAE, 730-731. 
77. FAC, 48. 
78. FAC, 154. 
sources in order that the current may receive a new direc-
l tion,"80 but its fertilization comes from new inventions, new 
I 
I 
I 
explorations, new discoveries in science. 
Man states anything at his peril; once stated it 
occupies a place in a new perspective; it attains a 
permanence which does not belong to its existence; 
it enters provokingly into wont and use; it ~~ints 
in a troubling way to need of new endeavors. 
While the need of new endeavors, the fresh paths that 
should be followed, is pointed out by individuals who have set 
themselves free from tradition and custom when these have been 
, hampering in effect, it requires collective endeavor to bring 
II. about stable advance, along the lines indicated. 82 Dewey 
would see this as the working together of experience and rea-
son, 83 experience representing the stable group and re·ason the 
creative intelligence of the individual. He seems to believe 
79. Randall, Art.(l939), 87. Cf. PHC, 3. 
t 80. PHC, 7. Cf. QC, 307. 
JL' 81 PHC, 8. Dewey, Art. (1937), 185-186. RPH, 100. 
I 
I 
I 
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that philosophy has been largely a matter of choosing between an 
1 
"impoverished and truncated experience on the one hand," and "an 
/ artificial and impotent reason on the other."84 He desires a 
philosophic reconstruction that would do away with the need of a 
choice between experience and reason. This, he is convinced, 
would destroy the division of men of good will into 
two hostile camps. It would permit the co8peration 
of those who respect the past and the institutional-
ly established with those who are interested in estab-
lishing a freer and happier future. For it would de-
termine the conditions under which the funded exper-
ience of the past and the contriving intelligence which 
looks ~o the future can effectually interact with each 
other. 5 
While the question might be raised as to the justifica-
tion of Dewey's use of "experience" and "reason" in the above 
!passage, it is evident he concludes that it is possible for 
"tradition" and "change" to interact and that such a relation-
ship should obtain. 
1----------------------
1 
84. RPH, 101. 
85. Ibid. 
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CHAPTER V 
TRADITION AND CHA1'-JGE IN RELATION TO THE SOCIAL PROC'ESS 
Social process is possible because of the interpenetra-
tion :of tradition·.and change. All inquiry and discovery is de-
pendent upon·_ the "union in nature of the settled and the un-
settled, . the stable and the hazardous. nl Were it not for this 
union .. there would be no ends, -whether as consummations or as 
ends-in-vie,t-1. There would be only a "block universe, either 
something ended and admitting of no change, or else a predes-
tined march of events," for "there is no such thing as fulfill-
ment where there is no risk of failure, and no defeat where 
there is no promise of possible achievement." 2 
It has been shown in the preceding chapter3 that De·wey 
considers man's problem in relation to the social process to be 
I
I that of producing changes that will lead to a "proposed objec-
tive consequence. 11 This involves questions having to do with 
I 
II 
ends and means, with continuity and novelty, and with progress. 
Dewey's views on these three factors of the social process will 
be considered in turn·; 
1. QC, 244. 
2. Ibid. 
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1. ENDS AND MEANS. 
Dewey emphasizes the interrelation of ends and means. 
He believes that the problem created by the distinction between 
ends and means in philosophic tradition is "se deep-seated and 
far-reaching that it may be said to be the problem·· of exper-
ience."4 He holds that 
all the intelligent activities of men, no matter wheth-
er expressed in science, ,fine arts, or social relation~ 
ships, have for their task the conversion of causal 
bonds, relations of succession, into a connection of 
means-consequence, , iri.to meanings. When the task is 
a chieved the result is art: and in art everything is 
common· between' means and ends. 5 · 
There is the tendency to be interested in ends without 
regard to means, to be interested in consequences and outcomes, 
rather than in the "conditions, material and procedural, by 
which they are obtained. 11 6 Taking ends without regard to means 
holds De\'rey, is to 11 degenerate into sentimentalism, 11 while tak-
ing means for ends is to "fall into moral materialism."7 He 
says: 
4. 
5-
6. 
7. 
8. 
In the continuous temporal process of organizing ac-
tivities with a co-ordinated and co-ordinating unity, a 
constituent activity is both an end and a means: an end, 
in so far as it is temporally and relatively a close; a 
means, in so far as it provides a8cond1tion to be taken into account in further activity. 
EN,· 369. 
EN, 369-370. 
LOG, 265. 
RPH, 73-
TV, 49. Cf. DE, 124. 
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I 
Dew~y speaks of ends or consequences as being of the 
same nature as the means used,l4 and Hook interprets him as at-
taching moral quality to the instruments or means as well as to 
the end, 11 to the transitional steps and to what eventuates from 
them. 11 15 The experimental method places method and means upon 
l the level of importance that has been g iven to ends in the 
/1 past .16 It does not isolate 11 Valuation of ends from appraisal 
of means. 11 17 Dewey believes that the value a person attaches to 
a given end is not to be measured by what "he says about its 
preciousne:ss ~~- but the care he devotes to obtaining and using the 
means without which it cannot be attained. •i 18 
The second point. of emphasis in Dewey's doctrine of ends 
/ is that there are no fixed ends. 1/lere there fixed ends there 
I would be limits to change • . They would "make futile all human 
efforts to produce and regulate change except within narrow and 
unimportant limits."l9 It must be granted that man, on the j 
::::~· ~;::::• e:::~~~~~:r:n:r:::• r:: :1:::1~~ t:; ::;:t;~ :::ed l/ 
refuge of the timid and the means by which the bolo. prey upon I 
the timid. n20 When final authority about ends and standards i -s 
set up tradition is restrictive and enslaving, not enhancing 
14. LSA; 86, 
15. JDIP, 14'1. 
16. Q,C ~- 278-279. 
17. TV; 31. 
18. TV, 27. 
19. P..PH, 70. 
I 20. HNC, 236-237. 
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/1 and liberating. 21 
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I 
Dewey distinguishes between ends and what he calls 
II 
l1 11 ends- in-vievl." 
I' 
By the latter he means "projections of possi-
1 ble consequences."22 He states: 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
Each successive event being a stage in a serial 
process is both existent and commemorative .•.. ·.the 
terminal outcome when anticipated.· •• . • becomes an 
end-in-view,- an aim, purpose, prediction-Z; u .sable as 
a plan in shaping the course of events.2.J 
Eiids-in-.view are variously designated--as plans,24 "operative 
in selecting and arranging materials"; as means2~ in present 
action; and as hypotheses26 that must be formed and tested 11 i'n 
strict correlativity with existential conditions as means." 
I 
However ends-in-view may be defined when they are achieved they/ 
are ends. They are 11 conclusions attained throu gh antecedent / 
endeavor, just as a post is not a goal in itself, .but becomes ~ 
goal in .relation to a runner and his race. "27 I 
I 
In the Schilpp volume Dewey states that he has carried J 
on a polemic a gainst finalities because he found them taken out, 
I 
of temporal context and set forth as things that are "inherent-
ly absolute, like 'ends-in-themselves' instead of ends- in-
relationship. u28 Classic theory is held responsible for 
21. Dewey, Art.(l929)4,~79. 
22. EN, 102. 
23. EN, 101. 
24. EN, 373. Cf. DE, 122,123. 
25. HNC, 226. 
26. LOG; 497. 
27. EN, 112. 
28. Dewey, Art.(l939)3,594. 
II 
I 
I 
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transforming ends att-ained into ends-in-themselves. This was 
done by "ignoring the concrete conditions and operat i ons -by 
means of i'Thich the fulfilments ••.. . are brought about." 29 Iso-:-
lated from the means which brought about these ends they were 
hypostatized. They v1ere 
taken to be the external ideals and standards of the 
very operations of inquiry, artistic creation and 
moral endeavor, of which in fact they are general- \ 
ized r esults. This hypostization (sic) alway:S hap-
pens _\"lhen concrete ends .in their terminal nature are 1 
erected i 1t o 1 ends-ifi-themselves~'30 
Closely related to the foregoing is Dewey's theory of I 
values and ideals. Just as ends ru1d means are interrelated so I 
are intrinsic and instrumental values not to be separated. Lik~ 
ends, ideals and values are developed in the process of inquiry 1 
As there is no place for fixed ends in De\.Yey' s thought so is 
,! there no place for a set table of values. 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
"Anything becomes unworthy, 11 says Dewey, ,"whenever it i , _ 
thought of as intrinsically lacking \<Torth . rr 31 He thinks it iin;.. 
possible to estimate how much of the rrobnoxious materialism and l 
brutality of our economic life is due to the fact that economic 1 
pations have no place in Dewey's scheme. He believes: 
The doctrine of 'higher' ends gives aid, comfort and 
29. LOG, 17T: 
30. LOG, 178. 
31. RPH~- 171. I 
32. Ibid. Cf. QC, 282-283. I --=====ti==~-==---~-===-===- =--~--------==---- -=-=-=------ = =t=-----
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II 
I 
support to every socially isolated and socially irre-
sponsible scholar, specialist, esthete and religionist. 
It protects the vanity and irresponsibility of his call~ 
ing from observation by others and by h1mself.33 
Dewey deplores the soc.ial division between a laboring 
and a leisure class and att-ributes it to a distinction between 
instrume.ntal and intrinsic . values. "Means are menial, subserv.,; 
ient, slavish; and ends are liberal and f1nal."34 Dewey holds: 
The meaning of the \'lord 'ideals 1: is significant of 
the divorce which has obtained between means and ends. 
'Ideals' are thought to be remote and inaccessible - of 
attainment •.•.• They hover in an indefinite way over the 
actual sc-ene; they are expiring ghosts of a once sig-
nificant kingdom of divine reality whose rule pene-
trated to every detail of 11fe.35 
The "real'' and the ''ideal" were never f.arther apart, 
·thinks Dewey, than they were during and following the World War. 
It was a war said to be carried on .for such ideal ends as human-
ity, justice, and liberty for all. · This war for ideals was car-
ried on by such realistic means of applied science as almost 
brought the world to ruin and threatened to wipe out c1v111za~ 
tion.- The peace settlement was 
loudly proclaimed in the name of the ideals that stir 
man's deepest emotions, but with the most realistic at-
tention to details -of economic -advantage distributed 
in proportion to physical power . to create future dis-
turbances. 36 
Ideals that are not illusions -are obtained only when 
they are framed from intelligent observation- and understanding 
RPH, 172. 
EN, 124. 
QC; 278-279. 
RPH, 128. 
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of concrete social events and forces, from the possibilities of 
existing situations. 37 Chinese leaders discovered this truth 
in r egard to ideals in the early years of the republic, when 
- the political revolution seemed to be a failure. Dewey rightly 
observed while he was in China that liberals were putting their 
faith in education and social change,~8 being convinced that an 
intellectual revolution was necessary before a political revo-
lution could become a reality. 39 
I 
Evi.ls in present day social judgments of ends and poli-
cies, thinks, Dewey, come from 11 itnportations of judgments of 
value from outside of inquiry.'' E:rrdJil ._,as values 
can be validly determined only on the basis of the 
tensions, obstructions and positive potentialities 
that are found by contro40ed observation to exist 
in the actual situation. 
Values are discovered in the process of inquiry. Dewey 
I says that even God took seven days for creation and he believes 
II that if the record v.rere complete vre should learn that it was 
not until the end of that period t·hat "he was aware of just 
1
1
· I what he set out to do with the raw material of chaos that con-
fronted him. u4]_ 
I De\vey would never think of making a set table of values 
i 
I 
il 
\I 
arranged as a hierarchy of higher and lower values. If he ad-
mitted any table of values it would be one subject to constant 
j ------
37. ION·;: 169. . 
38. Dewey, Art.(l920)2,144. 
39. Dewey, Art.(l920)1,381. 
1 
4o. LOG, 503. 
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change, :in terms of concrete situat ions as they arise.42 
It would be a mistake to conclude that Dewey is not con ' 
I 
1 cerned about ideals, ends and values. He speaks of the reality 
of their authority over men as an undoubted fact. 43 Han notes 
the importance of the contribution to present day thought made 
by Dewey's theory of value, 44 and Ayres ·says that Dev1ey' s con-
cern as a philosopher has been with the "true, .the good and the 
beautiful, , that is to say with meanings and values; and the 
values are contingent on the meanings. 11 45 It should be noted 
that 11 meaning" for Dewey implies a reference to 11 something ul-
terior or eventual. 11 46 
Dewey's theory of values has undoubted merit, to which 
attention will be given later; however, ,there · are 1rtconsisten~ 
cies and weaknesses in his position:·, that should be noted. 
Brightman says Dewey throws ideals out the door but 
I they come back through the window.47 Not only is it true that 
I 
II 
I 
I 
Dewey is idealistic in his service to humanity; 48 -it is also 
true that in his v;ritings ideals are recognized as well as dis-
claimed. 
In his article in Whither Mankind? Dewey says that 
standards by which we judge values are so traditional and re-
moved from the actualities ·of modern -life that we find it 
42. ETH, 230. 
43. CF, 44. 
44. Han, Art.(1929),124. 
45 ~ - Ayres, Art. ( 1939) 2305. 46. Dewey, Art.(l925) ,130. 
47. POI, 156. 
~~~~n =================================~========~======4 
80 
====~================================-=====~=-=-=-==~-----=-==~=====-~-=-=-=-========#========== 
· difficult to pass critical judgment upon what is going on at 
the present time. Standards of earlier days cannot be used and 
new standards, compatible to scientific methods are 11 as yet un-
~ avo\"led and unrevealed. We simply do not knOiv vrhat they are. u49 
It may be asked why the laclc of a standard seems of such con~ 
cern to one who supposedly develops h i s standard in the process 
of inquiry, why he needs a distant end controlling. a sequence 
of inquiries, 50 why he sets up a comprehensive "human ideal, ' ' 
\vhich he says cannot be . too inclusive, "as a standpoint from 
which to view existing condit·ions and judge the direction 
change should take,"51 or why he feels that there must be an ap 
peal to idealism for any significant American political movemen 
to succeed, that liberals in recent years have been at a disad-
vantage because of the lack of "any defined social philosophy 
which would give direction ·to •••.• latent idealism."52 
Dewey seems inconsistent, too, in his attitude toward 
universal principles. On the one hand he considers them the 
n chief obstacle to the lcind of thinking which is the indispen-
sable prerequisite of steady, secure and intelligent social re-
forms':.'; 53 on the other hand, he says that the generalized con-
ceptions of 11 truth, beauty and goodness have a genuine value 
for inquiry, creation and conduct." .n They have," he adds i 11 lik 
49. Dewey, Art.(l929)1,325-326. 
50. HWT, 39. 
51 • F AC , 17 0 • 
52. Dewey, Art.(l931)3,178. 
53. PHC,' 14o. 
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all..genuine ideals, a limiting and directive force.n54 
Dewey even lists values. He says that "in a general 
way ••..• we can safely point out that certain goods are ideal in 
character: those of art, science, culture, .interchange of knowl 
edge and ideas, etc.'' He hastens to defend this admission by 
saying, as might any teleologist, uBut that is because past ex-
perience has shown that they are the kind of values which are 
likely to be approved up.on searching reflection. "55 TI:rt another 
connection he states: 
There exist concretely and experimentally goods~' · .• 
the values of art in all its forms j:; of knowledge, of 
effort and of rest after striving, of education and 
fellowshi]2.._ of friendship and love, of growth in .mind _ 
and body .so 
De1vey says that we have just begun to use the economic 
and material basis of life for widely shared ideal ends,57 
that the value of security, ease and comfort of living for the 
common man is an "opportunity for a possible participation in 
mo:re ideal values ••..• in spiritual values. "58 He :- speaks also 
of responsibility for 
conserving, tr~~smitting, rectifying and expanding 
the heritage of values we have received that those 
who come - after us may receive it more solid and se-
cure, more widely accessible and more generous.ly 
shared than we have received it.59 
54. LOG, 178.-
55. ETH, 230. 
56. CF, 51. l 
57. Dewey, Art.(l928) ,274. 
58. Ibid., 266. 
59. CF, 87. 
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Inconsistencies in .Dewey's thought on values and ideals I 
having been noted, there remains the pointing out of weaknesses I 
in his position. Four of these will be indicated: the lack of I 
I definite goals , the lack of intrinsic -values, ''methodology," o-r I 
li 
I an over-confidence in science and the scientific me thod, and 
the lack of co smic support of values. 
Otto states that the greatest amount of criticism of I 
I 
Dewey has been his refusal "to indicate the goal or goals of hu.;.l 
man effort. u60 He mentions three things that seem to him- to be 1 
reasons for Dewey giving no indication as to what he believes _ 
to be of supreme worth in life: (1) Dewey fears a specific end 
will be accepted as final. ( 2) His "awareness of the pressing 
need for a new temper of mind and a new moral disposition:." 
(3) The modesty of Dewey.61 
Despite Otto's defence of Dewey, men will continue to 
make such statements as the follov.ring: "The ' lack of stress of 
I 
!
1 
universals gives no guide to social thinking .rr62 "Dr. Dev1ey' s 
policy of social experimentation needs a program of where to be-
gin'~ and how. "63 Dewey "stresses experiment and inquiry without 
telling us what we are looking for. "6 4 ''Atl.y telic effort is 
impossible unless it ii3 directed to the achievement of a fairly 
60. Otto, Art.(l939),54. 
61 . Ibid.,57-59. 
62. Cohen, (Notes on speech in Symposium, ''Dewey's Concepts of 
Experience and of Nature. 11 . Arner. Phil. Assoc., De-
cember 28, 1939.) 
63. Horne, JDP, ,21. 
6 4. Lee , Art • ( 19 40) , 7 4. 
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1 definite goal or standard. rr65 "There cannot be v-alue without 
--------- -----·---~------ -------------- --------
I antecedent standards of value, to discriminate the accBptance 
t or r ejection of what is before the envisaging activity •••.• God 
is the ultimate of limitation . "66 I i 
I 
I 
Dewey believes that the process of growth is the sig- I 
nificant thing , that " growth itself is the only moral 'end, •n 67
1 that " growth is a higher value and ideal than is sheer attain~ 
ment. n 68 Most people fail to find in Dewey any indication for ! 
I 
II 
I 
direction of grmvth. Tm.,rards what would he have man grow? 
· Hook interprets growth for Dewey as follows: 
goal~ 
The process of growth which produces whole clus-
ters of values, personal and social, from phase to 
phase, and which at the same time creates the con-
ditionfor further growth, is the only thi ng that " 
can be called the end of growth • •.. • All grow~h i s 
pre-eminently an affair of interaction , and on the 
educa~ional level -the interaction is primarily so-
cial. 9 
Mead , also, is one who finds in Dewey indications of a 
He says Dewey has four definitions of the moral end: 
I 
I 
"the realization of the individuality,',' (ethical}; "the perfor- I 
I 
I 
1mance of specific -functions , " (biological); "the satisfaction 
II 
of interests," (psychological); and "the realization of a com-
munity of individuals," (sociological). The four are but dif-
ferent aspects of the one norm, that of "fulnes s of the life of , 
l\---
j65. Hertzler, SP, 77· 
1 
66 ~ 1t'D1i tehead , SMW, .249-250. 
I 67. RPH, -177·. 
I 
I 
I 
68. CF, 56. 
69. JDIP, 180-181 . 
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the indi vidual·.-.n70 
Dewey ' s thoughi 
quotation just I 
gives the in-
Is there evidence of intrinsic values in 
or are all values exclusively instrumental? The 
made from IVIead would seem to indicate that Dewey 
dividual intrinsic value. Brightman speaks of Dewey as holding 
that intrinsic value belongs to persons only.7JJ_ This is sub-
stantiated in reading done for this dissertation, not .so much 
in what is directly said, as in what is implied. While Dewey 
gives intelligence high place in his philosop~y, he would not 
give it intrinsic value, such as Russell has in mind -when he 
says: 
We act, iri so far as r..;e are not blindly driven by in:.,. 
stinct, in order to achieve ends which are not merely 
actions, but have in · them some element, ,however pre-
carious and however transient, of rest and peace--not 
t he rest and peace of mere quiescence, but the kind 
that in the most intense form, becomes ecstasy• When 
vlhat passes for knowledge is considered to be no:.. more · 
than a momentary halting-place in a proce s s of i n qu Lcy 
which has ·-= no goal outsj_de itself, inquiry can no longer 
provide intellectual joys, but becomes -merely a means 
to better dinners and more rapid locomotion;.~(2 
Knudson criticizes the making of. truth a mere instru,.., 
ment. ''To -: degrade it," he says, "from an end to a means, is to 
destroy it.n73 Hocking , in the Dewey Symposium, insisted that 
truth is r eached, that ,,re have too easily given up our certa in-
ties.74 Pringle-Pattison holds that our knowledge is as true 
70. !l~ead, Art.(l935),70. 
71·. RV, 168. 
72. Russell, Art.(l939),156. 
I 7 3 ~ PP , 40 1 • 
1 74. Notes on speech, ,Anier. Phil. Assoc., December 28, 1939· 
II 
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I for us 
as ·othe '_ ampler kno\vledge for the higher being. Each is 
true as being an interpretation of the facts accessi-
ble at that particular stage. With new data comes new 
insight; but the new insight carries for~ard and incor-
porates the old--it does not abolish it.·r~ 
While De1.,rey has stated that i n every event there is 
"something obdurate, self-sufficient, ,wholly immediate, neither 
a relation -nor an element in a relational whole, but terminal 
and exclusive,"76 he makes of intelligent action an ultimate on-
ly because it comes last in reflective valuations. Intelligent 
action 
is the last, the final or closing thing we come upon 
in inquiry into inquiry. But the place it occupies in 
the temporal manifestation of inquiry is what makes it 
·such a value, not some property it possesses in and of 
itself, in the isolation of non-relatedness.77 
Although there is undoubted virtue in scientific method 
Dewey lays too much emphasis 1.up.o!L it .and. Jlpon'· t he v.alues of _ s.C-1 
entific knowledge. Parodi says it is "in scientific method 
alone that Dewey sees the privilege of humanity; upon it alone 
he makes its progress depend.n78 Hertzler believes that find-
ings :,:of the sciences provide only the means for advancement--
that what is needed are "patterns for the whole of life, ideals, 
or ends, to follow or approximate by means of the sciences. n79 
Schilpp maintains that civilization needs something science 
75. IG, 175-176. 
76. EN, 85. 
77. Dewey, Art.(l939)3,594. Cf. Dewey, Art.(l923) 2 ,130. 
78. Parodi, Art.(l939),239· 
79. SP, 217. 
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I 
does not and cannot give . He wonders '"'hether there is not some 
conne ction between recent barbarism in Germany and the number 
of German winners o;f Nobel prizes .80 Stuart81- objects to De\'T-
ey's looking to the findings of natural science for regulation 
of conduct, 82 because these finding s are but "descriptive and 
inter pret ative of actions ," unable to "regulate conduct in the 
maro..ne r peculiar to values 'prized' as 'direct i ve standards.'" 83 
·I In the judgment of many, .Dewey's theory of values is 
I inadequate because he rules out God and denies that value s have 
any cosmic · support. Values, he believe_s, are "realized upon a ' 
II natural basis . . .•. \'fe need no external cri teribn. . and guarantee 
8l!. for their goodness ." · "There are forces in natur e and society 
that generate and support ••••• ideals•" 8 5': It should be noted 
that the two quotations . just given do not exclude cosmic cup-
port, a l though that is Dev1ey' s intention. Sorley, . on the other 
hand, . affirms cosmic support as essential t o the conservation 
of values: 
I f reali~ed values are t o be conserved •.• this ~ conser~ 
vation must be due to something in the order of the cos,.. 
mic forces which is ••. on the side of good against evil, 
and may be trusted to see t o it that genuine values wi ll 
not permanently be lost--that good -\vi ll triumph i n the en 
Att~nt ion is called to what seem to be the two chief 
merits of Dewey' s thought on .values: (1) Ends grow . (2) Intel 
ligence is critical of means and endS; or means-. consequences .. 
80. 
81 . 
82 . 
83. 
84. 
86. 
Schilpp,(Notes on address •. ~er . Phil. Assoc•, Dec.28,1939). 
Stuart, Ar~.(l939),328. 
QC, 273-27 4 . 
Stuart , Art. (l939),~28. 
CF , 48. 85~ CF, , 51. 
rJIVIG, 170-171. 
I 
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i 
I 
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Ends grm.,r , standards of judgment are improved. Han _ 
is under just as much obligation to develop his most ad~ 
vanced standards and ideals as to use conscientiously 
those vv-hich he already possesses. 
8
Moral life ..... is 
rendered flexible, vital, growing . 7 
That there is rather general ac,cord 1vi th this idea migh 
be shO\·m. Schiller says that "alL_our ultimate syntheses ...•• 
must be provisional and temporary"; ~s_;, and Brightman notes that j 
"man's knowledge of true ideals is always growing ••.•• new ideal -
I 
are always being shaped. 1189 Jane Addams expresses a similar j 
idea in these words~ 
Each generation has its own test , the contempor-
aneous and current standard by which alone it can ad-
equately judge of its . own moral achievements •..•• it 
may not leg itimately use a previous and less vigor-
ous test. The advanced test must indeed include that 
which has already been attained; but if it includes no 
more, we shall fail to go forward, thinking complacent-
ly that we have 'arrived' i"ihen in reality v-re. have not 
yet started. 90 
De'vvey rightly places emphasis · on · judgments :of evalua-
tion;9l He goes so far as to say that "the important considera-
I tion •.••• is not a theory of values but a theory of criticism." 
By this he means ''a method of discriminating among goods on the 
! basis of their appearances, . and of their consequences."92 He 
,j 
I 
believes philosophy should be critical of "beliefs, institution , . 
customs, policies with respect to their bearing upon-: good. n9_3 
87. RPH, 175. 
88. LFU, 451. 
89. POI, 217. Of. Sorley, M'viG, 157. 
90. DSE, -2. 
91. LOG, 502. 
92. EN, 396. 
93. EN, 408. Gf. EN, , 436-437. 
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He holds that reflection is the sole agency for the creation of 
new consequences and goods.94 Intelligence, or observation and 
reflection, should become a directive force in the transition 
of conditions. When intelligence intervenes 
conditions become conditions of forecasting conse-
quences; when these consequences present themselves 
in thought, preference and volition, planning and 
determination; come into play. To foresee conse-
quences of existing conditions is to surrender neu-
trality and drift; it is to take sidea in behalf of 
the conseuqences that are preferred.~? 
That Dewey's thought is idealistic is shown in his re-
jection of philosophy which merely reflects and reports the 
11 chief features· of the existing situation as if they were final, 
without regard to what they may become" as "repulsively mater-
l ialistic"; 96 and in his saying that 
II 
I 
where professed idealism turns out to be a narrow 
pragmatism--narrow because taking for granted the 
finality of ends determined by historic conditions~­
the time has arrived for a pragmatism which shall be 
empirically idealistic, proclaiming the essential 
connexion of intelligence with the unachieved fu-
ture--with possibilities involving a transfigura-
tion.97 
2. CONTINUITY. 
Dewey was led to the development of what he has termed 
"for lack of a better word, 'instrumentalism,'" because he was 
94. Dewey, Art.(l922)3,351. 
95. ION, 143-144. 
96. QC, 79. 
97. Dewey, Art.(l917),29. 
. -- ·-
troubled by the dualism between "science" and "morals."98 He 
felt the need of "a method of effective inquiry, which would ap-
ply without abrupt break of continuity to the fields designated 
by both of these '\vords. u99 
Naturalism is based on the continuity of nature, man 
society.lOO In logical theory it means 
on one side, that there is no breach of continuity be-
tween operations of inquiry and biological operations 
and physical operations • . 'Continuity,' on the other 
side, means that rational operations grow out of organ~ 
ic activities, without being identical with that from 
which they emerge.lOl 
The subject of continuity will 'be treated first from the 
standpoint of stability and change; then attention will be given 
to change as evolution and as revolution. 
Dewey is quoted abovel02 as saying that change is the 
primary social fact; however, in Art as Experience he states: 
Nature and life manifest not flux :but continuity, 
and continuity involves forces and structures that 
endure through change; at least when they change, they 
do so more slowly than do surface incidents, and thus 
are, relatively, constant.l03 
One of these forces would be that of habit which "fur-
nishes a permanent thread or axis,nl04 of continuity in activi 
All habit has continuity. When a habit is flexible it does not 
"secure in its operation bare recurrence" nor does it "plunge us 
98. Dewey, Art.(l930),23. 
99. Ibid. 
100. HNC ;· 13. 
101. LOG, 18-19. 
I 102. Supra, p.57, n.32. 
103. AE, 323. 
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into .the hopeless confusion of the abselutely different.nl05 
There is change but it comes about by alteration of the old. 
Dewey states: 
A marked breach of continuity in the sequences of _ 
f uture or ensuing events with what we suppose happened 
in the past is enough, as a rule, to make us believe 
our belief invalid if not imaginary.l06 
Sorley notes, similarly, a continuity in the history of 
moral ideas. Although there is constant change the new stage 
is never entirely new. 107 Dewey speaks of "the inescapable 
linkage of the present v-1ith the past, nl08:: and believes that "pol 
icies framed simply upon -the ground of the knowledge of the 
Dewey thinks that the essential continuity of history is 
doubly guaranteed. On the one hand personal desire and belief 
are functions of habit and custom. On the other hand, objective 
conditions ·which 
provide the resour.ces and tools of action, together 
with its limitations, obstructions and traps, are pre-
cipitates of the past, perpetuating, willy-nilly; its . 
hold and power. The creation of a tabula ~ in or-
der to permit the creation of a new order is so impos-
sible as to set at naught both the hope of bouyant 
revolu£!8naries and the timidity of scared conserva-
tives. 
Mead speaks of continuity in the passage of events as 
105. HNC, 24-4-245. 
106. LOG, 226. 
107. MVIG, 106. 
108. EAE, 97. 
109. EAE, 94. 
110 • pp , . 16 2 • 
II 
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= II being what we mean by the inevitable.l~-;~u: he goes on to sa·y---+-r--------
1, 
11 bare continuity could not be experienced. There is a 
1
1! tang of novelty in each moment of experience ..•.• \vi th-
out this break within continuity, continuity would be 
1 inexperienceable ••... The continuity is always of some 
I 
quality, but as present passes into present there is 
always some break in the continuity--within the conti-
nuity, not of the continuity. The break reveals the 
I 
continuity, !£~le the continuity is the background for I 
the novelty. · 
1 De\tley maintains that there is room in nature for contin• 
gency and novelty. 113 It is to be noted, also, that his some-
\"/hat pessimistic outlook for change as just quoted from The Pub-
lie and its Problems is followed by the assertio~ that changes 
do take place and are cumulative in character. These changes, 
however, have been largely in techniques and instrumentalities; 
and "there is a marked lag in any corr•esponding change of ideas 
and desires." 114 
In the first chapter it was noted115:: that Feldman assert 
II that in Dewey's philosophy there cannot be a 11 consistent con-
I junction of the two principles of continuity and creative novel~ 
ty. 11 To adhere to the one principle compels the denial of the 
other. Feldman bases his conclusion, in part at least, on what 
he calls Dewey's "identity type of continuity." 116 In the light 
-of what Dewey says in one of his latest books about continuity 
1111. 
112. 
113· 
114. 
115. 
116. 
Mead, Art.(l929),239· 
Ibid. 
Dewey, Art. ( 1939) 3, 600. 
PP, 162. 
Supra, p.6, n.13. 
PJD, 89. 
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not being a "bare repetition of identities,nll7 it would seem 
that Feldman's criticism is not well.;.founded or that Dewey has 
taken pains to expound his vie\v more clearly. Pringle-Pattison 
I sees no inherent difficulty in combining emergence with continu-
ity for he speaks of "Continuity ·of process and the emergence of 
I real differences" as "twin aspects of the cosmic hiStory." 11!1 
1
1 Dewey speaks of the possibility of the principle of con-
tinuity operating "so as to leave a person arrested on · a low 
plane of development in a way which limits later capacity for 
growth.nll9 ~mile every experience is a moving force, 11 its value 
can be judged only on the ground of what it moves toward and in-
to. rrl20 The principles of continuity and interaction are not 
separate from each other. In their active union with each oth-
er they 11 provide the measure of the educative significance and 
value of an experience." 12li Dewey is thinking along this same 
line when he says: 
Since the idea of history involves cumulative con-
tinuity of movement in a given direction toward stat-
ed outcomes, the fundamental conception that controls 
determination of subjecti~~tter as history is that of 
a direction of movement. 
This and other occasional passages in Dewey show more 
purpose than is sometimes apparent in Dewey's thought of 
117. LOG, 245. Cf. LOG, 40. 
118. IG, .103. 
119. EAE, 31. 
120. Ibid. 
i 121. EAE, A2-43. 
122. LOG, 234 • . 
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continuity. · In one connection he states that when custom breaks 
down, "the only thing which can link together the succession of 
var ious acts is a common purpose running through separate acts. 
An, end-in-view gives unity and continuity ." 123 Stuart believes 
that while Dewey's assertion of a "natural continuity" of in-
quiry with organic behavior may be consistent naturalism .it is 
11 untrue to experience and unintelligible. 11124 He finds this 
continuity to be that of self-consciousness, not of "nature."l:2 · 
Ayres holds that if "art and morality are continuous with the 
whole of life, the essential continuity is that of thought.''l26 
Hook, in his interpretation of Dewey, speaks of the dis-
continuities within our experience--centers of trouble and per-
il. "Intelligence consists,"- he says, "in acting with and upon 
the specific continuities that run through given situations in 
order to eliminate their specific discontinuities .nl27 De\.,rey, 
though not consistent in his utterances on continuity, purpose 
and intelligence, gives intelligence so large a place in his 
general scheme that it might be held he is really in essential 
agreement with Stuart and A<}'res. He gives . to philosophy the 
role of defining "the larger patterns of continuity which are 
woven in effecting the longer enduring junctions of a stubborn 
past and an insistent future,"--patterns which are "prophecies 
123. ETH, 98. 
124. Stuart,Art.(l939),331. 
125. Ibid.,332-333· 
126. Ayres,Art.(l939),305. 
127. JDIP, 216. 
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rather than records. 11 128 
For Dewey the social process is an evolution, an evolu-
tion that denotes emergence, 129 hence makes possible improve-
ment and advance. As has been noted in an earlier chapter130 
Devrey believes that change must come gradually, no matter how 
critical the emergency. He would agree with Fichte who favored 
gradual progress under constitutional government, rather than 
revolutionary changes in these words: 
Ihre Staatsverfassungen •..•• sollen immer besser 
werden . Dieses geschah ....• entweder durch gewaltsame 
SprUnge, oder durch allm~hliches, langsames, aber 
sicheres Fortschreiten ••.•• Gewaltsame Revolutionen 
sind stets ein ldlhnes Wage stUck der I11enschheit ••..• 
Sicherer ist allm~hliches Fortschreiten zur grBsser-
e.n Aufkl~rung, und mit ihr zur Verbesserung der 
Staat sverfas sung .131"' 
Revolution and war , according to Hertzler, are almost always 
contrary to fundamental principles of progress. They 11 inter-
rupt or destroy progressive processes or even inaugurate retro-
gressive processes which it takes generations and sometimes 
centuries to overcome. 11 132 
Those in sympathy with Marxist or socialist theories 
tend to uphold violence in the way of class war, or at least to 
feel that violence may head off greater violence .133 Hook says 
The chief criticism of D~wey made from the point 
of view of his socialist critics is his underestimation, 
128. Dewey,Art.(l927)3,539· 
129. Childs, Art.(l939),424. 
130. Supra, p.ll, n.32. 
131. znF, vr,s. 
132 • SP , 47 8 • 
133. JDIP, 166. 
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of the necessity of -the class .- struggle as the means 
of achieving the social order presupposed by th~ 
untrammeled use of the method of intelligence.l54 
Ward notes that the function of the democratic state ''was to 
make possible social change without recourse to force and vio-
l ence11; however, the democratic state itself has tended to use 
the force and violence it was supposed to make unnecessary. 
Speaking of the state he says that "in so far as it is now pre-
venting discussion of change it is making inevitable the use of 
force and violence to secure change."l35 
Fichte speaks of a similar cause of revolution in the 
f ollowing words: 
Hemmt man den Fortgahg des menschlichen Geistes ••• 
der zur~ckgehaltene Gang der Natur bricht gewaltsam 
durch und vernichtet alles, was ihn 1m Wege steht, 
die Menschheit r~cht sich auf das grausamste an ihren 
Unterdr~cken, Revolutionen werden nothwendig .l36 
Hertzler believes the causes of revolution indicate the 
need of great flexibility in our social organization. The mean 
of communication must be free in functigning; group 
discussion and protest must be uno.bstructed; there 
must be free determination of group policy; fairness 
in class "relations must exist ••.•• there s~R:I.lld be no 
artificial restrictions upon opportunity. ':ifr 
The liberal, ho,:ld~ : Dewey, parts company "~l'li th the radi-
calism that means dependence upon violence as the "main method 
of effecting drastic changes."~38 Cohen says that to him .. the 
134. JDIP ;' 165. 
135. Ward,Art.(l928},293· 
136. ZDF, VI,6. 
137. SP, 484. 
138. LSA, 62. 
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"idea that armed rebellion is the only, or always effective, 
cure for social ills seems •..•• no better than the old supersti-
tion of medieval medtcine, that blood-letting is the only and 
the sovereign remedy for all bodily ills. nl39- Were liberalism 
dead, as he does not believe it is, C6hen would 
still maintain that it deserved to live, that it was not 
condemned in the court of human reason, but lynched 
outside of it by the passionate and uncompromisingly 
ruthless war spirit, common to communists and .-fascists -
.•••• It is pure fanaticism to belittle the gains which 
have come to mankind from the spiril~f free inquiry, 
free discussion, and accommodation. - -
The search for new values, believes Sdrley, "is a process of 
growth and development, not of destruction:-.or of revolution."L 
Dewey lists three forces that ultimately control socie-
ty-~"habit, coercive and violent force, and action .directed by 
intelligence. nl42 Habit or custom is the strongest force in 
times that are fairly normal, but in a social crisis other 
forces come into play. Reactionaries wanting to prevent change 
of the old order use coercion, intimidation and other forms of 
139. C6hen,Art.(l934),93· 
140. Ibid., 98. 
141. MVIG, 166. 
142. Dewey, Art. ( 1936) 3,166. 
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I 
little knowledge of means of effecting social changes .by any 
method other than'force."l43 Dewey believes that what causes 
social strife is 
failure to bring the conflict into the light of intel-
ligence where the conflicting interests can be adjud-
icated in behalf of the interest of the great majori-
ty •.•.• To say that all past historic social progress. 
has been the result of cooperation ·.and not of conflict 
would be •••• an exaggeration; •.• It is no exaggeration to 
say that the measure of civilization is the degree in 
which the method of coopera,ti ve intelligence replace.s 
the method of brute force.~44 
Dewey thinks society has these three -alternatives: 
(1) It may drift along, more or less an the mercy of accident, 
''with attendant improvisations. to meet special emergencies." 
(2) It may depend upon violence. (3) It may rely upon socially 
organized intelligence. The first two alternatives are not mu-
tually exclusive for if things are permitted to drift "the re-
sult may be some sort of social change effected by the use of 
force, "'Jhether so planned or not.nl45~· De:wey puts his faith in 
evolution that comes: about through the activity of social intel-
ligence.l46 
3. PROGRESS. 
·perry speaks of Dewey's thought as being distinguished 
I by its emphasis on social philosophy and progress, and he 
\ 
!I 
~~ -1-4-3-. _L_o_c_._c_i-·t-.-
1
144. LSA, 80-81. 
145. LSA, 87-88. 
146. EAE, 85. 
Cf. Whitehead, AI, 31 • . 
Cf. CAE, 755-756. 
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1 interprets this thought as "consisting in the perpetual recon-
struction of ends or purposes by which the life of the group is 
liberalized and expanded.nl4-7 Dewey himself sums up his system 
as 1'inquiry." This, he says, is 1'progressive and cumulative." 
Buryl49 would be apt to criticize Dewey's idea of prog-
ress, bound up as it is with his system. Bury believes that the 
11 dogma of progress" has about it the illusion of finality, that 
the time will come "Then it will be supplanted by a new idea as 
humanity's directing idea. 
Maciverl50 would raise issue ~ith Dewey over his at-
tempt to fuse technological and cultural factors in the social 
process. In primitive society means and ends were thus fused, 
but to seek such a unity today would be to resort to a 11 totali-
tarianism that suppresses the varieties of culture and does 
violence to the principle of cultural growth."· Maciver holds 
that the pattern of social change moves tmvards "a greater va-
riety of divergent and interpenetrating cultural coherences 
within an ever more inclusive and uniform utilitarian order.nl5 
Dewey's ideas on progress will be considered under 
heads: what progress is not, what it is, and how it is obtained. 
In the first place, progress is not to be confused with 
mere change. The tendency to do this arose with the almost 
147. PRP, 195. 
148. LOG, 311. Cf . Hertzler, SP, 478. 
149 . IP , 351. 
150. Maciver, Art.(l936),53-54. 
151. Ibid. 
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unbelievable changes that inventions and discoveries of the 
pas t century and more brought to pass in rapid succession. 
Deweyl52 holds this rapid change of conditions afforded an £2-
portunity for progress;' though not itself progress. Leighton 
notesl53 that change and progress are not equivalent terms, de-
generation, also, being change. 
Again, progress is not a definite sum of accomplishment 
that will forever stay done and 
by an exact amount lessens the amount still to be done, 
disposing once and for all of just so many perplexi-
ties and advancing us just so far on our road to a fi-
nal stable and unperplexed goal ••••• Certainly progress · 
in civilization ma;s not only meant increase in ··the 
scope and intricacy of problems to be dealt with, but 
it entails increasing instab1lity.l54 
Hertzlerl55- speaks, similarly, of the goal of social progress 
as a moving goal, ''elusive and receding as we advance, always 
only partially attained as it stands at any given moment." 
A minor form of progress ,c is that of getting nearer to 
ends already sought, minor because it "requires only improve-
ment of the means of action or technical advance. 11156 
In one instance Dewey defines progress as follows: 
Progress is present reconstruction adding fullness 
and distinctnes s of meaning , and retrogression is a 
present slipping away of significance, determination,· 
grasp •.•.• Unless progress is a present reconstructing 
it is nothing ....• Converting strife into harmony, 
152. CAE, 821. Cf. Dewey, Art.(l937)1,181. 
153. ISO, 361. 
154. HNC, 285-286. 
155. SP, 80. 
156. DE, 261. 
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monotony into a variegated seine, and limitation in-
to expansion •••.• is progress• 57. 
Other modes of progress _ consist in nenriching prior pur-
l poses and 1n forming new one.s ••••• projection of new possibili-
1, 
,, 
ties leads to search for new means of execution and progress 
takes place.nl5:8- Prasad,l59- too; links progress with the pur-
of men in society, released and integrated by social, eco-
and cultural changes. 
poses 
1
1 nomic 
The following quotation shows Shafer's criticism of Dew-
ey's idea of progress as readjustment: 
Professor Dewey makes a great show of belief in 
progress, and rests his advocacy of educational change 
on its contribution thereto. But he subjects the no-
tion of progress to an ordeal of 'explanation' from 
which it emerges as 'readjustment.' ••.•• The individU-
al's readjustment to a new circumstance means that a 
problem is solved, but no value inheres in the solu-
tion ••••• and the solution of one problem merely brings 
another •... into the individual's view, where it demands 
from him new readjustment. It is like an endless chain, 
and if the chain is not a circle it might as well be, l60 
for all the links are of equal strength, of equal value. · 
Higher progress than Dewey's ''readjustment 11 type is to 
found in the following statements, having to do with mod1f1 
tion and control: 
1157. 
158. 
159. 
160. 
161. 
Progress consists in modifying the laws of nature 
so that the Republic on Earth may conform to that So-
ciety to be discerned ideally by the divination of W1s-
dom.l61 
HNC, 281-282. 
DE, 261. 
DP, 285. 
PS; 126-127. cr. Dewey,Art.{ 1917) ,12. 
Whitehead, AI, 53· 
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~~---~=ss . is essentially the process of man'_s _____ _ 
increasing control over t.he forces of nature, so-
I 
ciety and human nature.l62 
Leighton outlines the supreme -criterion of social prog-
ress in words that bring to the fore self-determining individu-
als, thus serving as a criticism of Dewey's less adequate con-
Leighton states: I ception. 
1
1 The supreme criterion of social progress is this: 
I 
Does a given type of social order afford the favoring 
conditions for the development of an increasing pro-
Il
l portion ~. of thoughtful, harmonious, self-determining 
individuals rich in satisfying experiences; is there 
11 in it increase in wisdom and self-control, in wealth 
I of experience and insight, in fairmindedness, courte-
sy and simple friendliness? If a social order is not 
producing a larger proportion of individuals of this 
type it is not progressing.lb3 
The final question to be considered in this chapter is 
how Dewey believes progress is to be obtained. In his article 
in Whither Mankind? Dewey takes it for granted that "men live 
in a world that is undergoing extensive and accrelerated change, ''· 
and that "physical science and technological industry are the 
I causes of this change. nl64 Although Dewey at times seems to 
I 
! ~~ :::g:~P ::::~:a::u:n b;h:c ::::: :: ::::n::' o::e:t:::: s t:; t 
\ change, is not to be confused with progress~ The rapid change 
1 
of conditions brought about in recent years "affords an oppor-
\ tunity for progress ·but is not itself progress~n165 
I 
I 
I 162. Hertzler, SP, 116. 163. ISO, 361. Cf. Hertzler, SP, 73, 91. ~164. Dewey,Art.(l929) 1 ,313. cr. FAC; 171. 65. CAE, 821. Cf. S~afer, PS, 44. = . . . . . .. -======= 
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Hu Shih, in Whither Mankind?, expresses himself as con-
vinced by what he has seen of "human slavery'' in the Orient tha 
u a civilization to be worthy of its name must be built upon the 
foundation of material progress in l66 Millikan, who believes 
that progress :is obtained by the "discovery of new truth and the 
passing on of old truth'' 167 thinks that progress is now assured 
against any possibility of decline because modern science has 
so greatly extended facilities for the preservation and trans-
mission of knowledge.l68 Schilppl69, on the other hand, be-
lieves that a "continued one-sided emphasis on the physical sci-
ences" means the ruin of western culture. 
Dewey would find himself in fairly close accord with Hu 
and Millikan, less so with Sehilpp. He would see less than 
Millikan in the transmission of old truth as requLsite to prog-
ress, believing that "No advance in human history that was of 
any importance was ever made by taking steps along old -lines .._rrl: · 
He says that he believes the "fallacy which most paralyzes hu~ 
man effort today is the idea that progress _can take plac'e by 
more steps in the old wrong direction."l71 Following new paths 
is necessary if progress is to be made, thinks Dewey. 
166; 
167. 
168. 
1
169. 
170. 1171. 
Hu,Art.(l929),29. 
Millikan,Art.(l928),166. 
Ibid., 167. 
Schilpp,Art.(l928),324. 
CAE-;; 662-663. 
Ibid. 
cr. SHafer, PS,232. 
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.~other thing that makes for change and progress is di-
versity.l72 Addams, also, believes progress :- comes through the 
individual who varies from the type and has sufficient 
energy to express this variation ••••• Progress, however, 
is not secure ~ntil the mass has conformed to this new 
righteousness. ·r3 
De·wey considers ease of social change a condition of 
progress. 17 4 At the same time he grants to those who hold that 
reactionary conservatism ends by strengthening the cause of 
progress there are times when reactionary forces release pro-
gressive ones. He believes: 
ReactionaJYism helps only when it awakens men's 
minds, .only when it makes them see things they did-
n't see before, ,only when it focusses attention~···· 
The reactionary also serves by forcing the radical to 
abandon the cloudlan~gr dreams and come to closer 
grip with realities. 
As stated above, Dewey does not think progress is to be 
identified with social change. Rather does progress .depend on 
the ''direction which human beings deliberately · give that 
change. nl76 He holds: 
Progress is not automatic; it depends upon human 
intent and aim and upon acceptance of responsibility 
for its production ••••• ! put primary emphasis upon ,re-
sponsibility for intelligence, for the power which 
forese.es;. plans and constructs in advance.l77 
Dewey says that "sc·ience represents the of.fice of 
172. DE, 104. 
173 . DSE, 158. 
17 4 . CAE, 822 • 
175. CAE, 816- 818. Cf. Hertzler, SP, 550ff. 
176. CAE, 822. 
177~ CAE, 824. Cf. Boodin,Art.(l939),110. 
103. 
intelligence" and 11 is the sole instrumentality of conscious 1 as 
178 dist inct from accidental progress." Again, the ident ifica-
t i on of science and intelligence might be challenged. 
Rogers17g consider s the underlying motive of Dewey's 
phi losophy to be an attempt to ''furnish a sound logical basis 
f or progress .. " He thinks that for Dewey thinking is 
the method of social advance ••••• a method that is to 
'freEL·us. alike from .. the unchanging ideals of the con-
servative , and from a spasmodic demand for novelty 
. or freedom working under no principle of control from 
the past . 180 
178. DE~ 266. 
179. SHP, 479. 
180. Ibid . 
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CHAPTER VI 
TRADITION AND CHANGE IN INSTITUTIONS -, 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
From the study made in the preceding chapters it may be 
conclUded that, in general, De\'rey uses three criteria for the 
evaluation of institutions and attitudes toward them. In the 
first place, institutions, like traditions, , are subject to re-
construction ·to meet changing needs; 1again, this reconstruction-
or change should come gradually, as an evolution; 2 finally, so-
cial progress is secured by experimental inquiry, or intell1-
gence.3 In connection with the third cri.terion it is essential 
to remember that for D~wey social inquiry involves both 11 obser-
vat ional ascertainment of fact'' and "appropriate operational 
conceptions."4 Facts and ideas, practice and theory, are strict 
ly_ correlative. Social inquiry is immature and unsatisfactory 
in so far as 
these two operations of fact-finding and of setting up 
theoretical ends are carried on independently of each 
other, with the consequence that factual propositions . 
1. Supra, pp. 67-69. 
2. Supra, p. 94. 
3. Supra, pp. 41;47;87;97;103. 
4. LOG, 491. 
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on one side and conceptual or theoretical structures 
on the other are regarded each as final and complete 
in itself by one or another school.5 
Before considering Dewey's evaluation of such institu-
tions as the family, the church, and the school, as well as po-
litical and economic institutions, attention is called to some 
of Dewey's general opinions on the subject of institutions. 
Dewey believes that 11 institutions and traditions are i n-
)i dispensable to the nurture of what is deepest and most worthy in I 
1 human life."6 He would agree with Davis7 \<Vho likens institu-
tiona to the steel beams and metal ribs of an ocean liner, in 
that they knit social life together; however, with the stabili-
ty suggested by this figure Dewey would add -a certain flexibil-
ity that makes possible the adaptation of institutions to chang-
1 ing conditions.S He expresses the same idea in these words: 
I 
I 
Every social phenomenon •.... is itself a sequential 
course of changes , and hence a fact isolated from the 
history of which it is a moving constituent ~oses the 
qualities that make it distinctively social. 
I Moore lO points out the functional and dynamic nature of human 
II 
II relations involved in institutions. 
They are not separate, 
static entities but are 11 functionings of. men" and nreal only as 
minds make them.n 
When institutions fail to meet the needs of society they 
5. LOG, 507. Cf. LOG, 493· 
6. LSA, 30. cr. Bosley, QRC; 148-149. 
7 • CSM~ . 8. 
8. PHC, 139-140. Cr. HNC, 239· 
9.- LOG, 501. 
110. Moore,A~t.(l929),280. 
II 
should be changed or "re-formed."ll In one instance Dewey 
states that the test of institutions is their 11 effect in · fur-
thering continued education, n that all 
social institutions have a meaning , a purpose. That 
purpose is to set free and to develop the capacities 
of human individuals without respect to race, sex, 
class or economic status .•••• the supreme test of all 
political institutions and industrial arrangements 
•.•• the contribution -they make to the all-round growth 
of every member of society.l2 
Hook thinks that Dewey's ethical and social theory spec 
ifies "institutional changes" as "the most effective instru-
II menta of liberating the possibilities of individual growth."l3 
11 Changes in institution-s are not easily secured. The au-
1 t hority embodied in them is hostile to change, 14 and habit make i 
change dlfficult. 15 There is conservatism among the common peo-, 
ple, as we11. 16 Bosley, a follower of Dewey, speaks of the law 
of inertia that governs institution-s, causing them to lose the 
capacity of self-criticism, hence negating their value.l7 
Dewey asks, "How· •.•• can we get leverage for changing in 
sti tutions? rl. He decides that the chief means of continuous im-
provement and "social rectification ,lies in utilizing the oppor-
tunities of educating the young to modify the prevailing types 
11. LSA, 62. 
12. RPH, 186. 
13. JDIP, 112. 
14. Dewey, Art.(1937)1,180. 
15. HNC, 122. 
16. Davis, CSM, 9 .. 
17. QRC, 148-149. 
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of thought and desire. n 18 
There should be perpetual renewal or reconstruction of 
institutions. Where conditions do not permit such renewal there 
is danger of explosive changes. "The cost of revolutions," says 
Dewey, "must be charged up to those vlho have taken for their aim 
arrest of custom instead of its readjustment."l9 Too : often does 
it happen that 
the man who should be criticizing institutions expends 
his energy in criticizing those who would re-form them. 
What he really objects to is any disturbance of his own 
vested securities, comforts and privileged powers.20 
L. THE FAI"liLY. 
There is not a great deal about the family as an insti- J 
tution found in Dewey's writings. The section on the family in 
Ethics, although written by Tufts, may be said to represent 
Dewey's own thought, so close is the acknowledged agreement be-
tween the joint authors on subjects treated. 
Anything that gives women greater freedom of activity 
has ever had Dewey's enthusiastic support. He was an early ad-
vocate of woman's suffrage, which he deemed a necessary part of 
political democracy.21 It is said that Dewey's support of wom-
en 1 s rights was due to ''his knowledge of the character and in-
telligence of his wife, of Ella Flagg Young., and of Jane 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
HNC, 126-127. Cf. Cunningham, PP, 217ff. 
HNC, . 167 -168. 
Ibid. 
Jane Dewey, Art.(t939),39. 
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Addams.u22 He would advocate such changes in the institution~ 
of the family as might be necessary to give women greater free-
dom. When in the Orient twenty years ago he felt it furnished 
an example of what "masculine civilization ·o could be and do. 11 
He saw defects in Japan due to submission of women, and of Chi-
na he v1rote: 
It is my conviction that not merely the domestic 
and educational backwardness of China, but the in-
creasing physical degeneration and the universal po-
litical corruption and lack of public spirit, which 
make China such an ~asy mark, is the result of the 
condition of women. 3 
Dewey sees the family as an institution being weighed 
in ·the balance and facing threats of disintegration. As an ex-
ample, the situation in Soviet Russia comes most readily to 
mind. There the traditional family is considered nhostile to a 
truly communal life. "24 ~tli th reference to the family in Russia 
Dewey states: 
There is no word one hears oftener than Gruppe, 
and all sorts of groups are instituted that militate 
against the primary social importance of the family 
unit. In consequence, to anyone who looks at the mat-
ter cold-bloodedly, free from sentimental associations 
clustering about the historical family institution, a 
most interesting sociological experimentation is taking 
place, the effect of which should do something to de-
termine how far the bonds that hold the tradition-al 
family together are intrinsic and how far due to ex-
traneous causes; and how far the family in its accus-
tomed form is a truly socializing agency and how far 
a breeder of non-social interests.25 
22. Loc. cit.,30. 
23. LCJ, 161. 
24. ISR, 77. 
25. ISR, 77-78. 
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Robinson does not believe that Soviet leaders wish to 
destroy the family as an institution. He thinks they merely 
wish to subordinate it to the state , and "make it less private 
than it is in other a·ctual states. rr26 
Dewey felt that the family and locality spirit gave Cni-
na "its strength for its old traditional ends and its v.reakness 
for contemporary conditions and for international relations . "27 
Lirt28 writes more sympathetically and understandingly of the 
family system as the basis of Chinese society. He gives the 
follo"'ving comparison of the Chinese and the Japanese : 
The Chinese always say of themselves that their na-
tion is like 'a tray of loose sand,' each grain being, 
not an individual but a family. On the other hand, the 
Japanese nation is •••.• welded together like a piece of 
granite. Perhaps this is a good thing. The next world 
explosion may blow up the granite, but can at best but 
disperse the sands. The sands will remain sands.29 
Dev-;ey observes that in every large industrial center the 
effect of "machine industrialization has been to disintegrate 
the traditional family . "30 He thinks that Russia in creating 
social combinations to supplant or widen that of the family was 
trying to forestall these consequences of industrialization•31 
Perhaps greater change in the external conditions of 
family and home ha-s · come from a radical change in ideas, such ·as 
26. PE, 97-99. 
27. ISR, 258. 
28. MGrJJP, 175ff. 
29. MCMP, 185-186. 
30. ISR, 81. Cf. ETH, 497. ' 
31 . ISR, 81. . 
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a ·modification of views as to divorce and a questioning of the 
desirability of family life. These ideas lead to the tendency 
to ttremove much if not all social, legal, a.nd moral support from 
the institution of the family, and to encourage casual attach-
ments instead of permanent unions.n32 
Although the family is thus threatened, Ellis33 believes ! 
it cannot be destroyed because of the biological foundation on 
which it rests. Del-ley, also, recognizes physiological factors 
of sex; of procreation,· immaturity and need of care implicated 
in functions expressed in family life, but he tends to lay 
I greater stress on _the 11 something more in any family as socia-
l 
II 
I 
tion;.u This "something more 11 is the "transformation of the 
purely organic by inclusion ·within the scope of human associa-
tion. 11 34 The difference between the animal and the human 
is made when new potentialities are actualized, when 
the range of interactions that delimits the notion of 
the organic is taken up into the wider and more subtly 
complex association·,which forms human society. 35 
The family has been a great factor in human advance fro 
the "relatively planless and casual existence of the animal 
world to a significant and worth while life. 11 This advance has 
come about because civilized man has been able to build insti-
tutions, and has been disposed to do so, to give strength and 
32. ETH, 499-500. 
33· Ellis, Art.(l929)L210. 
34. Dewey, Art.(l928)c,l70. 
35. Ibid. 
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support to his plans and efforts for higher life.36 
Dewey believes that iri its deepest sense, and richest, 
a community must remain a "matter of face-to-face intercourse." 
For this reason he holds that the family and neighborhood, defi-
1 cient though they be, . 
I have always been the chief agencies of nurture, the 
means by which dispositions are stably formed and ideas 
acquired 1r1hich laid hold on the roots of character. The 
Great Community ••••• is conceivable. But it can never 
possess -all the qualities which mark a local community. 
It will do its final work in ordering the relations and 
enriching the experience of local associations.37 
3. THE CHURCH. 
Dewey is said to have accepted, nominally, the religious 
teachings in which he was brought up and he joined a church in 
Burlington at an early age.39 Although he tried to believe in 
the doctrines of the church "his belief was never whole-hearted 
36. ETH, 504-505. Cf. Addams, DSE, 78. 
37. pp' 211. 
38. Ellis, Art.(l929),226. 
I 39 • Jane Dewey , Art • ( 19 39) , 17 • 
I 
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' enough to satisfy his emotional need."4o 
One searches in vain for commendation of the tradition-
al church on the part of Dewey. In Ethics the church is cred-
ited with contributions to the justice of the marriage relation 
"and therefore to the better theory of the family, " 41 but, 
while this section .had Dewey's approval, it was written by 
Tufts. Almost without exception Dewey mentions the church but 
1 to criticize. Some of these criticisms will be noted. This 
will be followed by what he says about the decline of the influ- · 
ence of the church, by what he considers of religious value, andj 
I by a criticism of Dewey's interpretation of religion. 
,, Dewey thinks that the church, "the most pO\verful and 
authoritative of all social institutions, 11 42 has been dominated 
by people who used it for personal ends. He speaks of persons 
who, finding themselves in positions of social power and author-
ity, 
readily claim to be the bearers and defenders of ideal end 
in church and state. They then use the prestige and au-
thority their representative capacity as guardians of the 
highest ends confers on them to cover actions taken in 
behalf of the harshest and narrowest of material ends.43 
Theologians of the church are accused of glorifying a 
life of knowing apart from and above a life of doing. They 
teach, says Dewey, that God is the "perfect and ultimate 
40. Ibid. Cf. Dewey, Art.(l930),19. 
41. ETH, 494. 
42. QC, 255. 
43. QC, 282. 
reality" and that to know Him is bliss eternal. 44 "The pride of 
th~se who feel themselves learned in the express and explicit 
will of God is the most exclusive."45 
To this pride of knowing Dewey attributes what he ·calls 
11 the historic isolation of the church from other social institu-
tions." 46 He sees a present demand that churches take a more 
active interest in social affairs, that they take a "definite 
stand upon such questions as war, economic injustice, political 
corruption11 ;47 however, he feels that the church finds itself i 
such a dilemma as to make its social efforts of little or no ef-
feet. 
The dilemma in which the church finds itself has to do 
with the relation of social values to "a supernatural." Dewey 
puts -~ t thus : 
On the one hand, it is urged that the churches ar e 
going outside their special province when they involve 
themselves in economic and political issues. On the 
other hand, the very fact that they claim if not a mo-
nopoly of __ supreme. values :o and motivating forces, yet a 
unique relation to them, makes it impossible for the 
churches to participate in promotion of social ends 
on a natural and equal basis. The surrender of claims 
to an exclusive and authoritative position is a sine 
qua non for doing away with the dilemma in which church-
es now find tnemselves in respect to their sphere of so-
cial action.48 _ 
Historic Christianity is criticized, also, as being 
44. QC, 292. 
45. QC, 308. 
46. Ibid. 
47. CF, 82. 
48. CF, 83. 
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spiritually aristocratic, , for Dewey sees it as having been com-
mitted to a 11 separation of sheep and goats; the saved and the 
lost; the elect and the mass•" 49 
Dewey sees a decline in the "influence of priest and I 
pastor"50 and with this a decline in the influence of the churc I. 
'I I It might be said that ' he attributes the decline in the influ-
1 
ence of the church to two things: (1) The growth of the indi~ 
vidual in importance, and (2) The separation of church and 
state. 
When individuals were thought capable of direct rela-
1 tionship with God without the church as an intermediary, the 
II individual person developed in importance while the church lost 
some of its power and influence.51 
While there is still a conflict between church and 
state in some countries, the social center of gravity has been 
shifted from the church and the "thing new in history, the 
thing once unheard of, is that the organization in question is 
a special institution ·within a secular community.f'52 
Schaub53 believes that De.wey is not opposed to the ex-
istence of churches as a form of social institution. He would 
h~ve churches recover their vitality by reinforcing the human 
49. CF, 84. 
50. Dewey, Art.(l939)1,828. 
51. RPH, 47. 
52. CF, 61-62. 
53. Schaub, Art.(l939),413. 
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values 11 that are prized and that need to be cherished, values 
that are satisfied and rectified by all human concerns and ar-
rangements. '1 54 
De\-rey says that the adjective "religious'' does not de-
1 note an entity, such as an institution or a body of beliefs. 
II 
does not denote anything to which one can specifically 
point as one can point to this and that historic reli-
1 gion or existing church ••••• It denotes attitudes that 
1 may be taken toward every object and every proposed 
I end or ideal.55 
I He speaks of the religiouB experience as being a reality in so 
It 
far as "irt the midst of effort to f oresee and regulate future 
objects we ar e sustained and expanded in feebleness ... and failure 
by the sense, of an enveloping whole. n56 
In his response to Schaub's article Dewey states that 
his later writings have been devoted t o 
making explicit the religious values implicit in the 
spirit of science as undogmatic reverence for truth in 
whatever .form it presents itself, and the religious 
values implicit in our common life, especially_ in:-_ the 
moral significance of democracy as a way of living to-
gether.5'f 
Dev.fey goes on to say that he wrote A Common Faith to show per-
sons who have _abandoned supernaturalism and are consequently re-
preached by traditionalists that "they still have within their 
experience all the elements which g ive the religious attitude 
its value." 58 
54. CF, 82. 
55. CF, 9-10. I 56. HNC, 236-237. 
1 
57. Dewey, A:r\t. ( 1939) 3, 597. 
~~r~-'- Ibid. _____________ _ 
. II 
116 ~ 
-===--
I' 
\'lhile it is true that the church has at times merited 
some of the criticism given by Dewey, it might be urged that his 
interpretation of the church and religion is wanting in validity 
and adequacy. This matter is rather fully treated by Schaub in 
the Schilpp volume, as it is by Ensley in his dissertation, and 
will be but noted here. Questions might be raised, for example, 
about the church's "isolation from social institutions," just 
what Dewey means by the 11 supernatural'' and the dilemma he be-
lieves it places before the church, and the adequacy of a life 
that lacks a sense of dependence and worship. The need of the 
latter is expressed by Schaub in these words: 
A full-orbed human life must include worship as 
well as wonder and work ..•.• from worship comes won-
der's deepest arousal, and that breadth of horizon, 
and confident, irrepressible zeal without which work 
is lacking in perspective and is eventually doomed to 
flag . Emphasis upon work, and upon wonder in connec~ 
tion therewith, is ever a needed gospel, and Dewey's 
message is perhaps peculiarly suited to the needs of 
our day. Yet what is also required, and probably even 
more deeply, is a corresponding stress upon the indis-
pensability of worship and of that particular exercise 
of wonder to which worship g ives rise and by which it 
is refined.59 
4. THE SCHOOL. 
Kilpatrick60 believes that Dewey is responsible, more 
than any other one person, for "changing the tone and temper of' 
American education within the past three decades. 11 That his in-
fluence has reached beyond the borders of his native land was 
59. Schaub, Art.(l939),416. 
60. Kilpatrick, Art.(l939),464. 
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indicated above.61 Dewey correlated knowin,o:. and doing in his 
Laboratory Schoo162 in a \vay that made it as important a ven-
ture in educational experimentation as was ever made. While 
short-lived itself it led to further experimental work in this 
and other lands. vfuat Pound~3 has to say. about education ~ in~ re 
lation to the social order and modern life is interesting both 
in itself and as indicative of Dewey's influence on his thought ·I 
The three criteria for evaluating institutions, mentioned above, 
are all to be noted in this passage in which Pounu ·speaks of ed 
ucation as making 
us conscious that the pictures which sufficed for our 
grandfathers or our fathers may need retouching or re-
drawing now that huge metropolitan areas have sprang 
up where less than a century ago were swamps or Indian 
missions or frontier outposts. I~ost of all it makes 
us cautious about attempts to make things over out of 
whole cloth and over night to the pattern of uncriti-
cized conceptions of what ought to be·. It mediates 
between the need of stability and the need of change.64 
Childs65 gives the reminder that Dewey construes educa-
tion ·broadly, including schooling, but not limited to it. In 
its broadest sense it indicates any change that experience 
works in an individual. For the most part this consideration 
I 
of the subject "Till deal with education that signifies consciou l' 
effort by the school to shape conduct and thought. Four topics 
will be treated: what Dewey has to say about mistaken ideas of I 
61. Supra, pp. 21-25. 
62. Kilpatrick, Art.(l939),460ff . 
63. Pound, Art .(l928),102-103 . 
64. Ibid. 
65. Childs, Art.(l939),420. 
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education; reconstruction in education; education~ .and the 1m-
provement of society; and the school and public opinion. 
It is a mistake to think of the school as an institu-
tion for conserving and transmitting uncri ticized tradi tion·s ~ 
Schools are accused of sending out men to meet exigencies of 
contemporary life "clothed in the chain- armor of antiquity, and 
priding themselves on the a\vkwa:rdness of their movements as 
evidence of deep-wrought , time-tested convictions •. n66 
The school holds the key to orderly social reconstruc-
tion ~ but too often it has made the mistake of inculcating fixed 
conclusions rather than developing intelligence as a method of 
action~;67 Thinking is depressed in.·~ schools by the "weight of 
authority, custom; imitation, pressure of time, large numbers; 
the need of 'covering the ground;' of securing mechanical skill 
f i t n68 .••.• o spar ng axpayers. Such obstacles as ~ these are con.;.. 
solidated by fears lest the school promote habits of indepen-
dent thinking. It is fear of consequences of thought, thinks 
De\vey, that is back of most 11 professions of reverence for cul-
ture, respect for quantity of information and emphasis upon ~ dis 
cipline • 11 69 
A third mistake made by the schools, according to Dewey, 
is that of placing constant emphasis upon ~ preparation for a 
66. CAE, 779-780. 
67 . QC, 251- 252. 
68. CAE, 464. 
-~Ibid. 
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remote future. It would not seem entirely out of place to ask 
De1r1ey whether the tentative nature of his philosophy has had 
any connection with this error. Dewey asks: 
Who can reckon up the loss of moral power that 
arises from the constant impression that nothing is 
worth do.ing in itself, but only as a preparation for 
something else, which in turn ·,is only a getting ready 
for some genuinely serious end beyond?70 
Another mistake in education~ at least if it be in·· a de- l 
mocracy, is what might be termed class education. It is impos~ 
sible for education to meet its social responsibilities of 
training people to live together if the curriculum is based on 
"utilitarian ends narrowly conceived for the masses 11 and "tradi-
tions of a specialized class'' for the "higher education of the 
few. "71 
There is need for a reconstruction of- education·• It 
must go hand in hand 1-vith a reconstruction of philosophy and of 
social ideals and methods. Dewey writes: · 
If there is especial need of educational reconstruc-
tion at the present time, if this need makes urgent a 
reconsideration of the basic ideas of traditional phil-
osophic systems, it is because of the thoroughgoing 
change in social life accompanying the advance of sci-
ence, the industrial revolution, and the development of 
democracy. Such practical changes cannot take place 
without demanding an educational reformation to meet 
them, .and without leading men to ask what ideas and 
ideals are implicit in these secial changes, end what 
revisions they require of the ideas and ideals ,.-which 
are inherited from older and unlike cultures .72 
70. MPE, 25. 
71. DE, 226. 
72. DE, 386. 
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If the school:_is to prepare the individual to take his 
share in the solution of problems of the day it must see that 
his mind is led out into new fields. To enter a ne-...; field he 
must be led to ask questions he had not thought of before, ques.::  
I tions that create a "thirst for additional information .to be ob-
I tained by observation, by reading, by consulting persons -expert 
in that particular field. n73 The school must see, also, that 
the individual acquires not only forms of skill but that there 
be 11 enlargement of mental vision, power of increased discrim1~ 
nation• of final values, a sense for ideas, for principles,"74 
lest his skill be indifferently used to any end. Another requi 
site is the training of the individual -. to initiative and adapt-
ability. Dewey states: 
A society which is mobile, which is full of chan-
nels for the distribution of a change occurring any-
where, must see to it that its members are educated 
to personal initiative and adaptability. Otherwise, 
they will be overwhelmed by the changes in which they 
are caught and '"hose significance or connections they 
do no.t perceive.75 
Dewey believes that the school has no moral end or aim 
apart from participation ~ in social life.76 The school is re-
spon'Sible for the development of ultimate moral motives and 
forces, and setting them to work in the service of social inter I 
eats and aims. These ultimate motives and rorcea are held to b ~ 
7 3 • IrwT , 218 • 
7 4. HlilT, 288. 
75. DE, 102. 
76. MPE, 11. Cf. PHC'; 317. 
121 
----------------------==========#==-=------=----
(I 
social intelligence, "the power of observing and comprehending 
social situations., 11 and social power, "trained capacities of 
control. n 77 
S6c1al change needs psychological ' and moral foundation-s• 
A change is but external unless it is "rooted in the attitudes 
of those who bring it about and of those who are affected by 
it."78 For example, economic change does not of itself produce 
changes, mental, moral and cultural, necessary for the endUring 
success of economic change.79 Again, general and enduring mor-
al changes do not accompany a political revolution unless' appro-· 
priate habits of thought have previously been insensibly ma-
tured.80 
The chief means of continuous social progress• observes 
Dewey, 11 lies in utilizing the opportunities of educating the 
young to modify the prevailing types of thought and desire. ~~~1 
Adults have their habits comparatively formed but the impulsive 
activity of youth is "vivid, flexible, .experimenting, curious.-" 
!I Adults may not be able to perceive needed changes. They may be 
I 
I i unwilling to make the effort to effect a change or unwilling to 
pay the price of such change. It is necessary that in youth 
habits be formed which are more intelligent, more sen-
sitively percipient, more informed with foresight, ,more 
aware of' t...-hat they are about, more direct and sincere, 
77. IviPE, 43. 
78. Dewey, Art.(l937)4,237· Cf. Hocking, .Art.(l935),239. 
79. Ibid. 
80. HNC, 108-109. 
81. HNC, 127. Cf. Boodin, Art. ( 1939), 119. 
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more flexibly responsive than those now current.82 
Dewey states that it is not necessary to have a "formu-
lated definite ideal of a better state"83 in order that educa-
tion of youth for social progress be effective; and Kilpatrick 
observes that for Dewey education for social change is not an 
"indoctrination of specific ways of change."84 His emphasis is 
rather to the contrary. There is, however, a statement in De-
mocracy and Education that seems to hold to the necessity of a 
somewhat definite ideal of society. It is that "the conception 
of education as a social process and function has no definite 
meaning until we define the kind of society we have in mind. 11 85 
Dewey's apparent approval of the educational experiment he saw 
being carried on in Russia gives further ground for thinking he 
does not entirely discount the value of an ideal of a better 
state. 
In Russia he found education and propaganda identified 
for the ''universal good of universal humanity" ; 86: he thought the 
great task of the Russian school to be that of counteracting and 
transforming domestic and neighborhood tendencies so that col-
leoti vism might succeed; 8T and he said that he was converted by 
the Russian educational situation to the idea that 11 only in a 
82. HNC, 127. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Kilpatrick, Art.(l939),468. 
85. DE, 112. 
1 86. ISR, 54. Cf. Robinson, PE, 100. 
I 87. ISR, 72. 
i 
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society based upon :the cooperative principle can the ideals of 
educational reformers be adequately carried into operation;. 11 88 
Dewey states, also, that if education has no· "frame of refer-
ence it is bound to be aimless, lacking a unified objectiverr; 
he adds that the United States has such a unified frame in· de-
mocracy.89 Counts, also, would have education reinforce the 
type of social theory in which he believes. He writes as fol-
lows: 
If organized education is to reinforce the democratic 
method in society and serve the purpose of achieving so-
cial change with a minimum of disorder, while conserving 
all the democratic values, it must strike a balance be-
tween the processes of molding and enlightenment.90 
With reference to education and the means of social 
change, Dewey thinks that 
those who believe that education in the schools . ~has 
some part to play in bringing about social transfor-
mation have a greater responsibility than any others . 
to consider the means by which the transformation is 
to be brought about and the especial place of educa-
tional means among the total means.91 
He believes that educators have three possible direc-
tions of choice as to means of effecting social change.92 They· 
may act in such a way as to 11 perpetuate the present confusion 
' and possibly increase it"; they may become intelligently conser 
ative and try to use the schools to maintain the old order 
I 
I I 88. ISR, 86. 4 
I 89. De·wey , Art.(l937) · ,238. 
1
90. PAD;· 303. - 4 91. Dewey, Art.(l936) ,242. 
92. Dewey, Art.(l937)4,236. 
I 
I. 
"intact against the impact of new forces 11 ; or they may 
select the newer scientific, technological, and cultur-
al forces that are producing change in the old order; 
may estimate the direction in which they are moving and 
their outcome if they are given freer play, 93nd see what can be done to make the schools their ally. · 
Needless to say the third choice _is the one Dewey be-
lieves should be made. He would have teachers :'' cultivate the 
J habit of suspended judgment ••••• of desire for evidence, of ap-
1 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
peal to observation rather than sentiment •••.• inquiry rather 
than conventional idealizations.n94 When teachers do this 
schools will be the dangerous outposts of a human civ-
ilization.·~ But they wil l -also · beg in to be supremely 
interesting places~ For it will then have come about 
that education and P9litics are one and the same thing 
because politics will have to be in fact \vhat it now 
pretends to be, the intelligent management of social 
affairs.95 
The school has responsibility in the formation ' of public 
opinion· ~ It should assist in the necessary inquiry and communi-
cation of results , the latter being the "same thing as the for-
mation of public opinion•rr96 It requires continuous, persistent ! 
inquiry to "provide the material of enduring opinion about pub- I 
lie matters."97 Devvey holds : 
Genuinely public policy cannot be generated unless . 
it be informed by knm•rledge, and this knO\'lledge does 
not exist except >'I hen there is systematic,. thorough, 
and well-equipped search and record.98 
9 3 • Lo c . cit • 
94. CAE, 781. 
95. Ibid. 
96. pp' 177. 
97 • pp ' ' 17 8 • 
98. PP, 179. 
125 
\I 
II D::~~:::~-::en~h century liberalism, for exampl:-.-:-h~ws 
II that unless there is a "background of informed political intel-
1 ligence., direct action in behalf of professed liberal ends may 
end in development of political irresponsibility."99 
Academic freedornis of social significance for 
without freedom of inquiry and freedom on the part of 
teachers and students to explore the forces at work 
in society and the means by which they may be direct-
ed, the habits of intelligent action that are neces~ 
sary to the orderly development of society cannot be 
createa.lOO 
Dev.,rey considers the fundamental defect in democracy at 
the present time to be the 11 a.ssumption that political and eco-
nomic freedom can be achieved without first freeing the mind." 
Freedom of mind does not happen spontaneously, nor is it 
achieved just by the absence of obvious restraints. I It require _, 
I 
constant 
nurture of right habits of observation and reflection-. 
Until the taboos that hedge social topics , from con-
tact with thought are removed scientific ·method and 
results in subjects far removed from social themes 
will make little impression upon : the public mind.lOl 
Countsl02 believes that the "two chief threats to an in.;.. 
I tellectually free and honest education" are the "encroachments 
I· of 
I 
government and the attacks of minorities upon the school." 
He "rould have teachers prepared to 11 check or, at least, chal-
lenge" these encroachments. 
99. LSA, 15. Cf. Dewey, Art. ( 1931), 487. 
100. Dewey, Art. ( 1936) 3,166. Cf. PHC~ 297. 
101. CAE, 464. 
102. PAD; 309. 
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5 ;·· POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. 
As yet, ,says Dewey, no technique in important economic, 
political and international affairs has been developed. A _com-
plexi ty of condi tiona places difficulty in the vray of the devel-
opment of such technique. It may be that the difficulty wil~-
never be overcome, but the choice is "bet\veen the development 
of a technique by \vhich intelligence will become an intervening 
partner and a continuation of a regime of accident, waste and 
distress. "1°3 Consideration \vill now be given to Dewey's views 
in these fields where he states technique is yet to be devel-
oped: political institutions, economic ·institutions and interna 
tional relations~ 
The chief political institutionis the state. The val-
ue of the state is to be measured by its consequences.l04 It 
has no inherent sanctity. It has been organized by the public 
for the protection of the interests of its members. 105 Dewey 
states: 
The belief in political fixity, of the sanctity of 
some form of state consecrated by the efforts of our 
fathers and hallowed by tradition, is one of the stumb-
ling blocks in the way of orderly and directed change; 
it is an invitation to revolt and revolution;l06 
Although there is diversity in political forms, belief 
in "the state as an archetypal entity persists in political 
103. HNC, .277. 
104. pp' 74. 
105. PP, 33. 
106 • pp ' 34. c f . pp , 71. 
-- -
philosophy and science.u107 The state "becomes static, rigid, 
institutionalized whenever it is not employed to facilitate and 
enrich the contacts of human being with one another. rrl08 If the1 
state is to be strong, forceful and stable against accident its 
citizens must be free to "function to the limit of their capaci-
1 ty,ul09 and to experiment. 
After all, the formation of states is an experimental 
process, 110 and a state is u ever something to be scrutinized, 
investigated, searched for. Almost as soon , as its form is sta-
bilized, .it needs to be re-made."lll It should.'. not be thought, 
hO"v'lever, that a mere change in political agencies and methods 
will work wonders. There must be "constant watchfulness :~' and 
criticism of public officials by citizens'! if a state is to be 
11 maintained in integrity and usefulness."ll2 
At times state activity has proven injurious, as in the 
waging of war and the "suppression of dissentient minorities."ll~ 
At times a large measure of state activity is indicated; at oth-
er times a "policy of quiescence and laissez-faire" better meets 
conditions. Dewey holds: 
There is no antecedent universal proposition which 
can be laid down because of which the functions of a 
107. pp, 45. 
108. RPH, 207. 
109. RPH, 208. 
110. pp, 33. 
111. pp, 31-32. 
112. PP, 68-69. 
113. PP, 73-74. Cf. RPH, 204. 
128 
II 
state should be limited or should be expanded. Their 
scope is something to be critically and exper imentally 
determined.l14 
The state is an agency for conservation. ~vhile the time 
may come when a state will organize to "manufacture and dissemi-
nate new ideas 11 it is rather an institution that provides secur-
ity for private persons engaged in discovery and invention·•ll5 
The tendency to 
put what is old and established in uniform lines under 
the regulation of the state has psychological support. 
Habits economize intellectual as well as muscular ener-
gy. They relieve the mind from thought of means , thus 
freein~ ~hought to deal with new conditions and pur-
poses. 1 
Dewey would, in fact, measure the goodness of a state by the 
I 
de- l 
gree in which it nrelieves the individual from the waste of neg-
ative struggle and needless conflict and confers upon him posi-
tive assurance and rel3nforcement in what he undertakes." 117 
Political party machinery has been developed t o such an 
extent as to quite eclipse the "public, 11 more often than not. 
Dewey has this in mind when he says: 
Instead of individuals who in the privacy of their 
consciousness make choices which are carried into ef-
fect by personal volition, there are citizens who have 
the blessed opportunity to vote for a ticket of men 
mostly unknown to them, and which is made up fo'r them 
by an under-cover machine in a caucus whose operations 
constitute a kind of political predestination. There 
are those who speak as if ability to choose betvveen two 
tickets were a high exercise of individual freedom. But 
I 114. pp ' 7 4. 115. PP, 59-60. 
l ll6.PP.61. 
117. PP, 72. 
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it is hardly the kind of liberty contemp!f~ed by the 
authors of the individualistic doctrine . 
De·wey wrote a series of articles in the spring of 1931 
on the need of a new political party in the United States to 
meet a new social situation. He had given up hope of progres-
11 
sive evolution within the major exis t ing parties strong enough I 
to bring about required change. He felt that insurgents in the 
old parties or a coalition of those elements could serve only 
as useful brakes. He thought it utopian to expect that they 
could re-create their parties, the latter being committed and 
habituated to 11 purposes and policies diametrically at war v1ith 
their intentions. rr The dough seemed to him 
too extensive and too sodden for the leaven to take 
effect. They might form, conce i vably, the nucleus 
of a new party. But their own ideas will remain 
truncated and half-formed until they break loose 
and associate themselves openly with new interests; 
needs and companions.ll9 -
The situation was such as to demand radical change in 
purposes, policies and methods, change that neither of the old 
major parties could effect because their organizations were 
bound .up with the things that needed to ba attacked.120 
Dewey believed that it was the 11 psychological time for 
launching a new political party devoted to well defined and new 
political issues. rrl 2l He held it could not succeed by a mere 
118. PP, 119-120. Cf. PP, 134-135 · 
119. Dewey, Art.(l931)1,117. Cf. Hook, JDIP, 165. 
120. Dewey, Art.(l931)2,152. Cf. Dewey, Art . (l931)3,177. 
121. Dewey, Art.(l931)3,178. 
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appeal to economic self-interest, 122 or on a purely intellectua 
basis.l23 I t would have to ap peal to idealisml24 and to social 
imagination .125 Dewey thought that the only vJay to 11 achieve 
any lasting reform is to find the one great is sue on which all 
others converge.n 126 When it came to working out this "one 
great issue" he stated it as 11 recovery of the agencies of the 
government by the national community for the service of the na-
tion•''l27 This program , he thought, could be "defined in terms 
of direct social needsn and could be developed as these change. 
"irlhile opportunistic in application; 11 he said, "it will be defi-
nite and concentrated in .purpose.nl28 
Although Dewey's thought on political parties has been 
developed from situations within the United States its :applica-
1 tion is of wider significance. 
6. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS. 
Classical political economy was based on a conception 
of 11 natural laws." These laws were supposed to govern economi·c 
phenomena 
in the sense that all phenomena which falled to con-
form to them were abnormal or 'unnatural'-~were a vi-
cious attempt to suspend the working of natural laws 
122. Loc. cit. 
123. Dewey, ~1\rt. ( 1931) 4, 203. 
122.~. Dewey, Art. ( 1931) 3,178. 
125. Dewey, Art.(l931)4,203. 
126. Ibid. 
127. Ibid. 
128 ~ Ibid., 204. 
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or to escape from their inevitable consequences. Any 
attempt to regulate economic phenomena by control of 
the social conditions under which production and dis-
tribution of goods and services occur was thereby judged 
to be a violation of natural laws, an 'interference' 
with the normal order , so that ensuing consequences we·re 
bound to be as disastrous as are the consequences of an 
attempt to suspend or interfere with the working of any 
physical law, say; the law of gravitation.l29 
The practica l product of this theory of economy was a 
system of "laissez-faire 'individualism' and a denial of the va-
lidity of attempts at social control of -economic phenomena.ul30 
1
1 1.rfhitehead states that early liberal faith that 11 individualistic 
competition and industrial activity would necessarily work to-
1 gether for human happiness" broke down as soon as it was tried. 
He thinks it may be said no one now holds that 11 apart from some 
further directive agency, mere individualistic competition, of 
itself and by its own self-righting character, will produce a 
satisfactory society."l31 It might be questioned whether Vvhite-
head is correct in believing the theory of laissez-faire has 
been thus completely surrendered. 
Dewey observes that while the common criticism of the 
liberal school is that it was too individualistic it is just as 
pertinent to criticize it as not having been individualistic I 
enough. He says this because the philosophy of early liberalisJ 
I 
"assisted the emancipation of individuals having a privileged 
antecedent status, but promoted no general liberation of all 
129. LOG, 505. Cf. PHC, 279. 
130. Ibid. 
131. AI, 44. 
I 
I 
I 
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individuals. 11132 
Fichte argued against laissez-faire when he "'rote: 
In der Regierung ebensowohl als anderw~rts muss man 
••.•• aufb5ren, irgend etwas zu Berecbnendes dem b linden 
Zufalle zu Uberlassen, in Hoffnung, das~ er es wobl mach-
en \"<'erde .133 
De"rey is particularly exercised because · science, 11 the 
most potent instrument of widespread, enduring, and objective 
social changes, 11 has been left at the mercy of private desires 
for personal gain.l34 He believes that the present 11 insecurity 
of life is the fruit of the adoption in practice of this anarch-
ic doctrine.ul35 Whitehead similarly holds that 11 the self-suf-
ficing man, with his peculiar property which concerns no one 
else, is a concept without any validity for modern civiliza-
tion.'il36 
While the institution of private property is defended, 
says Dewey, as promoting such virtues as 11 prudence, accountabil-
ity, ingenuity and security 11 137 it no longer refers to the prod.;. 
uct of individual labor. Today private property means a 11 legal-
il ly buttressed institution• Capital is no longer the outcome of 
deliberate personal sacrifice, but is an institution of corpora-
tions and finance with massive political and social ramifica-
tions.11138 
132. PHO, 281. Of. 1.1\[hitehead, AI, 80. 
133. GHS, 12. 
134. PHO, 323. 
135. Ibid. 
136. AI, 34. 
137. EN, 234. 
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Dewey believes that we "are in for some kind of social-
ism, 11 whatever name we may call it now, and whatever name it 
will be called when realized. 139 Economic determinism, he 
states, is no longer just a theory but a fact. He believes that 
there is a choice, however, open to society as to whether this 
socialism shall be public or capitalistic. The latter would be 
a "blind, chaotic · and unplanned determinism, issuing from busi-
ness conducted for pecuniary profit"; the former would be the 
"determination of a socially planned and ordered development. ni4 11 
Hocking, on the other hand, does not approve of state 
directed capital and industry. He believes this proposal is due 
to 11 faulty analysis,~' that what the state needs to do is to "es-
tablish uniform practice.s and control the · rules of competi-
tion."l41 
The problem of human values is further reason why theo~ 
ries of political economy need to be reconstructed. Dewey de-
plores the fact that there has been the tendency to treat eco-
nomics as on a lower level than morals or politics. Industrial 
and economic life, he holds, has been brutalized by its exile 
from the ''pale of higher values," by the failure to "equate it 
as the means by which social and cultural values are real-
ized;rrl42 Dewey would hold this separation of practice and 
139. ION, 119-120. 
140. Ibid. 
141. Hocking, Art.(l935),238. 
142 • QC , 2 82 • 
134 
four angles: the mechanization of industry, class struggle, in-
security, and the controlling of human values by economic val-
ues. 
Machines are used for an increasingly large percentage 
of economic work. The worker has no share in forming the ends 
for which the machines are operated. Aside from his wage he 
has no interest in those ends. He does not understand the rna-
ch ines nor care for their purposes, says Dewey. In his activi-
ty nmeans are cut off from ends, instruments from what they 
achieve. 11 143 If a man understands what he is about, if he sees 
that his work is a necessary part of a whole process, and if he 
has concern for the whole, 11 the mechanizing effect is counter-
acted.11144 As it is he is just a tender of a machine; there is 
no place for the creative activity that gives value to human 
life. 
Dewey blame s the "separation of production and consump-
tion, means and ends," for the division of men into social 
classes.l45 There develops class struggle between "those whose 
productive labor is enforced by necessity and those who are 
privileged consumers, 11 and the belief arises that class struggl· 
143. HNC , 143-144. 
144. Ibid. 
145. HNC, 272. 
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is a ''means of social progress, instead of a register of the 
barriers to its attainment."l46 
There is little if anything more detrimental to human 
values than the feeling of insecurity. Dewey notes that inse-
curity is the "most marked trait of present economic life," and 
believes that it 
cuts deeper and extends more widely than bare unemploy-
ment. Fear of loss of work, dread of the oncoming of 
old a ge, create anxiety and eat into.7 self-respect in a way that impairs personal dignity.l 4 
Human values should control economic values* as Dev;ey 
believes they will when means are no longer kept separate from 
ends .. 148 "The ultimate problem of production," holas Dewey, "is 
the production of human beings . 11 l49 He goes on to say: 
To this end, the production of goods is intermedi-
ate and auxiliary. It is by this standard that the 
present system stands condemned. 'Security' is a 
means, and although an indispensable social means, it 
is not the end. Machinery and technological improve-
ment a r e means ..... Discovery of individual needs ru1d 
capacities is a means to the end, but only a means. 
The means have to be implemented by a social-economic 
system that establishes and uses the means for the pro-
duction of free human beings associating with one an-
other on terms of equality.l50 . 
Dewey 11rote an article entitH~d "The Economic Basis of 
the Ne\v Society, 11 specially for Ratner 1 s Intelligence and the 
I'1odern \vorld, published last year. He begins by recalling 
146. HNC, 273. 
147. ION, 54-55. 
148. ION, 135. 
149. Dewey, Art.(l939)2,430. 
150. Ibid. 
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constructive thought of the World War period that centered about 
two comprehensive objectives: the establishment of a 
system of international la111 that would ensure peaceful 
relations between nations; and the reorganization of 
the social and economic relations "1-Tithin nation-s.l51 
In 1918 Dewey published an article bearing on the second of thes~ 
objectives. It was later reprinted in Characters and Events -withl 
the title ''Elements of Social Reorganization.'' Dewey quotes the 
greater part of this article of 1918 in his recent article, "The 
Economic Basis of the New Society. 11 He says that, unfortunately, 
he need make no apolo gies for quoting from an article written 
\ twenty years ago for the "evils existing then still exist now, 
the thing needing to be done then still needs to be done now. 11 
References to material in the earlier article will be made by way 
of the more recent article. 
Dewey held in 1918 that there were three problems or "de-
ficiencies" which would need to be cared for in any effective so-
cial and economic reorganization: (1) The failure of the social 
order to secure to its members steady and useful employment. 
(2) The low standard of living--degraded and inhuman--found among 
any belonging to the industrial class. (3) The lack of effi-
ciency in production and distribution.l52 
Dewey believed the first of these evils was the most ob-
\f ious and most definite point of weakness. It was serious not 
ibnly because of the poverty and misery entailed but also, .and 
. 2 151. Dewey, Art.(l939) ,416. 
152. Ibid.,417-419. 
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even more, because of the consequent undermining of morale and 
character . . He thought it impossible to overestimate the "'un-
dermining of confidence in oneself, of respect for oneself, the 
undermining of faith or belief in the world and in others'" due 
to "'precarious and insecure tenure of employment.'"l53 Since 
during the war there had been such pooling and organizing of ex-
perience, backed by the authority of the government, as to give 
every man and woman capable of work 111 useful, steady and reason-
ably remunerative employment 111 Dewey was convinced the problem 
is not inevitable.l54 
While it is customary, held Dewey, 11 1 to connect lov; 
wages and lack of work with poverty and suffering'" there is too 
often failure 
'to translate poverty ~nd the misery that goes with it 
into terms of the general vitiation, the general deter-
ioration of the scale of life on the part of a large 
element of the population~'l55 
With reference to the third weakness, that of lack of ef 
ficiency in production and distribution, De-..vey observed that the 
existing social order's chief pride was in what it considered 
extraordinary efficiency in just those phases of the economic 
process. Efficiency, however, is a matter of "'the ratio which 
the actual output bears to the available resources. 111 Looked at 
from that standpoint there was inefficiency in both production 
and distribution•l56 
153. Dewey, Art .(l939)2,417-418. 
154. Ibid.,418. 
155. Ibid., 418. 
156. Ibid.,419-420. 
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Not only did Dewey list weaknesses in the economic or-
der of 1918 ; he also set forth three things which he deemed 
"'essential minimum elements of an intelligent program of socia 
reorganization.' nl57 
He thought the first demand of a better social order 
would be the 
'guarantee of the right, to every individual who is 
capable of it, to work--not the mere legal right, but 
a right which is enforceab le so that the individual 
will always have the opportunity to engage in some 
form of useful activity.' 15~ 
In the second place, war had revealed the "'possibili-
ties of intelligent administratiorr~-administration which could 
be used to raise and maintain on·c a higher level the general 
standard and scale of living.•ul59 For example, the minimum 
wage was an accomplished fact; Great Britain had done much in 
the way of providing better housing for the laboring class.; and 
ad.vance in various types of insurance had been made .l60. 
In the third place, Dewey felt the need of securing 
greater industrial autonomy, by which he meant 
1 greater ability on the part of the workers of any par-
ticular trade or occupation to control that industry, , 
instead of working under conditions of external control 
where they have no interest, no insight into what they 
are doing, and no social outlook upon the consequences 
and meaning of what they are doing.' 161L 
157. Dewey, Art.(l939) 2 ,422. 
158. Ibid.,{i-20-421. Cf. ION, 72. 
159. Ibid., 421 . 
160. Ibid., 421-422. 
161. Ibid., {1-22. 
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Twenty years later Dewey, in retrospect, found that at-
tempts at radical social change had been defeated in every Euro-
pean country save Russia. ''Italy and Germany moved into Fascist 
dictatorships and other European and South American countries in 
that direction"; and events in the United States seem "to give 
the lie to hopes then entertained." v.Jhile social reorganization 
did take place it was in a direction "opposite to t hat of the 
hopes entertained by liberals and radicals in the earlier per-
iod."l62 
It might be said that failure to carry out needed eco-
nomic and social reform, following the World War was due--at 
least in the United States--to two things. On the one hand the 
slogan and practice was "Return to Normalcy," meaning by normal-
cy the "old social-economic regime." On the other hand there de· 
veloped what Dewey calls "social tinkering" or the employment of 
palliative methods.l63 He once said that palliative and r emed-
ial measures are "cheap, short cuts which avoid recognition· of 
I basic causes" and "have to be paid for at a great cost. 11 164 
Hook g ives as one reason for Dewey's opposition to the New Deal, 
its uhalf-hearted reforms," which Hook interprets as "the pres-
ervation of capitalism."l65 
From what has been stated above it is evident that Dewey 
162. Dewey, Art.(l939) 2 ,424-425. 
163. Ibid., 424-427. 
164. CAE, 762. 
165. JDIP, 237. 
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expects reform to come by way of a planned economy. This re-
quires something by way of authority as distinct from the free-
dom of laissez-faire. Dewey would be unwilling , however, to sac-
rifice liberal ideals of liberty , -as noted in an earlier chap-
ter.l66 He deprecates the demarcation of two spheres, one of 
authority and the other of freedom and the setting of one over 
I 
I 
I 
against the other.l67 Rather is the problem one of the 11 rela- i 
tion between authority and freedom." 16B Whitehead expresses the 
same idea in saying that a "doctrine as to the social mingling 
of liberty and compulsion -:. is required."l69 
De\vey believes the "urgent and centraln question a t 
present is whether needed economic reform can be brought about 
without the sacrifice of 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
all that was best worth conserving in older democratic I 
ideas and ideals: intellectual and moral freedom; free- \ 
dom of inquiry and expression; fre edom of a ssociation in 
work, recreation and for religious purposes; the free·- I 
dom of intercourse among n ations vvhich, always hampered 
by tariff walls and fear of war , is now deliberately sup- 1 
pressed in many countries.l70 
1
. 
In a number of connections Dewey tries to show that lib-
erty and freedom are relative. Liberty is effective power to ·do 
specific things. The demand for liberty is a demand for pm-1er 
11 either for possession of powers of action·. not already possessed! 
or for retention and expansion of pov1ers already. possessed. rr 171 \ 
1
· , 166 ~ 
167. 
168. 
169. 
170. 
171. 
Supra, p.44. 
Dewey, Art.(l937)1,170-171. 
Ibid.,l71. 3 AI, 77. Cf. Dewey? Art.(l937) ,351. 
Dewey, Art. (l939)-,425-426. 
Dewey, Art.(l935) 2 ,41. 
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I History shows · that, in the main, the demand for liberty has corne l 
I from tho s e who wanted to nalter the institutional set-up"; but I 
I 
at present efforts at organized control of economic forces are 
I resisted, "by a certain group, in the name or liberty • "17 2 
I' "There is no such thing as the liberty or effective power of an 
I individual, group, or class," holds De1trey, "except in relation. 
I 
i 
1 to the liberties, the effective powers, of other individuals, 
1 groups, and classes."l73 
I 
Freedom, De\vey believes, "depends upon conditions of 
l1110rk which are socially and scientifically buttressed11 ; 174 it is 
11 11 power to act in accordance \>lith choice." 175 \vhether this free- ! 
dom, as power to act in accordance with choice, is attained 11 de- l 
I pends upon positive and constructive changes in social arrange-
ments."l76 Dewey states: 
'de are bound to gether as parts of a whole, and only 
as others are free ....• can any one be free. Law, gov-
ernment, institutions, all social arrangements must be 
informed with a rationality that corresponds to the or-
der of the whole, which is true Nature or God, to the 
end that power of unimpeded action can be found any-
where ..... Freedom- is not obtained by .mere abolition of 
la,..., and institutions, but by the progressive saturation 
of all laws and institutions with greater and greater 
acknowledgment of the necessary laws governing the con-
stitution of things.l77 
Dewey holds that the goal of the new political movement 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I for which he has labored is economic reform by way of a planned 
II I, 
II 17 2 • Lo c • c it . i I 
173. Loc. cit. Cf. PP, 149-150. 
17 4. HNC , 306 . C f . EAE , 77 • " 
17 5 . PHC ' 277 . :1' 11
1 
176. PHC, 282. 
177~ PHC, 283-284. ==~,1 ==========~~~========!' ~ 
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economy.l78 Davis, too, believes that there must be a "scien-
tifically planned economic life," that economic processes must 
~~'~ :::1:: ~:::n:d::o::: :::: :: ::~:: self-1nterest.l79 He think~ 
a society that scientifically plans its ends, painstak-
ingly sets out to achieve its ends, that is willing to 
acknowledge its mistakes or modify its methods in the 
light of experience.l80 
I 
I 
It is important, urges Dewey, to distinguish between a 
I planned society, such as is found in Communist and Fascist coun 
I 
I 
·I 
tries and a continuously planning societ y. Results ~ of the form 
er type of planning are such that in the minds of many people 
"the very idea of social planning and of violation of the integ 
rity of the individual are being intimately bound together."l81 
Dewey holds: 
The attempt to nlan social organization and associa-
tion without the freest possible play of intelligence 
contradicts the very idea in social planning . For the 
latter is an operative method of aQtivity, not a pre-
determined set of final 'truths.'lb2 
To Dewey it seems that the "true and final source of 
I 
change has been, 
in science. " 183 
and now is, the corporate intelligence embodie~ 
He states:: I 
In so far as the attempts ..... now being made in the 
direction of organized social control and planned economy 
178. Dewey, Art.(l931)4,205. 
179. CSM, 877-878. 
180. Ibid. 
181. Dewey, Art.(l939) 2 ,431. Cf. Hook, JDIP, 156. 
182. Dewey, Art.(1939)2,432. 
183. Dewey, Art.(1937)1,188. 
l. 
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.I I 
I 
ignore the role of scientific intelligence, in so far 
as these attempts depend upon and turn for support to 
external institutional changes effected .. for the most 
part by force, just so far are ' they_ re-enstating re-
liance upon- the method of externa! authority that has 
always broken down in the past.l8 
Organized intelligence has demonstrated--its value in the 
narrower field of science, observes ·"Dewey, and is a resource 
that should be tried in the "broad field of human social rela-
tionships."l85 Alternatives to intelligent method are "authori-
1[ ty, imitation, caprice and ignorance, prejudice and passion." 
I To claim that intelligence is a better method than these alter-
1 
i 
I 
I 
natives is 11 hardly an excessive claim·;" says Dewey.l86 Again 
he states: 
If intelligent method is lacking, prejudice, the 
pressure of immediate circumstance, self-interest and 
class-interest, traditional customsi institutions of 
accidental historic origin, are not lacfgng, and they 
tend to take the place of intelligence. :r 
There is a danger that "those most conscious of present 
I 
evils and of the need of thorough-going change in the social-errol 
nomic system" will resort to some 11 short-cut way out, like the 1 
method of civil war and violence.''l88 Instead.-of 
relying upon : the constant application of all socially 
available resources · of knowledge and continuous . in-
quiry they may rely upon· the frozen intelligence of 
some past thinker, sect and party cult: ·frozen because 
arrested into a dogma.l89 
I 
I 
I 
I. 
1\ 
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184. Loc. cit. 
185. Loc. cit.,l84. 
186. EN, 436-437. 
187. QC, 265. 
188. Dewey, Art .(l939)2,431. 
189. Ibid. Cf. LOG, 508. 
c--- r--
I 
I 
-+==----== 
I 7 . I • NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM . I 
i 
I 
I 
i 
I 
Cunninghaml90 writes of the relation of nationalism and \ 
internationalism to sovereignty. The former places sovereignty 
I in each group--absolute sovereignty; the latter calls for alle-
11 
'I 
glance on the part of subordinate groups to 11 the ideal group or 1
1 humanity, the great society of minds." In. actual practice na-
1 tionalism has been, and still is, dominant. I 
Dewey sees beneficent qualities connected with the his- ! 
torical or i gin of nationalism . I t was a movement away from ob-
noxiou s conditions, "parochialism on one hand and dynastic des-
potism on the other:;"l91 - Where ther e has been lack of national 
spirit, public spirit has been practically non-existent. This 
was long true in China. Within recent years she has been 
forced to develop a strong national consciousne ss .to protect 
herself a gainst external imperial domination. 
There are four foundation~ stones upon -which the struc-
ture of the National State is erected, · says Dewey. These are 
1
1 "Patriotism, National Honor, National Interests and National 
I 
Sovereignty. nl92 It is no wonder, thinks Dewey, that "the win-
dows of such a building are closed to the light of heaven; that 
its inmates are fear, jealousy, , suspicion, and that War issues 
190. PP, 321. Cf. Hocking , Art.(l935),244. 
191. CAE, 798-799. I 192. CAE, 803. Cf. Rogers, Art.(l929),330. 
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1 regularly from its portals.nl93 
Since the ltJorld War there has been a growth of 11 exacer-
bated nationalism, nl9_4 a type of "social reorganization" very 
different from that for wh ich Dewey had hoped. "Conditions 
which caused the 1.rforld !tJ'ar remain in full force," and to them I 
must be added intensified nationalism . That old problems are un l 
solved and new ones added Dewey attributes to "failure of the 
'\•wrld communities to 'meet and forestall' needed change with 
1 sympathy and intelligence. '"195 
Alt.hough physical interdependence of nations has greatly 
increased it seems that 
nations try to deal with the problems created by the 
new situation by drawing more and more into themselves i 
by more and more extreme assertions of independent na- · 
tionalist sovereignty, whi le everything they do in the 
directionof autarchy leads to ever closer mixture with 
other nations--but in war.l96 
There is more anarchy and incompetence, thinks Barnes~l9 
international relations than in any type of go vernment within 
national boundaries. A sense of international obligation seems 
lwell:..nigh lacking. Gettell speaks of a state which "falls back 
upon . its 'sovereignty' to repudiate its international obl1ga-
t1ons11 as an ninternational outlm;."l98 International law can-
not properly be called law, holds Dewey , for 
193· 
194. 
195-
196. 
197. 
198. 
CAE, 803. 
Dewey, Art.(l931)2, 425. 
Ibid. Cf. CAE, 184. 
FAC, 165-166. 
ST, 655. 
PSi- 452. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
it expresses simply certain usages which are accepted 
so long as they do not come into conflict with the 
purpose of a state--a purpose which always gives the 
supreme law of national life.l99 
Dewey asserts that the United States has an interest 
the peace of the world that is 11 deeper and broader than that 
which self-interest dictates. 11 He sets this forth in these 
I 
I 
in J 
I 
I 
1 '.!'lords: ! I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
We are bound by the history and spirit of our posi-
tion in the world, and the law of noblesse oblige--the 
law that urges that every human being shall use his ad-
vantages and privileges not for his mvn enjoyment alone, 
but as well for the aid and service of his neighbors--
lies more heavily upon us than it does upon any other 
nation that has ever existed.200 
Never v1as there greater need of efforts toward _under- I I 
standing and cooperation bet11een the nations of the world~ Tuf'tJ 
thinks the need of the day is 11 the promotion of good \'Till be- I 
tween groups, classes, races, and nations. " 2011 Dewey would 
place emphasis upon "whatever binds people together in coopera-
1 
I 
i 
I 
I 
i tive human pursuits and results, apart from- geographical limi~a~ 
'II 1', tion; ','202 feeling that 
11 it is not enough to teach the horrors 
of \'Tar and to avoid everything which would stimulate interna-
I 
tional jealousy and animosity.rr203· Dewey once wrote of a man, I 
It 11 a good psychologist,~' who wished 11 this planet might get into 
I \'Tar vli th another planet, as that was the only effective way he 
199. GPP, 199. Cf. Gettell, PS, 435· 
200. CAE, 651. Cf. Ward , Art.(l928),303. 
201. Tufts, Art.(l929),401. 
202. DE, 114. Cf. Hook, JDIP, ,207-208. 
203. Ibid. Cf. Dewey, Art. ( 1931) 8, 48. I 
II 
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saw of developing a world-wide community of interest in this 
globe's population.'•204 
Prasad speaks of the connection between democracy and 
international cooperation, "founded on principles of universal 
peace and universal well-being"; 205 and Dewey urges American 
democracy to serve the world by demonstrating 
in the conduct of its own life the efficacy of plural, 
partial and experimental methods in securing and main-
taining an ever-increasing release of the powers of 
human nature, in service of a freedom which is, cooper-
ative and a cooperation which is voluntary.20b 
Dewey once gave the cause of war as "a clash of inter-
ests due to absence of organization. 11207 7 It seems unnecessary 
to analyze this concise statement. Attention is called to but 
two causes, mentioned by other writers and in the line of Dew-
ey's own thought. Leighton208 speaks of economic nationalism 
as a cause of war, and Ludwig , 209 a journalist, gives the rela-
tively uncritical opinion that propaganda is the main cause of 
war. Wars of the present generation have had their genesis in 
the minds of a few and could be brought into being only through 
propaganda which averred that those who live 'over there' 
are different from ourselves and are therefore evil, 
having what we do not possess and long ing to possess 
204. 
205. 
206. 
207. 
208. 
209. 
what we have. These people, who wear wooden shoes and 
blue mantles instead of leathern boots and jackets, 
who eat sausages and drink beer instead of mutton 
CAE, 825. 
DP, 183. 
FAC, 175-176. 
CAE, 648. 
SPC, 476. 
Ludwig , Art.(l929),180. 
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I 
and red v'line, who take the chalice at the Lord's Sup- . 
per rather than t~e Host alone--these are not worthy 
to own that beautiful district. And vice versa. The 
chauvinists have al,.,ays flattered their own folk, and 
defamed foreign peoples.210 I 
The World War, a war to end war, "left behind it innum_i 
erable seeds of further conflict planted in the lush soil of I I 
1 men's smoldering desires for revenge , " rightly observed Thom~ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
as;2ll .it was a "moral defeat, 11 a "disaster compared with which 
the external victory or defeat at arms pales into insignifi-
cance"; 212 and threatened to destroy the democracy for which it 
'\vas to make the world safe, as Dewey has shO\'ln above . 213 These! 
are some of the reasons -why it would seem that greater efforts I 
should have been made to avoid the present European War. 
Dewey has never favored pacifism• Pacifists seem to 
him to be interested in ends of peace but to have contempt for 
the means by which it is secured. He says not all who say 
I 
11 I deals, Ideals, shall enter into the kingdom of the ideal, but l 
only those shall enter who know and respect the roads that con-
duct to the kingdom."21A- At another time he wrote: 
210. 
211. 
212. 
213 . 
214. 
215. 
Until pacifism puts its faith in constructive, in-
ventive intelligence instead of in appeal to emotions 
and in exhortation, the disparate unorganized forces 
of the world will continue to develop outbreaks of 
violence.215 
Loc. cit. 
Thomas, Art.(l928),79-80 . 
Meiklejohn, WAM , 82. 
Supra, ,p.l4o, n.l62 . Cf . RPH, 204 . 
CAE, . 549. Cf. ETH, 413 . 
CAE, 639. Cf. Leighton, -SPC, 485. 
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I Kant held that a state of peace "must be established. n2 .:6 
I 
1
1 It is an achievement, intelligently planned and secured. Lud-
1 
II v-rig believes it is possible to educate youth to peace. 217 Dew- 1 
ey 's views are similar to those of Kant and Lud\'lig. He holds I 
that the idea of peace is a negative idea, a police idea. He 
believes: 
There are things more important than keeping one's 
body whole ; and one's property intact. Disturbing the 
peace is bad •...• because the fruitful processes of co-
operation in the great experiment of living together 
are disturbed. It is futile to work for the negative 
end of peace unless we are committed to the positive 
ideal which it cloaks.: Promoting the efficacy of hu-
man intercourse irrespective of _Q~ass, racial, geo-
graphical and national limits.2Ht 
In recent years Dewey's peace writ ings have emphasized 
one thing as a solution to the problem of war: getting rid of 
the war system. He asks, "How long have we been taking steps 
to do away with war, and why have they accomplished nothing?·~ 1 2 
His answer to the latter question ' iS that it is because tithe 
steps have all been taken under the v1ar system," when it is not 
a step that is needed, but a 11 right-about~face. 11 220 
idr i ting of Europe, Dew.ey says that it is not just the 
results of the last v1ar which threatens her civilization- but 
the prospects of the next war, and the next. 11 It is the war 
216. pp, 118. 
217. LUdi'lig, Art.(l929),185. 
218. GPP, 131-132! Cf. ETH, 414. 
219. C_I\E, 662. 
220. Ibid. 
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system," 221 the "world's present greatest evil."222 The war 
system is "entrenched in politics, in diplomacy, in existing in"-
t ernational law and in every court that sits under existing in-
ternational lavv. "223 In working on the proposition·: to Outlaw 
ltlar, Dewey said: 
The proposition ••... is not the moral proposition 
to abolish wars. It is the much more fundamental 
proposition to abolish the war system as an author-
ized and legally sanctioned institution-. ..•. To grant 
the difference between these two propositionB, , one 
simply to do away with \iars and the other to elimi-
nate the war system as the reigning system under which 
international politicsj diplomacy and relations are 
conducted--to understand the difference between these 
two propositions is f:undam_ental.224 
Ratner notes that the Outlawry Plan fulfills basic re-
quirements of Dewey's philosophy of instrumentalism; that it 
11 admirably and completely exemplifies his conception· of the 
method of intelligence in social affairs."225 Ratner explains j 
the \vay means and ends are supposed to interact in .Outlawry, by I 
saying that 
the underlying principle of Outlawry, defining the end 
. is that international law should be on the· moral side 
of the war question; and the means to be employed in 
realizing that end--from start to never-ending finish 
--is to be and only to be the moral will or moral senti-
ment of civilized people as that will or sentiment is 
nrc;p;ressively enlightened and organized by understand-
ing ot that end itself; and by the continuous and pro-
gressive interactive functioning of means-in-ends in 
'I 221. CAE, 695. 
222. CAE, 653. 
223. CAE, 654. 
224. CAE, 654. 
225. n~:l, 529. 
the decisions of the Court.226 
Dewey has not favored the League of Nations as a form of 
world grouping . In 1923 he called it a League of governments 
rather than a League of nations, a.nd "of governments whose poli-
cies played a part in bringing on the war and t hat have no wish 
to change their policies.n227 
In 1918 the term "associated" government was being used 
II of the United States in official communications, the United I' 
, I 
" 
I 
an "allied, States not b eing technically government. Dewey ap-
proved of the "associated" idea, as suggesting a new order, un-
' ion for the Sake of common ends and interests. 228 He thought 
1 that the two phrases mi ght be used to indicate the two approach-
es to a future League of Nations, "one rooting in political 
needs, the other in economic necessities." 229- He wrote: 
The real problem is one of organization for more ef-
fective human association and intercourse. The newer 
politics signify the social mind carried - into questions 
of human relationships, while the older politics meant 
the formulations of the legal mind concerned with de-
fense and litigation~ Every statesman of the worldto-
day, every political thinker, can be categorically 
placed according as his plans and ideas are formed pri-
marily in the negative terms of protection·· against op-
position and threatening danger, or in the positive 
terms of association for realization of common inter-
ests.230 
Dewey does not approve of the force clauses of the 
226. IMV/, . 529. Cf. Millikan, Art.(l928),159. 
I 
227. CAE, 622. 
228. CAE, 6o2-6oa·. 
229. Ibid. 
230. CAE, 603. 
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J\ League of Nations Covenant. 
tion with that dependence upon force which is the essence of 
He considers them 11 foci of infec-
the war system. 11231 They prevent nations from depending upon 
1
11 enlightened public judgment, n which 
i is the strongest force there is; all treaties including 
I pledges to use the sanction of force and to resort to so-called international war, themselves depend upon 
· I nothing but the moral force of sentiment and opinion .• 232 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
While Dewey disapproves of the League he does favor a 
positive "federated concert of nations; 11233 similar to what 
had in mind in his day when he held that the law of nations 
Kan~ 
I 
should be founded on a federation of free states.23 Kant would 
1
. 
give such a federated government agencies of legislation; judi- 1 
cial procedure and administrative commissions, . and is convinced ! 
it would relax tension between states, leading to voluntary I 
groupings all over the world, 11 freely experimenting and freely 
cooperating self-governing local, cultural and industrial 
II 
j! 
groups." 235 \tlhen that time comes the world will truly be safe I 
I for democracy. 
8. LIBERALISMAND INSTITUTIONS; 
To the 11 hard and fast conservative, •.• says Dewey, insti-
l tutions are finaL The conservative cannot conceive of existinJ 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I. 
231. 
232. 
233. 
234. 
235. 
Dewey , . Art. ( 1932) 4, ,1.47. C f. ·Kant, , PP, 135. 
Ibid. cr. IMW-~ , 525ff. 
CAE, 560. cr. Cunningham, .PP, 32lff. 
PP, 128. 
Ibid. C·T. CAE-; 647-648. 
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constitutions, institutions and social arrangements as mere 
"mechanisms for achieving social results.'1 236 Leighton237 holdJ 
the conservative right in "emphasizing the historical continu1t1 1 
of social order" but wrong in hindering its modification to meel l 
changing conditions; he holds the radical right in insisting up ·I 
on the need for readjustment but wrong in trying to make a 
"clean break with the past." The sound attHude, the reasonabl1 
attitude, he believes 
is the mediating spirit of liberalism . The liberal is 
the opponent both of blind traditionalism and doctri-
naire idealism. He is the proponent of the gradual bet-
terment of our existing social institutions to meet the 
changed needs of
8
man by a cautious but open-minaed ex-
perimentation.23 . 
It has been indicated in this chapter that Dewey's ap-
proach to institutions is, in the main, that of a liberal. Th1~ 
can scarcely be said, however, of his attitude toward the churc~. 
That must be classified as radical and, paradox-ically, dogmat-
ic.239 Other radical tendencies in his attitude were noted in Jj 
connection ·with the need of a new political party and i_n his op 
1 
position to a continuance of the war system. Here he calls for i 
a right-about-face rather than gradual change. His point seems 
well taken but might prove "doctrinaire idealism" in practice. 
236. CAE, 825. 
2 37 • I SO , 2 6 • 
238. Ibid. 
239. Cf. Brightman, Art.(l939),;?02. 
CHAPTER VII 
I 
I 
TRADIT.ION AND CHANGE IN DEMOCRACY 
Il l. DEMOCRACY • 
I 
I Dewey's early life and training gave him, as has been 
indicated abovel, what Hook calls an "ingrained democratic bi-
as."2 As a youth Dewey believe-d that "democracy is the best of 
all social institutions"3; that early belief has become an in-
creasingly strong conviction. 
In 1888 Dewey wrote The Ethics of Democracy. His pur-
pose was to oppose writers who made light of democracy as a 
"numerical notion,"4 and to maintain that from the democratic 
standpoint the individual is more than an individual. He is a 
personality.5 Dewey thought that while there is an individual-
ism ·in democracy which there is not in . aristocracy 
it is an ethical, not a numerical individualism; it 
is an individualism of freedom,, of responsibility, of 
initiative to and for the .ethical ideal, not an individ-
ualism of lawlessness::. In one word, democracy means 
that personality is the first and final reality.6 
1. Supra, p. 17. 
2. JDIP, 6. 
3. EAE, 25. 
4. TED, 22. 
5. TED, 23. 
6. TED, 22. 
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In this same early writing society is spoken of as organic, the 
individual embodying and realizing within himself "the spirit 
and will of the · whole organism. "7 De\vey thought that hmvever 
this theory of society as an organism might be disguised it 
could have but one result--the sovereignty of the individual.8 
As years went on Dewey continued to think of society as 
an organism in which the "individual" and "society" are not to 
be set over against one another in a rigid type of Either-Or 
reasoning.9 It seems evident, however, t hat he has shown an 
increasing tendency to point out the individual's functional 
relation to society.lO 
Dewey speaks of democracy as a moral ideal that endeav-
ors to unite "two ideas which have historically often worked 
antagonistically: liberation of individual a on one hand and 
promotion of a common good on the other.nll He thinks of the 
"Liberty and Equality" of the motto of the French Revolution as 
representing values which belong to individuals in their dis-
tinction from one another, and "Fraternity" as representing the 
values that belong to them in their relat i on·s with one anoth-
er.l2 
That Dewey considers the foundation of democracy to be 
7. TED, 13. 
8. TED, 11. 
9. LOG, 191. 
10. HNC, 13; EN, 244; QC, . 275-276; ION~' 48-49. 
11. ETH, 387-388. 
12. Ibid. 
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both individual and social is shown when he states that it is 
based on faith in these three things: (1) The capacities of hu-
man nature, (2) Human intelligence, and (3) The power of pooled 
and cooperative experience.l3 
Dewey holds that the American democratic tradition is 
based on faith in the 
ability of human nature to achieve freedom for indi-
viduals accompanied with respect and regard for oth-
er persons and with social
4
stability built on cohe-
sion instead of coercion.l 
This faith in individuals and their pptentialities is not an 
individualism opposed to association. Rather is it 
an individuality that operates in and through voluntary 
associations. If our outward scene is one of exter-
nally imposed organization,., behind and beneath there 
is working the force of liberated individualities, 
experimenting in their own ways to find out and real-
ize their own ends.l5 
Whitehead believes, similarly, that the "future of the Universe 
...•• awaits for its complete determination·: the spontaneity of 
the :povel individual occasion."l6 
The intelligence which Dewey holds a part of democracy' 
foundation is "not the faculty of intellect honored in text-
. 
books and neglected elsewhere," but is 
the sum-total of impulses, habits, emotions, records, 
and discoveries which forecast what is desirable and 
undesirable in future possibilities and which contrive 
13. Dewey, Art.(l937) 2 ,458. 
14. FAC, 162. Cf. RPB:; 208. 
15. Dewey, Art.(l928)1,275· 
16. AI, 328. 
157 
- -1 
ingeniously in behalf of imagined good.l7 
In a recent book Dewey restates his view that coopera-
tion, or 11 fraternity in the classic French formula'' is a part of 
the foundation of democracy--"as much a part of the democratic 
ideal as is personal initiative.nlS Apart from the cooperation 
of communal life, ideas of democracy are utopian, says Dewey, 
and -fraternity, liberty and equality are "hopeless abstrac-
tions.rrl9 Equality becomes 
a creed of mechanical identity which is false to facts 
and impossible of realization •...• Liberty is then thought 
of as independence of. social ties and ends in dissolu-
tion and anarchy. It is more difficult to sever the idea 
of brotherhood ~ from that of a community, and hence it is 
either practically i gnored in the movements which iden-
tify democracy with Individualism, or else it is a sen-
timentally appended tag. In its just connection with 
communal experience, fraternity is another name for the 
consciously appreciated goods which accrue from .an asso-
ciation in which all share, and which give direction to 
the conduct of each. Liberty is that secure release 
and fulfilment of personal potentialities which take 
place only in rich and manifold association with others • 
•..• Equality denotes the unhampered share which each in-
dividual member of the community has in the conse-
quences of associated action ••••• It is not a natural 
possession but is a fruit of the community when i~B ac-
tion is directed by its character as a community. 
Some of the earlier ideas regarding the democratic 
state have been nullified, claims Dewey, by the course of 
events. The two ideas that he has particularly in mind are 
that "each individual is of himself equipped with the 
17. Dewey, Art,.(l917) ,67-68. Cf. EN, 406. 
18. FAC, 22. 
19. pp' 149. 
20. pp' 150-151. 
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intelligence needed, under the ·operation of self-interest, to 
engage in political affairs, 11 and that "general suffrage, fre-
quent elections of officials and majority rule are sufficient 
to ensure the responsibility of elected rulers to the desires 
and interests of the public• 11 21 Dewey says this second idea is 
logically_ bound up with the first one and stands or falls with 
it. They are based on the idea of· what has been called the 
"omnicompetent" individual--"competent to know in . all situations 
demanding political action what is for his own good, and compe-
tent to enforce his idea of good and the will to effect it 
against contrary forces. ".22 
That the illusion in the assumption of omnicompetence 
in the individual was not detected earlier, holds Dewey, has 
I been due to the "misleading influence of a false psychology." 
-1 He has in mind the separation of knowing and doing, against 
which he carries on .a ceaseless polemic. He goes on. to say: 
that the philosophy of an earlier day held that 
ideas and knowledge were functions of a mind or con-
sciousness which originated in individuals by means 
of isolated ·contact with objects• But in fact, knowl-
edge is a function of association ·:and communication; 
it depends upon · tradition, upon :tools and methods 
socially transmitted, developed and sanctioned. Facul~ 
ties of effectual observation, reflection ··and desire 
are habits acquired under the influence of the culture 
and institutions of society, not ready-made inherent 
powers ;:23 
21. PP, 157. Cf. Barnes, ST, 652-653· 
22. PP , 158. 
23. Ibid. 
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\vhile Dewey lists faith in human nature as necessary to 
democracy he would make it clear that he does not believe that 
a laissez-faire theory of leaving human nature to itself is 
productive of"democratic insitutions that work successfully..n2 
2. RISE OF TOTALITARIANISM. 
Dewey sees in the "historic involvement of democratic 
theories of the state with the older 'individualistic' atomism" 
the chief source of difficulty that has led to a widespread re-
jection of democracy for authoritarianism, , and to the develop-
ment of organic theories upon which modern totalitarian states 
are founded.25 
He thinks the rise of dictatorships is to be explained 
also, as a desire for security that is not secured by econumic 
competitive individualism.. In many count.ries 
the demand for collective and organized guidance and 
support has become so urgent that the very idea of 
individual freedom has gone into the discard and be-
come an ideal, not to be praised, but to be despised • 
•••• In countries in which there are no open and ac-
knowledged dictatorship s the conceptions of liberty 
and individualism seem to be losing their magic force; 
and security, discipline, order, and solidarity are, 
by soci~l transfer, acquiring magic power in their 
stead.26 
1
'1 Laski says t hat what is declining in democracy is security and 
1
1 "this declines because the success of capitalism, its power to 
! 
offer _·an increasing economic good, is in dispute as never 
24. FAC, 124. 
25. LOG, 518. 
~_.___p~w~~ ~ - -~~D2_ill_~ll3_~_. _ _Q_~ ~---W ~_!~ --~-~~} ~~~~J_ , 30~~· __ 
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1 A third reason for democracy's being on the wane, as 
II 
I 
I 
given by Dewey, is a "general decline of faith in Parliamentary 
1nstitutions";28 however, the outstanding reason for its de-
cline, he believes, is that democracy has been too exclusively 
political in nature. It has no so-cial roots in the countries 
from which it has disappeared. It has not become "part of the 
bone a.nd blood of the people in daily conduct of life." Rather 
were democratic forms nlimited to Parliament, elections and com-
bats between parties.'' Dewey states: 
\ihat is happening proves conclusively, I think, 
that unless democratic habits of thought and action 
are part of the fiber of a people, political democ-
racy is insecure. It can not stand in isolation. It 
must be buttressed by the presence o~9democratic methods in all social relationships. 
Totalitarian leaders, says Dewey, hold democracy in con 
tempt.30 C6unts31 gives consideration to the attitude of these 
leaders toward democracy. He says that in theo·ry the Soviet 
revolution identifies itself with the democratic movement in 
history, but ''in actuality the Communist Party repudiated polit 
leal democracy completely and established ••••• a rigid dicta-
torship." In Italian Fascism he sees a complete and emphatic 
repudiation of both the letter and the spirit of democracy, a 
27. DC, 216. 
28. ETH, 390. Cf. Laski~ DC, 79-80. 
29. Dewey, Art.(l937)2,462. Cf. Dewey, Art.(l937)3,351. 
30. OAE, 725. 
31. PAD; 143ff. 
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reaction against the entire liberating movement of the 
past three or four hundred years ..•.• against rational-
ism, equality, individual freedom, civil liberty, major-
ity rule, parliamentary government, and international 
peace •••.• Fascism resurrects from _the past the princi-
ple of authoritar1~nism and makes it the guiding star 
of the new Italy.3 
Counts goes on to say that democracy is repudiated even more 
completely and uncompromisingly by the Third Reich than by the 
new Italy. National Socialism 
through its affirmation of the leader principle and its 
proclamation of the divinity of Hitler's person and mis-
sion surpasses Fascism in its devotion to the doctrine 
of authoritarianism. It permits no phase of the life of 
the German people to escape its grasp ...•• it carries to 
a logical conclusion the principle of totalitarianism.-'3 
For Dewey democracy implies pluralism, experimentalism 
and toleration, all of which are held in contempt by dictators. 14 
While democracy recognizes the "infinite variety of human na-
ture, and the infinite plurality of purposes for which men as-
sociate themselves together, " 35 totalitarianism is based on a 
monistic theory that. means 
one party control of press, schools, radio, the thea-
ter and every means of communication, restrictions on 
private gathering s and private conversations •..•. no 
freedom of belief, speech, press or assembly •••.. Ar-
bitrary irresponsibility varies in direct ratio to 
the claim for absoluteness on the part of t~e princi-
ple in behalf of which power is exercised.3 
For totalitarianism there is nsome voice so authoritative as to 
32. PAD, 149-150. 
33· PAD, 158. 
34. CAE, 725 ·. 
35. CAE, 726. 
36. FAC, 89-91. Of. Rocco, Art.(l934),649. 
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preclude the need -or inquiry"37 but democracy's method is one 
of toleration and regard for the "intelligence and personality 
of others, even if they hold views opposed to ours, and of sci-
entific inquiry into facts and testing of ideas."38 
It is argued that authoritarian government is superior 
to democracy in that it can handle a crisis more rapidly and of-
fers greater security.39 Robinson says that dictatorships are 
built on the principle that "the necessity for the compulsion of 
citizens always exists. They have erected an emergency princi-
ple into a permanent principle. "40 Dewey, of course, maintains 
that dictatorship is not superior to democracy. The only time 
when it seems superior is. in rr abnormal conditions created by war 
and internal economic crises"; 41 however, to Dewey nothing is 
more fundamentally. wrong than to use these "pathological condi-
tions as criteria of the excellence of a government." 42 As to 
the matter of the security afforded under an authoritarian gov-
ernment, Dewey considers that whether "securi ty 11 and 11 freedom" 
are incompatible depends upon the definition given those terms. 
He states: 
If 'security' is limited to economic safety it cer-
tainly is incompatible with the kind of laissez-faire 
freedom that has developed in modern highly industri-
alized countries. If freedom is combined with a 
37. ETH, 365. 
38. Ibid. Cf. FAC, .,95. 
39. Dewey, Art.(l937)3,351. Cf. Brightman, Art.(l938),267. 
40. PE, 110-111. 
41. Dewey, Art.(l937)3,351. 
42. Ibid. 
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reasonable amount of equality and security is taken 
to mean cultural and moral security and also mater-
ial safety, I do not think tha~3security is compati-ble with anything but freedom. 
Dewey recognizes the power of emotional appeals and the 
appeal to idealism used by dictators. Totalitarianism does not 
rest upon external coercion alone.44 Its advocates maintain 
that democratic states must employ external and mechanical de-
vices to hold the support of their citizens because they fail 
to ''enlist the whole make-up of citizens, emotional as well as 
ideological.n45 Dewey believes that nin spite of the wide use 
of purges, executions, concentration camps, deprivation of 
property and of means of livelihood" it would be impossible for 
a government to endure long in a country where there has been a 
scientific spirit "unless it has the support of so-called ideal-
istic elements in the human constitution.••46 
Counts47 tells of the repeated propagation by German 
teachers of history of the doctrine that democracy is shown by 
history and the findings of racial science to be the "political 
form of the racial decline of a creative people." The 
contemporary attaclc upon democracy is militant and 
inspired. It has assumed the features of a crusading 
faith •••.• It rejects peace as an ideal and glorifies 
war and conquest, raising imperialistic adv~nture to 
the level of the paramount national virtue.48 
4 3 • Lo c • c it • 
44. FAC, 11. 
45. Ibid. 
46. FAC, 35. 
47. PAD,' 4-5. 
48. Ibid. 
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The phase of Communism with which Dewey is least able tc 
sympathize is its "emphasis upon the necessity of class vvar and 
of world revolution by violence," 49 and its insistence that any 
means is justified by the end desired.5° He believes: 
Few Communists are really aware of the far-reaching 
implications of the doctrine that civil war is the only 
method by which revolutionary economic and political 
changes can be brought about. A comparatively simple 
social structure, such as that which Russia had, may be 
able to recover from the effects of violent internal 
disturbance. And Russia, it must be remembered, had 
the weakest middle class of any major nation. Were a 
large scale revolution to break out in highly indus-
trialized America where the middle class is stronger, 
more militant and better prepared than anywhere else 
in the world, it would either be abortive, drowned in 
a blood bath, or if it were victorious would win only 
a Pyrrhic victory.51 
Dewey declares himself an "unalterable opponent of Fas-
cism in every form."52 Its absolutism is set against the plur-
alism which he holds necessary for the progress of society;53 
its authoritarianism has no place for the experimental inquiry 
that is at the heart of Dewey's system; it suppresses all liber-
al and democratic tendencies. When Dewey was in Japan he was 
told that previous to the publication of the Constitution in 
1889 the title "Son of Heavenn had been used only with reference 
to dead emperors. In the Constitution, which is of comparatively 
recent date, the deification of the living ruler occurs for the 
first time. Dewey knew that this deliberate use of religious 
49. CAE, 430. Cf. FAi, 79. 
50. Dewey , Art.(l934) ,89. 
51. Ibid.,90. 
52. Ibid., 89. 
53. CAE, 726. 
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myth was calculated to prevent the growth of democratic ideas.5 
Dewey believes that the future of democracy is "allied 
with the spread of the scientific attitude."55 The latter is 
the onlY- guarantee against misleading propaganda and the only 
"assurance of the possibility of a public opinion intelligent 
enough to meet present social problems•o"56 There is irony in 
the fact that "the theory which has made the most display and 
the greatest pretense of having a scientific foundation," (re-
ferring to Marxism), should most consistently violate every 
principle of scientific method. From . this contradiction is to 
be learned the "potential alliance between scientific and demo-
cratic method and the need of consummating this potentiality in 
the technique of legislation and administration."57 
Dewey would not claim that any existing democracy has 
ever made adequate use of scientific method, but 
freedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, free-
dom of communication, the distribution of what is 
found out to every individual .as the ultimate intel~ 
lectual consumer, are invQlved in the democratic as 
in the scientific method.?8 
These characteristics are sadly lacking in totalitarianism. 
Hook says that to speak of t he German and Russian "four- and 
~ive-year plans as scientific experiments is to speak a bloody 
jest," for their basic objectives were "laid down by a minority 
54. CAE, 166. 
55. FAC, 148. 
56. FAC, 148-149. Cf. C6hen,Art.(l934),100. 
57. FAC, 101. 
58. FAC, 101-102. 
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party dictatorship, and submitted for formal approval after ev-
ery voice of opposition had been stilled by terror.rr59 
3. RECONSTRUCTION OF DEMOCRACY. 
Democracy is on the defensive against totalitarianism. 
Dewey thinks this may be the best thing that could happen to 
the ideal of democracy.60 It may force democracy to change frorr 
a "vague optimism, a weak benevolent . aspiration, at the mercy of 
favorable circumstances 11 to a 11 compaet, aggressive and realistic 
intelligence directing circumstance '~ u61 It may lead to a grasp 
of the reasons for the failure of democracy and to steps that 
bring about "that type of social organization that will encour-
age the soci~lized extension of intelligence." 62 
Problems in the age of t he airplane are being dealt 
with by means of the political machinery of the stage-coach per-
iod, says Dewey.63 He accuses this generation of having taken 
democracy for granted, of ·having thought and acted as if 
our forefathers had founded it once for all. We have 
forgotten that it has to be enacted anew in every gen-
eration, in every year and day in the living relations 
of person to person in all social forms and institu-
. tions. Forgetting this we have allmved our economic 
and hence our political institutions to drift away from 
democracy; we have been negligent even in creating a 64 school that should be the constant nurse of democracy. 
59. JDIP, 59 • 
60. CAE, 726. 
61. Ibid. 
62. LSA, 53. 
63. Eth, 392. Cf. Ba~nes, ST, 653· 
6 4. Dewey , Art • ( 19 37 ) , 2 38. 
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The present situation with reference to democracy calls 
for change, for revision in traditions of democracy, in early 
theory, in its extent, and methods. 
The problem is complicated, holds Dewey, because of 
"underlying persistent attitudes," formed by traditions, customs 
and institutions 11 which existed 'vhen there "las no democracy. n65 
He thinks there should be no attempt to "minimize the novelty of 
the democratic order, nor the scope of the change it requires in 
old and long cherished tradi tiona. "66 Much of the difficulty 
seems to him to be due to "traditional ideas which make the in-
dividual and the state ready-made entities in themselves."67 
Dewey claims that doctrines of political democracy 
1
1 served their purpose well--a "particular local pragmatic need 11 ; 
however, this very adaptation to immediate circumstances often 
unfitted them to 
meet more enduring and more extensive needs. They lived 
to cumber the political ground, obstructing progress, all 
the more so because they were uttered and held not as 
hypotheses with which to dirggt social experimentation 
but as final truths, dogmas. 
One of the chief weaknesses in democratic theory, be-
l lieves, Dewey, has been the failure to recognize economic issues 
and to lead to economic democracy. 69 He states: 
As long as those who wish to preserve intact certain 
6 5 • F AC , 17 3 • 
66. FAC, 163. 
67. RPH, 209. 
68. PP, 145-146. 
69. ETH, 393-394. 
-=t ____  Cf. Brightman, Art.(l938),273· 
168 
'I 
------
'I 
II 
!I 
=r privileges;, of which they have become possessed, suc-cessfully prevent the recognition of the presence of economic questiops, the workings of professedly dem-
ocratic governments will be so crude and one-sided as 
to give ground for attack on the whole democratic idea 
in politics.70 
I 
The idea of democracy is wider and fuller than' can be 
I 
J ' 'exemplified in the state even at its best.n71' If democracy is 
II to be realized it must "affect all modes of human association, 
I 
the family, the school, industry, religion. "72 The struggle for 
democracy, says Dewey 1 ''has to be maintained on as many fronts 
II as culture has aspects: political, economic, internation~l, edu-
1 cational, scientific and artistic, religious. n73 
Prasad urges the connection between international and 
economic aspects of democracy, when he says: 
It is only through international regulation that 
we can now hope to4integrate economic with politi-cal organization.7 
The experience of the last hundred and fifty years 
demonstrates that popular government is only the 
super-structure of democracy and that its foundations 
must be laid deep in instructed intelligence, world 
peace and economic well-being.75 
With reference to the need for revision in methods if 
democracy is to survive, Dewey believes that America's battle 
I for democracy is to be fought not in Europe but within her own 
1
1 
institutions and attitudes. It can be won on1y by extending 
I 
~1---
170. ETH, 397. Cf. Childs, Art.(l939),443. 
71. PP, 145. 
72. Ibid. 
73. FAC, 173. 
74. DP, 176. 
75. DP, 202. 
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the application of democratic methods, methods of con-
sultation, persuasion, negotiation, communication, coop-
erative intelligence, in the task of making our own poli-
tics, industry, education, our culture generally, a serv-
ant and an evolving manifestation of democratic ideas. 
Resort to military force is a first sure sign that we 
are giving up the struggle for the democratic way of 
life, and that the Old World has conquered morally as 
well as geographically--eucceeding in imposing upon us 
its idea]s and methods.7o 
Hook, in his John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait, sums 
up conditions needed for ''true democracy 11 as 
opportunity for continuous employment, wide social se-
curity, democratic participation of producers and con-
sumers not only in government but in economic life, an 
open educational career to all children, encouragement 
complete freedom ' of scientific inquiry, the pooling of 
telligence to plan for a public W§lfare upon- which can 
built independent personal lives;r7 
of 
in-
be 
Dewey expressed himself as skeptical of the idea that bei 
cause present democracy is not what it should be genuine democ- I 
I 
racy can be produced by "sweeping away what we have left of I! 
one. "78 The idea that social and economic reform 11 can be effectl 1 
i ed only by a period of a class dictatorship in :which democracy 
1 is abrogated11 is quite different from: 
the position that the democratic end and ideal demands 
for its Q!ill adequate realization a pretty thoroughgoing 
change in the economic structure of society, ,one to be 
brought about by democratic methods and not by means 
of suppression of democracy.79 
To Dewey 1 t is sheer defeatism to "assume- in advance of II 
actual trial that democratic political institutions are irtcapabl~ 
1
77. 
78. 
1 79. 
I 
FM, ~5. Cf. FM, ~. 
JDIP, 232. 4 Dewey, Art. ( 1937) , 238. 
Dewey, Art.(l938),71-72. 
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~ither of further development or of constructive social applica-
11 :ion. nBO There is an old s·eying that the cure for the ills of 
jl I democracy is more democracy. Dewey observes that this is not 
apt if it means that the evils may be "remedied by introducing 
more machinery of the same kin-d as that which already exists, 
or by refining and perfecting that machinery. n 8l He sees it as 
apt only if it 
indicates the need of returning to the idea itself, 
of clarifYing and deepening oun apprehension of it, 
and of employing our sense of its meaning to c§~ti­
cize and re-make its polit·ical manifestations. 
Democracy, holds Childs,83 cannot remain a democratic 
society · unless it seeks to make adjustments by "inquiry, discus-
sion, conference, and the principle of majority rule." He cred-
its Dewey with having tried to organize the school so as to give 
actual experience in the process of making adjustments by such 
methods.84 Dewey, himself, says that he ean think of no ques-
tion of greater importance than the question as to how schools 
of today are to "render the idea of democracy a living and ef-
fective reality in the minds of the youth who form the future 
citizenship of the country." 85 
Whitehead expresses himself as believing that the 
80. LSA, 85. 
81. pp, 144. 
82. Ibid. Cf. PP, 146-147. 
83. Childs, Art.(l939),443. 
84. Ibid. 
85. Dewey, Art.(l938),72. Cf~ DE, 101. 
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condition of a successful democratic society is that general ed-
ucation should give a philosophic outlook. 86 Philosophy's gift 
he continues, 
are insight and foresight, and a sense of the worth of 
life, in short, that sense of importance which nerves 
all civilized effort. Mankind can flourish in the low-
er stages of life with merely barbaric flashes of 
thought. But when civilization culminates, the ab-
sence of a coordinati:p.g philosophy of life, spread 
throughout the community, spegls decadence, boredom; 
and the slackening of effort. 7 
Dewey believes that democracy is to be developed only 
by slow diffusion--by the "slow day by day adoption and conta:- . 
gious diffusion in every phase· of our common life of methods 
that are identical with the ends to be reached. u88 He harks 
back to foundations89 of democracy, in saying that American 
democracy can 
serve the world only as it demonstrates in the conduct 
of its own lif~ the efficacy of plural, partial, and 
experimental methods in securing and maintaining an 
ever-increasing release of the powers of human nature, 
in service of a freedom which is co-operative and a 
co-operation which is voluntary.90 
He likens the democratic method to the simplicity, yet difficul 
ty of the "energetic, unflagging, unceasing creation of an 
ever-present new road upon which we can walk together."91 In 
other words, democracy needs to be regnforced by scientific 
86. AI, 125. 
87. Ibid. 
88. FAC, 175-176. 
89. Supra,_ p. 157, 
90. FAC, - 175-176. 
91. F AC , 17 6 • 
Cf. Laski, DC, 162. 
n. 13. 
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method and experimental intelligence.92 
Dewey says that if democracy is on trial in reality it 
is collective intelligence that is on trial.93 He believes: 
\vha t stands 
tions, moth-e 
stitute duty 
predatory se 
ning in intell 
platitudes; st 
individualism 
nism, and real 
order, chance 
planned use of 
n our way is a lot of outworn tradi-
slogans and catchwords, that do sub-
thought, as well as oun entrenched 
interest. We shall make a real begin-
gent thought when we cease mouthing 
cpnfirting our idea· to antitheses of 
socialism, capitalism and commu-
ze that the issue is between chaos and 
control: the haphaz~~d use and the 
scientific techniques. 
Dewey joins numerous present-day writers in urging the 
need for trained erts rather than politicians to handle many 
ent are such matter as 
sanitation, lie health, healthful and adequate 
housing, tran ortation, planning of cities, regula-
tion and distr · tion of immigrants, selection and 
management of rsonnel, right methods of instruction 
and preparat 1 of competent teachers, scientific . ad-
justment of5t ation, efficient management of funds, and so on.9 
Such 
facts~.-an inquiry 
ly equipped'' and t 
for their utilizat 
as these are to be settled by inquiry 
can be carried on only by those "especi 
results of which need trained technicians 
Barnes, al , believes that the opinion of a trained 
expert is "likely have greater validity than the concensus of 
92. LSA, 92. Cf. 
93. PHC, 327. Cf. 
94. PHC, 328. Cf. 
95. PP, 124-125. 
' 79. 
' 126. 
itehead, AI, 126. 
f. Boodin, Art.(l939),110. 
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millions of uninformed and intellectually incompetent voters";97 
and that reconstructed democracy will fail to function effective 
ly unless it "makes provision for expert guidance amidst the 
mazes of contemporary opinion.'~98 Barnes sees the great problem 
in the reconstruction of democracy as that of effecting a harmo-
ny of expert control with "some guarantee of political freedom 
and public supervision."99 
Dewey, similarly, believes experts should not relieve 
the masses of responsibility. 100 The latter's responsibility 
is to 11 inform the experts as to their needs 11 ; and to force them 
to take account of these needs • The_ world, holds :~ Dewey, has 
"suffered more from leaders and authorities than from the mass• 
es.nlOl The essential need is to improve methods and condi-
tion-s of discussion and persuasion. That is 
the problem of the public •.••• Inquiry ••. devolves 
upon experts. But their expertness is not shown 
in framing and executing policies, but in discov-
ering and making known the facts upon which the 
former depend ••••• rt is not necessary that the 
many should have the knowledge and skill to carry 
on the needed investigations; what is required is 
that they have the ability to judge of the bearing 
of the knowledge supplied by others upon common 
concerns.102 
It is possible to develop _~ffeetive intelligence on the 
part of the public, thinks Dewey, for no matter ··what differences . 
97. ST, 653-654 . 
. 98. Ibid. . 
99. Ibid. 
100. PP, ,208. Cf. PP, 177-179. 
101. Ibid. 
102. PP, 208-209. Cf. Bryce, MD, II,l61. 
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there may be in native intelligence "the actuality of mind is 
dependent upon the education which social conditions effect.ulO~ 
Here is seen once more Dewey's theory that knowledge is gained 
from action, from operations of doing and making. He believes 
that the prime condition of democracy is a kind of 11 knowledge 
and insight which does not yet exist."104 This knowledge is 
like a tool which is "evolved and perfected only in opera-
tion.-ul05 
103. PP, 209. 
104. pp' 166 : ~ 
105. PP, 167. Cf. LOG, 160. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
EVALUATION 
As was stated in the introductory chapter the chief mo-
tive for considering tradition and change in John Dewey's socia 
philosophy was to interpret his views in relation to transition 
and reconstruction within the Chinese Republic. In this chap-
ter tradition and change in China will receive brief considera-
tion. This will be followed by an evaluation of Dewey's thought 
on tradition and change and by conclusions reached in the en-
tire study. 
1. TRADITION AND CHANGE IN CHINA. 
Dewey's affection and admiration for the Chinese ·people 
has been noted above as has the fact that, after his own, China 
1 is the country nearest his heart. Doubtless . one reason for 
his feeling of nearness to China is his view of an underlying 
similarity between China and America and the remarkable manner 
in which many background -conceptions of Chinese thought tend to 
coincide with Dewey's thought. 
People of the West are accustomed to think of China as, 
1. Supra, p.22,n.30. 
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for centuries, the exampl:~ par excellence of conservatism. vlhile 
I 
this is largely true it is just as true that conservatism is 
neither native nor natural to China. Dewey attributes China's 
period of conservatism to an "inelastic system of memoriter edu 
cation in a dead language." 2 
China's earliest philosophy was .::founded on the Yin and 
the Yang, the dual principles of change. Monroe3 observes the 
striking fact that in the primitive philosophy of the "most en-
during and stable of all human societies" supposed to be hos-
tile to change, rather than in the changing West, there is I 
I found this "fundamental principle of constant change, or revolu 
tion, resulting in a creative evolution." 
China's habits of life and thought are democratic. 
While her democracy had the seeming. weakness of being centered 
in local units, a handicap in her contact with an aggressive 
modern world, this type of organization can be shown to have 
been of value to China. Cliina's democratic spirit, observes 
Dewey, has been historically manifest in the "absence of classe · , 
the prevalence of social and civil equality, the control of in-
dividuals and groups by moral rather than physical force. 114 Hu 
Shih5 states that the social and cultural movements in China 
during the past twenty years have been "on · the whole unmistakab 
2. Dewey, Art.(l920)1,381. 
3. CNE, 81. 
4. CAE, 293. 
5. Hu, Art.(l936),738. 
-====*-=-------------=========== -----
in the direction of liberalism and democracy" and he believes 
that China may be "one of the last strongholds of liberalism in 
the world. 11 
It is Lin Yutang's conviction that even if 
a cataclysmic upheaval like a communistic regime 
should come, the old tradition of individuality, 
toleration, moderation .and common sense will break 
Communism and change it beyond recognition.6 . 
He goes on to say that a communistic state in which the human 
individual is regarded as but a member of a class or a state or-
ganism fails to make an appeal to China; and a "fascist China 
would have a hard time persuading the Chinese gentleman that the 
strength of the nation is more import~~t than the welfare of the 
individual. "7 
Tang announces China's political objective to be that of 
providing, "under a Republican Government, the greatest good for 
the greatest number of our citizens, 11 and her international ob-
jective that of living at peace with all the world.s 
Watchwords of the hour in China are resistance to aggres 
sion and reconstruction. Even in the midst of war the recon-
struction that began with the establishment of the Chinese Repub 
lic ·is being carried forward. All the old standards of China as 
well as the newer ones of the West are "challenged and subjected 
to critical test.n9 RandalllO tells of a Chinese student of 
6. MCI>ll', 76. 
7 . Ibid • , 113 • 
8. Tang , Art.(l937),88. 
9. Monroe, CNE, 280. 
10. Randall, Art.(l939),93-94. 
l75 
Dewey who understood Dewey's experimentalism to mean that "the 
slate must be wiped clean for a fresh start." This student 
thought that the Chinese past was entirely mistaken and to be 
forgotten, while men used the scientific method in developing 
for China "all those values which Dewey has found as the perma-
nent deposit of the Christian and individualistic West. 11 The 
Chinese student did not realize that Dewey's intention was that 
he should use experimentalism in "dealing with his own inherited 
materials," that Dewey stands for reconstruction of tradition 
rather than destruction. Others have had the experience of f 
ing Dewey occasionally so misinterpreted in China. 
Monroe was impressed with Sun Yat-Sen's "respect for the 
past of Cninese culture and his attempt to preserve in the pres-
ent transition some of the fundamental merits of the old order," 
and considered this trait one of the chief merits of his sys-
tem.ll Especially does Monroe approve of his adding examining 
and inspecting functions to the Western leg islative, judicial 
and executive functions of government. Sun was well within the 
cultural traditions of his race in insisting that the essential-
ly sound principle of examining be revived in modernized form. 
Of the inspecting function Monroe states: 
The inspecting or censoring function ..... has the 
sanction of ancient custom in China. For two thousand 
years the Imperial organization maintained, perhaps in.;,;. 
termittently, some form of a board of censors whose du-
ty it was to see that government was carried out 
11. CNE, 272-273· 
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efficlently ••.•• The need of such a function even in 
the West is indicated by the numerous congressional 
and legislative investigation committees.I2 
The New Life Movement, originated by Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek a few years ago, is an attempt to recover for 
China some of her greatness when the four virtues of Li, I, =L=i~1 
and Chih were practiced. Madame Chiang13 says: 
It has become obvious. that mere accumulation of 
wealth is not sufficient to enable China to resume 
her position as a great nation. There must be also 
revival of the sp irit, since spiritual values tran-
scend mere material riches. 
Li stands for courtesy, I for duty or service, Lien for a demar 
cation of rights and their limits, and Chih for highmindedness 
and honor.l4 Attempts have been made at turning these ideals 
into realities by applying them first "to the universal and in-
dispensable facts of life'' ... .,. . food, clothing , shelter and con-
duct.l5 
While the New Life Movement is usually deemed a needed 
and beneficial reconstruction of tradition it must be admitted 
that it has not had the support of the Chinese leader who has 
been closest to Dewey -- Hu Shih, the present ambassador to the 
United States. He looks upon it as a ''reactionary and passing 
mood," affected by European totalitarianism in its use of such 
slogans as "revival of our glorious past" and "cultural 
12 • CNE , 190. 
13. Chiang , Art.(l935),355· 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid., 357. 
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reconstruction on the basis of the revival of an indigenous civ-
ilization.nl6 
Cnina, says Dewey, has "evolved, not borrowed" her civ~ 
ilization. Her problem is one of "transformation, of making 
over from within."l7 When Dewey visited in China he came to 
feel that the Chinese must be g iven time. The Taoist idea of 
non-doing , a doctrine of "active patience, endurance, persist-
ence while nature has time to do her work" is "at the root of 
their laissez-faire, contented, tolerant, pacific, humorous and 
good-humored attitude toward life." He noted that the Chinese 
have learned to "wait for the fruition of slow, natural process-
es." 18 
That China's evolution has been a gradual one, averse to 
change by violence and force is shown in her upholding the gov-
ernment of virtue, which, say s Hsi1, "is a government by moral 
1 influence, by positive example, by reason and justice, while 
government by force is the negation of these principles.rrl9 
While it is well known that ancient China revered the 
scholar it is not commonly known that it is intelligence of a 
practical sort that has had the highest respect in China. Lin 
says that in China "real leadership is conceived as a leadership 
of the mind, u20 and Chinese respect for the scholar is based on 
16. Hu, Art.(l936),738. 
17. CAE, 287 . 
18. CAE, 205-206. 
19. PPC, 45. 
20. MCMP. 77 . 
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a respect for that "type of education which increases his prac-
tical wisdom, his knowledge of world affairs, and his judgment 
in times of crisis."21 
Peterson writes of the intelligence of the Chinese, at-
tributing. it to reasons quite in accord with Dewey's conception 
of intelligence as experimental inquiry. He states: 
Perhaps the most intelligent race in the world to-
day is the Chinese, yet very few of them can read or 
write or cipher. This intelligence has come through 
observation, imitation, native ability to reflect and 
judge and create, and a marvelous technique in the use2 of the hands ceveloped through ages of craftsmanship. 2 
It is thus seen that China offered a fertile field for 
the cultivation of Dewey's social philosophy. The question of 
the adequacy of his theories on tradition and change for China, 
as for other groups, is now to be considered. 
2. EVALUATION. 
It has been noted above23 that Dewey evaluates tradi-
tion or institutions .:o and attitudes thereto on the basis of the 
following three criteria: (1) Traditions are subject to recon-
struction to meet changing needs. (2) This reconstruction 
should come as an evolution. (3) Social progress is secured by 
experimental inquiry, or intelligence. 
The chief phases of Dewey's thought will now be reviewe 
21. Lac. cit. Cf. Bryce, MD,II,510. 
22. CR, xvi-xvii. 
23. Supra, p.l05. 
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I with an evaluation of each. Some of Dewey's theories relative 
1
1 to tradition and change, internal and external change, and ends 
l or values will be reviewed under reconstruction; main theories 
with regard to continuity and progress and means of change will 
be reviewed under evolution; theories on knowledge, the test of 
new insight and scientific method, under experimental inquiry. 
Dewey is rightly opposed to the Either-Or type of reason-
I 
1 ing that, failing to see the organic relation between tradition 
I and change, would set one over against the other. He agrees 
with Whitehead24 who holds that the spirit of change and the 
spirit of conservatism are inherent in the very nature of things 
and that there can be nothing real without both. For Dewey tra-
ditions are indispensable; 25 however, they are to be employed,26 
not just treated with respect. Dewey's chief problems have 
dealt with the reconstruction of tradition to mee~ present sit-
uations,27 for tradition tends to perpetuate the status guo and 
obstruct insight into actual condi tiona. A ·number of examples 
of his reconstruction of tradition, most of which are to be ap-
proved, are given in preceding chapters of this dissertation. 
The more deeply significant of these, for the present, would 
seem to be the needed reconstruction of economic liberty as 
24. SMW, 281-282. 
25. Supra, p.l06,n.6. 
26. Dewey, Art.(l929),330. 
27. Supra, p.9,n.23. Cf. p.50,n.3 • 
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laissez-fairs in the direction of a planned:. economy, 28 that 
cares for the needs of all by way of providing employment and 
opportunities for the growth of every individual; the recon-
structio~ of international relations so that the approach is no 
longer rooted in political organization but in common ends and 
interests, organization· for more effective human association an 
intercourse; 29: and the enactment anew of democracy to meet the 
challenge of conditions that have recently, in many lands, pro-
duced totalitarianism. 
Some change is internal, or personal, some is external, 
or environmental. Dewey is not wholly ~onsistent in what he 
says as to the relative significance of these two - factors, nor 
in the importance assigned the individual, the person. On the 
one hand he opposes behaviorism and insists that a change in I 
mentality is the most significant and most practically effective 
of changes, that social change needs psychological and moral 
I foundations; on the other hand he tends to obscure the place of 
1
,, 
mind in change in the interests of change in objective arrange-
1 menta and institutions.30 In one connection31 Dewey explains 
1 that what is really objectionable to him in 'subjectivism' is 
I 
the emphasis of change made in the person rather than in the 
environment in which he lives. Change in the latter involves 
28. Supra, p.l41. 
29. Supra, p.152. 
30. Supra, pp.60-64; p.l22,n.78,n.80. 
31. QC, 275-276. 
I 
I 
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change in the former but there is a "radical difference between 
a change in the self that is cultivated and valued as an end, 
and one that is a means to alteration, through action, of objec 
tive conditions." 
This raises the question as to Dewey's concern for per-
sonality. His earlier view seems to be that of personalism but 
gradually naturalism has tended to obscure the intrinsic value 
of persons.32 Thilly33 states that Dewey does nQt carry natura] 
ism to its logical, materialistic conclusion because of his 
abiding faith in human nature. His concern for the individual 
is shown when he makes the test of political institutions and 
industrial arrangements their contribution to the "all-round 
growth of every member of society." 34 But it must be said that 
Dewey does not give a satisfactory account of the part played 
by the self, or personality, in change. 
Dewey's main theories with relation to the ends of so-
cial process and values center around the absence of fixed ends 
and of intrinsic values. Ends and means are interrelated; in-
trinsic and instrumental values are not to be separated. Ends, 
ideals and values are developed in the process of inquiry. 
Means have the moral value attached to ends.35 The chief mer-
' its in this part of Dewey s system are the fact that ends grow, 
intelligence is critical of ends and means, and means, as well 
32. Supra, p.45; pp.l55-l56. 
33. Thilly, Art.(l926),532. 
34. Supra, p.l07,n.l2. Cf. p.l36,n.l49. 
35. Supra, pp.72ff. 
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as ends, have moral value. It has already been indicated that 
Dewey is not consistent in his rejection of ideals. He dis-
claims. them, yet sets :':them up. He finds universals an obstacle 
yet values them and he lists goods ideal in character, although 
opposed to lists of values.36 
It has been noted above37 that the greatest amount of 
criticism of Dewey has been due to his unwillingness to set 
goals for the social process. While there is the question as . 
to whether the method Devrey stresses is not more important than 
the conclusion reached, the former cannot really be worked v.rit 
out "intended conclusions',~38 and ''proposed objective conse-
quences,n39 however hypothetical they may be. Experience shou 
yield standards and goals of a fairly definite nature, however 
open they may be to criticism on the basis of further exper-
ience. Society needs th.e guidance of such fruits of experience 
Here, again, Dewey's practice is better than his theory for he 
does not leave his system entirely without a "frame of refer-
ence, u40 and an "ideal. of change, n41 ·indefinite as he aims to b 
Dewey's chief thesis with regard to the means of change 
is sound. There should be gradual evolution rather than change 
brought about by violence and revolution. To those who fear t 
slowness of evolution gives it no chance in the series of crise 
36. Supra, pp.72ff. 
37. Supra, pp.79ff. 
38. QC, 20. 
39. LOG, 500. 
4o. Dewey, Art.(l937)4,238. 
41. DEi 94. 
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facing the world of today, Dewey would say that the more criti-
cal the situation the more gradual should be the plans and poli-
cies worked out to meet it.42 It has been discovered that in 
some situations Dewey takes a radical view of change and demands 
a "right-about-face," a change of path as the only possible road 
to progress. 43 Where it is impossible for progressive evolution 
to bring about needed change or where palliative measures are 
substituted for a solution of basic difficulties it would seem 
that more radical measures are rightly needed. 
In other connections, however, Dewey says that there is 
inescapable linkage of the present with the past, that change is 
never total nor miraculous. It is impossible to create a tabula 
rasa. There are changes and they are cumulative in nature.44 
This brings up the question of biological features of change and 
their strength. While for Dewey inquiry is biological as well 
as cultural, at times he does not seem to give sufficient weight 
to sucll biological factors as habit, heredity and physical want, 
which tend to work against speedy change.45 
Sometime·s Dewey's idea of progress is that of readjust-
ment to circumstances46 while again it is a matter of modifica-
tion of environment and intelligent direction of circumstance. 47 
Dewey believes that the chief means of continuous social progres 
42. Supra, p.11,n.32. 
43. Supra, p.l54, et al. 
44. Supra, pp.90-91. 
45. Supra, p.l2,n.38; p.34,n.l5. 
46. Supra, p.lOO,n.l60. 
47. Supra, p.l67,n.61. 
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is to be found in educating youth to modify prevailing types of 
thought and desire. 48 The soundness of :this theory depends up 
there being an ideal of society and the kind of ideal set. To-
talitarian states, also, stress the education of youth to modi-
fy prevailing thought and desire and according to a definite 
ideal not approved by democracies. · 
Experimental inquiry is at the heart of Dewey's thought 
and experimentalism is the preferred designation of his philoso-
phy.49 Its opposition to absolutism is commendable as is the 
linkage of facts and ideas in the obtaining of knowledge. But, 
as has been indicated above, 50 a theory that sees in knowledge 
no intrinsic value, that makes of it a mere instrument is inade-
quate and dangerous to the interests of truth. This is true if 
the test of the truth of new insight is pragmatic rather than 
the test of coherence. Usually Dewey appears to accept the fo 
er test, but there are times when he calls for coherence in the 
outcome.51 
Experimental inquiry, or intelligence is identified wit 
scientific method.52 The true and final source of change is 
said to be the corporate intelligence embodied in science.53 
Questions have been raised as to whether Dewey is not too 
48. Supra, p . . 122. 
49. Supra, p.29. 
50. Supra, p .84; p. 39. 
51. Supra, P-P • 39-4o • 
52. Supra, p.42; p.l03, ~t al. 
53- Supra, p.l43,n.l83. 
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optimistic as to the power of science,54 the while a scientific 
habit of mind is to be valued and cultivated. 11 Methodology," or 
an over-confidence in science and the scientific method has been 
listed as a weakness in his position.55 Dewey tends to set this 
method up as an absolute value instead of submitting it to the 
test of experiment and further insight. A similar dogmatism was 
found in his evaluation of the church and religion.56 
Dewey's fondness for Plato strikes a chord of response. 
He would like to see a "Back to Plato" movement in philosophy. 
To be sure he would have it back 
to the dramatic, restless, co-operatively inquiring 
Plato of the Dialogues, trying one mode• -of attack af-
ter another to see what it might yield; back to the 
Plato whose highest fli ght of metaphysics always term-
inated with a social and practical turn, and not to the 
artificial Plato constructed by unimaginative commenta-
tors who treat him as the original university profes-
sor.57 
Dewey rightly sees in the democratic method similarities 
to the method of experimental inquiry in its likeness to the un-
ceasing creation of an ever-present new road. Dewe;y can but be 
admired for the steady way in which he still builds that road, 
although he is now eighty years of age and has admitted to mo-
mente of relaxation -~ when the desire to be 11 relieved from the con 
tinual claim of the world in which we live that we be up and do-
ing something about it, seems irresistible.rr58 
p.58,n.40; pp.83-84, et al. 
p.82. 
pp-.113ff. 
Art • ( 19 30) , 21. 
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ABSTRACT 
I 
The selection of the problem of tradition and change in 
in China, where his influence has been pronounced. 
After a treatment of environmental (American and for-
eign), academic and personal influences on Dev1ey' a social 
thought tradition and change are related to the social process 
--the ends of the process and means of attaining them. This is 
followed by an application of his theories on tradition and 
change to institutions--the family, school, church, political 
I 
I and economic institutions, international relations, and democ-
l\ racy. 
I 
i Dewey uses the word "tradition" to include institutions, 
II 
! 
customs and beliefs. Tradition.s are indispensable; however, 
they need constant reconstruction. Change should be in the lin 
of this continuous reconstruction. Change is inevitable but it 
may be measured and controlled in such a way as to lead . to pro- J 
posed objective consequences. 
Change is both internal and external, or personal and 
environmental. Dewey's position on :the relative importance o:f 
these factors of change is not wholly consistent. While his 
philosophy is naturalistic he disavows behaviorism of the Wat-
sonian type. He believes social change needs psychological and 
moral foundations but tends to place the greater stress on 
I 
~09. 
I 
·---- 1 
. -- 1--· 
~natitut _ional and environmental factors. 
. \\ It is the interpenetration of tradition and change that 
I makes social process possible. There is continuity in the 
process, involving forces and structures that endure through 
change, but continuity is not a bare repetition of identities. 
I It is an evolution that has place for emergence, making progress 
I 
I 
I 
,I 
I 
I 
possible. 
As a liberal Dewey places his faith in gradual evolu-
tion. He is opposed to violence as a method of change, maintain! 
ing that the more critical the situation the more gradual should 
be the execution of plans and policies. 
The ends and means of social process are interrelated 
are, also, intrinsic and instrumental values •· Dewey does not 
succeed in rejecting altogether ends-in-themselves and intrinsic 
values, although that is his intention, since definite goals 
seem to him a limit to change. Dewey looks upon means and in-
strumental values as having the moral significance attached to 
ends and intrinsic values. Failure to recognize their moral 
scientific habit of mind. It signifies apposition to absolutism. 
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I 
and system-making, and is the method of obtaining knowledge 
through a combination of theory and practice, of fact and idea. 
For Dewey knowledge has no intrinsic value. It is developed in 
process and is instrumental to further steps in the process~ 
The above yields three criteria on the basis of which 
Dewey evaluates traditions and attitudes thereto: they are sub-
ject to reconstruction to meet changing needs; this reconstruc-
tion should come as an evolution; and, fina~ly, social progress . 
is secured by experimental inquiry, or intelligence. 
I Dewey advocates changes in the family necessary to give 
I women freedom to make their contribution to civilization. In 
some countries the family as an institution -faces disintegratioJ 
because of its subordination to the state; in Cnina the old fam-1 
ily system is breaking up. Everywhere industrialization tends 
to disintegrate the traditional family, as do radical ideas on 
the desirability of permanent family ties. Dewey believes the 
family and local community must remain the basis of the Great 
Community. 
While Dewey's approach to institutions is, in the main, 
liberal his attitude ; toward the church is radical and dogmatic. 
He criticizes it for being the stronghold of vested interests, 
for a pride of knowing isolated from doing, and for isolation 
from ·social institutions--a situation ·resulting from faith in 
the "supernatural, 11 and for spiritual aristocracy. The church 
has declined in influence since the individual has grown in im- ' 
portance and since there has come the separation of church and 
2~1 
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state. Dewey calls for a recovery of the vitality of the church 
on the basis of religious values found in the seientific method. 
The school, holds Dewey, is to be criticized for con-
serving the past at the expense of needed reconstruction, incul-
eating fixed conclusions. instead of promoting habits of independJ 
ent thinking, emphasizing preparation for a remote future instea •_ 
of for present living, and giving utilitarian education to one 
class while a "higher" education is given another class, thus 
failing to train people how to live together. The school should 
be so reconstructed as to lead the mind into new fields and 
train the individual for participation in the life of society. 
Academic freedom should be maintained since the school offers 
the chief means of social change. 
The state does not have sanctity as an institution, 
claims Dewey. It is subordiate to its citizens and ever re-
quires re-making by them. The "public" has largely beenr- eclipse.d. 
by political party machinery. Political parties offer little 
prospect of progressive betterment to meet new social and econom 
ic needs. Dewey believes c:a new party, devoted to well defined 
land new political issues, is needed. 
I Political economy of the past was based on the idea that 
!regulation is interference; this laissez-faire theory is largely 
!responsible for economic maladjustment of the present. E~tensiv 
reform is necessary to meet problems of unemployment, low stand-
ards of living, and industrial inefficiency. A return to 11 nor-
lmalcy11 jj.nd social tinkering of a palliative nature fail to meet 
II 
--
the need. What is wanted is a proper combination of authority 
and freedom that will preserve liberal ideas while allowing a 
planned economy. 
International relations are in a deplorable state be-
cause attempts to solve them have been made on the basis of po-
litical needs and interests rather than economic necessities, 
from the standpoint of the legal mind, concerned with defence 
and litigation.rather than of the social mind, devoted to prob-
lems of human association. Dewey is committed to the outlawry 
of war. 
In the face of crises ·due to the decline of democracy 
and the rise of totalitarianism, Dewey expresses himself as un-
alterably opposed to the violence and absolutism of Communism 
and all forms of Fascism. He puts faith in democracy and the 
democratic method of social progress, while insisting that de-
mocracy needs to be enacted anew in this and every generation. 
His chief contention is that where democracy has failed that 
failure is due to its being limited to politics and not being 
extended to all modes of human association. 
Conclusions reached are as follows: 
(1) Dewey appreciates tradition and the instrumental 
~alue of the past for inquiry; however, tradition, institutions, 
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tradition from change, permanence from flux, continuity from 
discreteness, the individual from society. 
(3} Dewey's view is to be commended for the importance 
attached to intelligence, the insistence that change be evolu-
tionary, the idea that ends grow, and the recognition of moral 
value in the means of social process as well as in its ends. 
(4} There are such conf~sing inconsistencies in Dewey's 
thought as the follovting_: sometimes he emphasizes the personal 
factor in change as the more important, sometimes the environ-
mental factor; at times he tests the truth of new insight by 
the~ criterion of pragmatism, at times _by that of coherence; 
while opposed to absolutism he seems to make science and the 
scientific -:-- method ultimate; he dis.claims ideals yet sets them 
up; he finds universals an obstacle yet values them; he treats 
progress ,both as readjustment to and as modification of environ-
11 ment. 
( 5} Dewey's position is inadequate in that it treats 
knowledge and truth as of but instrumental value, it lacks cos-
mic support of values and fails to give the church and religion 
their merited place. 
(6} Such problems as the following are unsolved: the 
definite nature of the ends of action, the relative importance 
of method and conclusions, the part played by biological forces 
in social change, and the part that the self, or personality, 
plays in change. 
(7) While Dewey's theories of tradition and change are, 
21~ 
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.I 
on the whole, admirably adapted to a changing China, they need 
supplementation by a more constructive philosophy of personali-
ty and of the higher values of life. 
----==J:t::======= 
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